the same power upon it, to be exercised only "on application "of the legislature, or of the executive." The reasons are obvious, why congress are not to withhold assistance in all cases of invasion and insurrection, until applied to by the legislature or executive of the suffering state, and why the states are. It is the duty of the federal government to provide for the common defence of the whole union, but it would not have been the duty of particular states to defend an invaded state, except for this stipulation; and a previous application for assistance is required, to prevent one state from obtruding itself into the affairs of another. "The United States shall guarantee and protect on application." The same power was to do both, and if I have proved that the latter undertaking referred to states, it follows that the former has no reference to, nor confers any power on congress, as to the constitution or form of government of any state. It would have been a tremendous power, considering the scope given by the unsettled signification of the word "repub"lican," and quite sufficient to lash any state into an humble subserviency to the will of congress. Between the states themselves, an agreement in interest rendered such a power both safe and useful; but between congress and the states, who would be often in collision, it would be a scourge in the hands of a rival. The United States must be the parties, both to the guarantee and to the union, or to neither, as the United States constituted both.

But it is not in this particular case very important, whether the guarantee is a duty imposed upon the states, which contracted to perform, or upon congress, which did not contract to perform. Its end is "a republican form of government." The meaning of this expression is not so unsettled here as in other countries, because we agree in one descriptive character, as essential to the existence of a republican form of government. This is representation. We do not admit a government to be even in its origin republican, unless it is instituted by representation, nor do we allow it to be so, unless its legislation is also founded upon representation. Now, this condition prohibiting slavery, both as constitutional and legislative, destroys these radical and necessary qualities, without which no government can be republican. Congress is not a representation of Missouri, either for legislation or forming a constitu

tion. If, therefore, the guarantee be imposed on the states, it is the duty of all to resist an obvious violence to republican principles; if on congress, it can never be its duty, or its right, to commit an act, which the guarantee was intended to prevent. One other argument remains, apparently sufficiently strong of itself to settle the question. Even allowing to congress a degree of sovereignty, equal to the regal, yet the plenary sovereignty of kings did not empower them to annex conditions subsequent to gifts or grants of land, much less to sales for a pecuniary consideration. Such arbitrary attempts have been frequently adjudged to be void in the English courts. Had the English kings, after having granted or sold lands upon specified terms, prescribed new conditions as to the mode of their cultivation, their own courts would have decided it to be an unwarrantable imposition. Does congress possess a higher species of sovereignty than the kings of England, able subsequently to controul the mode of cultivating lands previously sold, and to diminish their value to the purchaser, after having received the price? Whatever may be the power of a state legislature in this case, the same power does not extend to congress. The power given to it by the constitution is "to dispose of the ter"ritory of the United States." Having disposed of it by sales, the power is at an end, because it is executed; aud no power remains with congress in relation to the lands sold, beyond what they possess over the lands, or the mode of their cultivation in the oldest state of the union. Ex post facto laws, and laws impairing contracts, are recognized as contrary to republican principles, because they are inconsistent with the freedom of property or of labour, the preservation of which is an essential object of those principles; and thence arose the positive prohibition upon both the federal and state governments to enact them. Thence also the powers delegated to congress are all prospective. I cannot, therefore, believe, that it will persevere in legislating retrospectively, locally, and contrary to the genuine principles of representation, as preferable to that republican moderation, which never withholds from others the rights enjoyed by itself.

In contending for political liberty, I have not meddled with the subjects of slavery and emancipation, because it was sufficient to prove, that they belong to the local powers reserved to

the states, and have been so considered by every state in the union. Inheritances and the regulation of property are not powers more local than slavery, and if congress can legislate as to the last, and also regulate property by corporations, it may as correctly insist, that an uniform system of inheritances, and for distributing wealth, is comprised within the scope of its powers. But, although the absurd enthusiasm as to the subjects of slavery and emancipation, recently excited, needs no fuel, an endeavour to abate it is not reprehensible; and for this purpose it would be well for moderate men to consider, whether emancipation in the slave-holding states does not appear by the census to be proceeding as fast as their circumstances will justify, and as the general interest of the community of states can require.

There remains a right, anterior to every political power whatsoever, and alone sufficient to put the subject of slavery at rest; the natural right of self-defence. Under this right, societies imprison and put to death. By this right, nations are justified in attacking other nations, which may league with their foes to do them an injury. And by this right, they are justified, if they see danger at a distance, to anticipate it by precautions. It is allowed on all hands, that danger to the slave-holding states lurks in their existing situation, however it has been produced; and it must be admitted, that the right of self-defence applies to that situation, of the necessity for which the parties exposed to the danger are the natural judges : Otherwise this right, the most sacred of all possessed by men, would be no right at all. I leave to the reader the application of these observations.

SECTION 16.

THE DISTRESSES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The previous attempts to ascertain the principles and construction of our constitutions have been made with a view of unfolding the ultimate causes of the distresses experienced by the United States. If they have flowed from false constructions, and real violations of constitutional principles, the remedy must lie in a return to those principles, and no where else; because good principles are useless, without practical extracts; and indeed pernicious, if they inspire a confidence, which serves as a cloak for abuses.

Let us previously take a glance at the causes which have produced the existing distress in Britain, as a mirror by which those which have operated here, will be visibly reflected. I premise, that the distresses of Britain cannot have been caused by a deficiency of manufactures, because she makes a superfluity of them, beyond the demands of home consumption, and a surplus for exportation. The best authority for facts within my reach, is the Edinburgh Review. It states, that the publick burdens of that country amount to the annual sum of £106,084,203 sterling. This total is compounded of taxes,

64,506,203. Poor rates and county levies, ₤12,000,000. Tithes, £5,000,000. And an enhancement of grain by the protecting corn-laws, £ 24,578,000. But the acquisitions by banking, and by all other exclusive privileges, are left out of the computation; and the total of the national burden is therefore stated at considerably less than it ought to be. Nevertheless, from this reduced total, the distresses of Britain are very clearly deduced. Estimating the profits of capital at three per centum, somewhat under the interest of money, but about the rate at which land sells, it requires a capital of three thousand millions of pounds sterling, to supply ninety millions annually, being about sixteen millions less than the annual expenditure;

and the conclusion is irresistible, that the distresses of Britain arise from the condemnation of this vast mass of national capital to eleemosynary purposes. As I shall make some use of the corn prohibition when I come home, it is necessary to borrow a reason from the Review, to prove that it is a tax of this character. This tax arises from an enhancement of the price of bread beyond what it would cost, if importation was free. Now the Reviewers prove, that which is indeed obvious, that this tax is paid by consumers, and received by landlords; because, by increasing the value of agricultural products, or to speak more correctly, of agricultural manufactures, rents will be correspondently increased, and thus the protecting cornlaws must augment the income of capitalist land-owners. This transfer, though indirect, of the profits of labour to those who do not labour, is strictly of the eleemosynary character, and the tendency of every eleemosynary measure to produce national distress, in whatever garb it appears, is well established, both by the existing state of England, and also by all experience. We have universally seen national distress graduated by mortgaging national capital, for the gratuitous benefit of idle or unproductive individuals. Though some people are rich enough to be idle, it is an evil both corrected and more than counterbalanced, by the great productive right of the freedom of labour or of property; but when a nation is robbed by laws of this productive right, and forced to buy idleness, the best corrective of idleness is destroyed, and its prolifick procreator is created. Idleness is encouraged by being pensioned. Industry is discouraged by being subjected to the payment of these pensions. Capital becomes less productive by being taken away from its owners. And therefore, every increase of the eleemosynary family produces a correspondent degree of national distress, as in the case of England.

The United States, by associating themselves with several of this family, have found a degree of national distress, which they are gravely told was caused by futurity; for this is the amount of the doctrine, that our distresses have been caused by our having neglected to make our protecting duties high enough. If the affairs of a merchant, a farmer, or a mechanick, go on badly, he looks back for the cause, should he be a man of good understanding; but if he be a weak man, he rejects the