same people uniting with each other, established other co-ordi nate divisions of power, still excluding an investiture of one, with a supremacy over the others. If this last act, so similar to the first, left an unexpressed supremacy to be found by construction; the first is exposed to the same species of ingenuity for abolishing from our entire political system, every thing analogous to checks and balances: For, legislative, executive and judicial mutual independence, cannot in my view, be placed upon stronger ground, than the independence of the governments of the states and of the union upon each other.

Lest however some future Filmer may undertake to prove, that one of these departments may constitutionally assume a supremacy over the other, by the instrumentality of means to effect good ends; as Charles the first did over the lords and commons, by resorting to ship money, as a convenient or necessary means, to effect an end highly beneficial to the English nation; I shall, on account of my own deficiency in authority, conclude this section with a few quotations, leaving their application to the reader. Ramsay's history of the United States vol. ii. p. 167. "The rejection of British sovereignty therefore drew after it the necessity of fixing on some other principle of government."

P. 172. "The far-famed social compact between the people and their rulers, did not apply to the United States. The sovereignty was in the people. In their sovereign capacity, by their representatives, they agreed to forms of government for their own security, and deputed certain individuals as their agents, to serve them in publick stations, agreeably to constitutions which they prescribed for their conduct."

P. 173. "It is hoped for the honour of human nature, that the result will prove the fallacy of those theories, which suppose that mankind are incapable of self-government."

P. 174. "Political evil will at least be prevented or restrained with as much certainty, by a proper separation or combination of power, as natural evil is lessened or prevented, by the application of the knowledge or ingenuity of man to domestick purposes.

"From history the citizens of the United States had been taught that the maxims, adopted by the rulers of the earth, that society was instituted for the sake of the governors, and that

the interest of the many was to be postponed to the convenience of the privileged few, had filled the world with bloodshed and wickedness; while experience had proved, that it is the invariable natural character of power, whether entrusted or assumed, to exceed the proper limits, and, if unrestrained, to divide the world into masters and slaves. They therefore began upon the opposite maxims; that society was instituted, not for the governors but governed; that the interest of the few should in all cases give way to the interest of the many; and that exclusive and hereditary privileges were useless and dangerous institutions in society. With them the sovereignty of the people was more than a mere theory. The characteristick of that sovereignty was displayed by their authority in written constitutions."

P. 175. "It therefore became necessary to run the line of distinction between the local legislatures, and the assembly of the States in congress."

Federalist. p. 81. H. "The general government can have no temptation to absorb the local authorities left with the states. Commerce, finance, negociation and war, comprise all the objects of a love of power. All those things which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable, that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils, to usurp the powers with which they are connected. But let it be admitted, for argument sake, that mere wantonness, and lust of domination, would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the people of the several states would controul the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite."

P. 254. M. "The federal and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes."

P. 282. H." In the compound republick of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will controul each other, at the same time that each will be controuled by itself."

P. 288. H. "The federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependance on the people, but it will be moreover watched and controuled by the several collateral legislatures."

P. 302. H. “I am unable to conceive, that the state legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting the federal legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their constituents."

SECTION 6.

PROPERTY.

Blackstone has treated of "The rights of persons, and the rights of things;" but the rights of man include life, liberty and property, according to the prevalent fashion of thinking in the United States. The last right is the chief hinge upon which social happiness depends. It is therefore extremely important to ascertain, whether it is secured by the same principle with our other rights; and whether the security, if the same, ought to be equivalently efficacious; before we proceed to the contemplated examination of several constructions of our constitutions. The rights to life, liberty and property, are so intimately blended together, that neither can be lost in a state of society without all; or at least, neither can be impaired without wounding the others. Being indissolubly united, a principle which embraces either must embrace all; and by allowing it to constitute the only solid security for one, we admit it to be the only solid security of the rest. A sovereignty in governments, of every form, has universally claimed and exercised a despotick power over life, liberty and property. Whether enjoyed by a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or by a mixture of the three, it acknowledges no controul, and submits to no limitations. In England, this sovereignty has in many instances legislated death, banishment, and confiscation; and in many more, exercised a despotick power over property, by giving away the national wealth, not for the national benefit, but according to its own will, or to purchase adherents to sustain its own power. All this is a correct and legitimate consequence of the principle of a sovereignty in governments. Every thing within the scope of a sovereignty belongs to it; therefore the sovereignty of king, lords and commons in England, exercises an unlimited power over every thing, not only in the direct modes of cutting off heads, confiscating