either in his own right or in right of his wife, should suggest to all parties concerned an inquiry as to the reason and occasion of this conveyance.

We are not referred to any case directly in point, and are not aware that any exists; but we believe the views above expressed are in harmony with reason and good sense, and not in conflict with any adjudged case. In Billings v. Collins, 44 Me. 271, it was held that the assignment of negotiable paper, by operation of a bankrupt or insolvent law, was not in the regular course of trade, and that the assignee could only acquire the rights of the insolvent. The opinion of the court is brief, simply announcing the result without adducing any argument in its support; but we have no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision. So far as it goes it supports our position in the present case.

For these reasons, after careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that this note was not taken in the regular course of business, and that the judgment of the court below upon that ground was erroneous and must be reversed.

In this opinion BUTLER, C. J., and FOSTER, J., concurred. PARK, J., was absent, and SEYMOUR, J., did not sit.

men.

The foregoing case is certainly one of considerable importance to business Two questions seem to arise. Whether the endorsement was so far bond fide and for valuable consideration as to exclude equitable defences. 2. Whether the transaction comes so far within the range of ordinary commercial usage in the negotiation of bills and notes as to transfer an absolute title to the endorsee, or only one in trust for the real and ultimate benefit of the endorser, thus making the endorsee a mere agent of the endorser, and by consequence conferring no higher or better title than he himself has.

In regard to the first question, there could be no question so far as the endorsement was for the benefit of the wife of the endorser, merely as wife. The wife might have stood in the same relation as other creditors, by reason of having made advances to her husband.

But nothing of that appears in this

case.

Her claim rests merely upon the relation of the parties, husband and wife, and the duties growing out of the relation. In this there is nothing of the nature of a valuable or pecuniary consideration. The consideration is good and ample to support any otherwise legal undertaking; but it is, after all, in the nature of a gift and must be postponed to the claims of creditors even; and could never be made the basis of an endorsement of negotiable securities, so as to exclnde equitable defences based upon actual fraud in the concoction of the instruments.

And although the portion of the secarity sequestered for the benefit of creditors may be said to rest upon the valuable consideration, it is certainly not in the ordinary course of commercial transactions in the use of negotiable paper. It is more of the nature of a

general assignment of one's estate for the benefit of creditors; more analogous to going into insolvency or bankruptcy, than carrying forward business in the ordinary course. It is common and entirely in the due course of business to endorse a note or bill in payment or as security for a pre-existing debt, and such an endorsement of negotiable paper, before due, will exclude equitable defences. The cases are collected and

classified in Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt.
569; and the note to Le Breton v.
Peirce, 1 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 35.
But when such an endorsement assumes
the form of a security for creditors
generally, it at once suggests a trust
for the benefit of the endorser, and
no court, we think, would, under such
circumstances, feel disposed to regard
the transaction as excluding equitable
defences.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

IN RE THOMAS U. RUTH.

A statute providing that no person shall sell intoxicating liquors without a permit, to be granted by the county judge, if on application he shall be satisfied that the applicant is a person "of good moral character," and that certain other requisites of the law are complied with, is constitutional.

THOMAS U. RUTH applied to the Circuit Court of Page county for permission to sell intoxicating liquors for medicinal, mechanical, sacramental, and culinary purposes: permission was refused, and thereupon he appealed to this court.

W. W. Morsman, for appellant.

No appearance contrà.

BECK, J.-By sections 1575-6 of the Revision, any citizen of the state, except hotel-keepers, keepers of saloons, eating-houses, grocery-keepers, and confectioners, were permitted to sell intoxicating liquors for mechanical, medicinal, culinary, and sacramental purposes, upon presenting to the county judge a certificate of twelve citizens of the township in which he resided that he was a man of good moral character, and a citizen of the county and state, and executing bond with sureties, and conditioned as therein prescribed. The duty of a person so authorized to sell liquors, and sundry regulations touching the same, are prescribed in these sections. These provisions are amended by chap. 128 of the Acts of the 12th General Assembly, which provides that upon application being made for the permission, a day shall be

fixed for the hearing, a notice thereof be given of the time and in the manner prescribed, and that any resident of the county may, on the day of final hearing, show cause against the allowance of the permission, which "shall be refused unless the county judge shall be fully satisfied that the requirements of the law have in all respects been fully complied with, that the applicant is a person of good moral character, and that taking into consideration the wants of the locality, and the number of permits already granted, such permit would be necessary and proper for the accommodation of the neighborhood." The application of appellant was rejected, as we gather from the abstract before us, on the ground that he was not a fit and proper person as contemplated by the law to receive the permission. No question is made upon this point. Counsel concede that appellant "does not possess the standard of morals contemplated by the statute." But it is argued that the law which limits the granting of permissions of this kind to persons of good moral character, is in conflict with the Constitution of the state and therefore void. The validity of no other provision of the statute is attacked. Counsel bases his argument upon article 1st, sect. 1st, of the Constitution, which declares that all men are equal and endowed with the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and sect. 6th of the same article, which forbids the General Assembly granting "to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." He argues that as intoxicating liquors are property, the General Assembly cannot restrict dealing in them for lawful purposes to any class of citizens-as to citizens of good moral character.

The breadth and design of these constitutional provisions, to secure equality of all and the enjoyment of property by all, are fully understood and as fully conceded. But the equality secured to the citizen cannot be exercised to the damage of the lives and property of others; neither can property be acquired, enjoyed, and disposed of to the peril of the lives, health, happiness, and property of others. The Constitution does not interfere with the police power of the state to protect the people in their lives, health, and property. The state is clothed with the power to prevent injury to these. See Constitution, Art. 1st, Sect. 1st. Gunpowder, nitro-glycerine, and other explosive agents are pro

perty, yet the state may confine traffic in them to certain classes of persons, and confine the storage to certain localities. Certain poisons are property, but the sale of them may be restricted to certain persons, namely, those having sufficient intelligence to know when they ought to be used, and of sufficient character for prudence to give assurance that these deadly agents will not be carelessly administered. So intoxicating liquors are deemed by the law, agents that are dangerous to the morals, health, and lives of the people, though useful for proper purposes; their sale in the hands of men not of good character would be abused, and the people suffer therefrom. A preventive restriction is thrown around their sale by permitting men of good moral character alone to deal in them. But counsel exclaim, Have not men of bad moral character the same rights as men of good morals? Undoubtedly all are equal before the law as to the rights of property. But no one has the right to deal in these liquors, so far as his own interests are concerned; but as the wants of the people for certain lawful purposes demand that some should be allowed to sell them, the privilege is granted to certain persons not because they have a right to sell the liquors, but because the wants of the people demand the sale should be authorized to some extent and they will be less likely to do injury than others who might be intrusted with the privilege. The sale of the liquors by all men of good morals is not permitted, and the law is not therefore intended, nor does it operate, to secure commerce in intoxicating liquors to all persons of that class. It has been found that the health and lives of the people demand that a few licensed persons be empowered to sell these liquors for lawful purposes, and that all others be forbidden to deal in them. Of those who are authorized, the law requires satisfactory proof of good moral character. In this respect it differs not from all license laws, which bestow privileges upon fit and proper persons making application therefor. These laws have always been sustained. The authorities cited by counsel are not in conflict with the foregoing views.

In our opinion the provision of the statute in question is not in conflict with the Constitution.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

The foregoing opinion certainly challenges attention, if not criticism.

VOL. XIX.-49

The statute of Iowa, after providing for the prohibition of sales of intoxi