When the committee deny that, "a power to create, implies a power to preserve," they are to be understood as denying the application of this principle, only by the case of creating corporations. A power to create a public office, necessarily implies a power to preserve that office: but a power to bestow a corporate franchise to carry on a private trade, is totally different from creating a public office; a distinction between the corporate franchise, and the business to be conducted under it, must be always borne in mind; the power that creates a corporate franchise, for private purposes, not only cannot preserve such franchise, but cannot new-model or impair it; its corporate character and existence, are as secure as the existence and personal rights of a natural person: but its trade and business, like the employments of natural persons, remain subject to regulation, by the local authorities, where it seeks to locate them. Thus a power in the states to tax, or even to prohibit a trade in bills of exchange, and gold and silver bullion, is not a power to destroy the corporate franchises of the bank of the United States. These corporate franchises remain, notwithstanding the exercise of this power, just as the existence and rights of an individual remain, though his business is taxed, or he is forbid to engage in certain employments. The government of the union have conferred upon the bank certain capacities, for engaging in trade: but it has not and cannot confer an absolute right and power to drive this trade, in

contempt of state laws. It is made capable, but not sovereign; its capacity must be examined, not with a single eye, to the supremacy of the power that created it; but with a whole view, of what that power could confer, and what it has conferred.

If the committee have succeeded in shewing, that the power which created the bank of the U States, is not supreme, in the sense of the two first propositions; but is limited in its powers and means of preserving the bank, so as to render the third proposition untenable, the fourth and fifth propositions, which are founded upon, and consequences derived from the other three, must necessarily be given up: As applied to the question under discussion, however, it has been shewn, that a power to tax their trade, is not a power to destroy the corporation. It is not perceived how a power to di minish the profits of labor and capital, by exacting a portion of their proceeds, for the support of gov ernment, can be construed into a power to destroy human life, and annihilate capital. The power of taxing the bank is denied, because it might be so used, as to prevent the corporation from deriving profitable trade, and this is deemed a power to destroy the charter, which did not originate the trade, but merely created a facility for conducting it.But what is most singular is this, that after arriving at this conclusion, an admission is made, that at once demolishes the whole doctrine upon which it is

founded.

It is conceded, that each state may tax the

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stock owned by its citizens in this bank. Then it is not a public institution, exempt from state taxation, upon the great principle, that the states cannot tax the offices, institutions and operations of the government of the union. It is not that the states have no power to tax the bank; but that this power exists only over its capital, and does not extend to its operations. What then becomes of all the labored doctrines of the opinion? The government of the union, though supreme within its sphere of action, removing all obstacles, and so modifying all powers, vested in subordinate governments as to exempt its own operations from their influence, cannot [after all, preserve what it can create. Those who advance this pretension, are compelled to admit, that, upon their own principles, a power to destroy, may be wielded by the state governments.

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In its utmost extent, a state tax, upon tions of the bank, can produce no other injury, than a suspension of its business. By ceasing to trade, a tax upon business can always be avoided. Not so a tax upon capital. Should the states of Pennsylvania, New-York and Massachusetts combine to tax the stock in the bank of the United States, owned by their citizens, to an amount that must consume the annual profits, and encroach upon the capital advanced, the destruction of the bank must be inevitable: for this tax upor capital may be exacted, whether it be productive or not. The power of the states to tax the business of the

bank, is denied upon the broad ground, that the power to lowy such a tax is tantamount to a power to destroy the bank, and is incompatible with a power of the government of the union to create it. Yet this power to tax the capital, though incontestibly of greater potency to destroy the institution, is admitted to exist. Between the point decided and the point conceded, there is a palpable contradiction, to which sound [argument and just conclusions are never subject.

Another very absurd consequence results from the decision and admission, when connected together as they arc, in the opinion under consideration. A state tax upon the stock, or actual capital invested by its citizens in the bank, cannot reach or affect the stock owned by foreigners, or by the other states: but a tax upon the business, operates alike upon all the stockholders. Should Massa

chusetts tax the stock of her citizens, stock in the bank must be worth less in Massachusetts than elsewhere. Should all the states tax the stock owned by their citizens, stock held by foreigners must be most valuable. Should one state tax the stock so as to exhaust the capital, the citizens of that state must sell out to citizens of other states, or to foreigners. Should all the states assess such a tax, the whole stock must be transferred to foreigners, or the bank annihilated. One consequence, therefore, of this admission, may be to throw the institution into the hands of foreigners; when our government will exhibit the strange spec

tacle of a company of foreign' bankers regarded as a national institution, and as such, protected by the constitution of the Union, from any of the burthens to which citizens are subject.

It may be said, that this admission was unwarily made, and upon further consideration, would be retracted as inconsistent with what had beer previously decided. But the committee conceive, that this explanation is quite unsatisfactory. It has been already stated, that the constitution does, in express terms, declare what subjects shall be exempt from the taxing power of the states. It was felt, that, indirectly to exempt other subjects, was unwarrantable upon all established principles of interpreting laws and constitutions. This argument was pressed, and to escape its force, the admission was made, so that evidently it is part of the decision, and as such sweeps away the grand pillar upon which the whole decision rested.

If the committee have taken a correct view of the subject, it would seem manifest, that in denying to the states a power to tax private corporations of trade, incorporated by the government of the Union, where no doubt exists of the power to create the corporation, it becomes necessary to maintain many doctrines of very doubtful character, and dangerous tendency; while conceding to them this power, involves nothing either doubtful or dangerous. It strips such corporations of all pretensions to be regarded as instruments of government, in the same sense as the mint and the post office.