at the trial should have been stricken since it was concededly improper and illegally obtained through police coercion. The court held that the witness' testimony should not be stricken but strongly condemned the conduct on the part of the police. The defendant in this case has had no right of his violated. It is clear that the emphasis with respect to the Fourth Amendment has shifted from the right of property to the right of privacy (Warden v. Hayden [1967] 387 U.S. 294; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41; and Katz v. California, decided U.S. Supreme Court, December 18, 1967) but it is clear that no right of privacy, right of property, or constitutional right of the defendant, Charles Snyder, was involved even if the defendant's allegation with respect to illegality be true. Our New York State Court of Appeals dealt with this problem of standing as late as December, 1967, in People v. L. Judson Morehouse. There, the defendant was attacking eavesdropping bugs with respect to Neyer and Steinman and claimed that even though his privacy was not invaded, he still had standing to challenge the evidence resulting from those bugs. Our Court of Appeals, after discussing Berger, stated as follows: "We are not about to accept the proposition that the Supreme Court has abandoned traditional standing requirements until it declares such intention in a less ambiguous fashion than Berger, under defendant's reading of its purports to do this. Just recently, we indicated in People v. McDonnell, 18 N.Y. 2d 509, at p. 510, that standing presented a 'threshold question' in determining whether a defendant could challenge eavesdropping evidence. We adhere to this position and, therefore, hold that defendant cannot challenge the Neyer and Steinman bugs or any evidence obtained thereby." CONCLUSION The judgment of conviction should be affirmed in all respects. Respectfully submitted, WILLIAM CAHN, District Attorney, Nassau County, ROBERT J. ROUNTRY, Assistant District Attorney, of Counsel. |