cuted an appeal as to the Monroe street frontage and the city as to the LaSalle street frontage.

WILSON, MOORE & MCILVAINE, for appellants.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Corporation Counsel, and WILLIAM D. BARGE, for appellee.

Per CURIAM: It was held by this court in Sanitary District v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Railway Co. 216 Ill. 575, that the plat of School Section addition to Chicago was a common law plat. Under the doctrine announced in the case of Sears v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 204,) the fee to Monroe street is in appellant, and the court should have enjoined the city from enforcing the ordinance against that frontage.

The city, by the condemnation proceedings, only acquired an easement in the property taken for LaSalle street, leaving the fee in the property taken in the grantor of the complainants. As to that frontage the court properly held complainants to be the owners of the fee and enjoined the city from enforcing the ordinance against that frontage.

The principles involved in this case are fully discussed in the opinions filed in the cases of Sears v. City of Chicago, supra, and Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 192.)

The decree of the circuit court as to the LaSalle street frontage will be affirmed but as to the Monroe street frontage it will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the circuit court, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded.

EDWIN B. SHELDON, Appellee, vs. THE CITY Of Chicago, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 28, 1910-Rehearing denied Dec. 9, 1910.

1. PLATS-fee of all streets in original town of Chicago is in the city. The fee of all streets in the original town of Chicago is in the city of Chicago without regard to the date when the canal commissioners conveyed the abutting lots, whether before or after the adoption of the act of 1833, concerning plats.

2. The principles involved in this case are fully discussed in the opinions rendered in Ryerson v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 185,) and Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 192.) DUNN, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JULIAN W. MACK, Judge, presiding.

This was one of eight bills in chancery severally filed in the circuit court of Cook county by property owners in the city of Chicago whose property abuts upon the public streets of said city, against the city of Chicago, to enjoin the city from enforcing, as against their respective properties, the provisions of an ordinance passed by the common council of the said city on February 5, 1906, which ordinance provides no person shall use any space underneath the surface of any street or other public grounds in the city of Chicago, or construct or maintain any structure thereunder, without first obtaining a permit so to do from the commissioner of public works of said city. The complainant is the owner of the north-west corner of Lake and LaSalle streets, which has a frontage of sixty feet on Lake street and a frontage of ninety feet on LaSalle street, which premises are improved with a five-story and basement brick and stone building, and adjoining the said building, and beneath the sidewalks upon both frontages, are situated subways, which complainant uses in connection with his building. It also appears from the record

that the premises of the complainant are situated in the original plat of the original town of Chicago. The trial court, upon a hearing, entered a decree enjoining the city from enforcing said ordinance against the complainant as to said property, and the city has prosecuted an appeal.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Corporation Counsel, and WILLIAM D. BARGE, for appellant.

WILSON, MOORE & MCILVAINE, for appellee.

Per CURIAM: The principles involved in this case are fully discussed in the opinions filed in the cases of Ryerson v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 185,) and Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 192,) and according to the holdings in those cases the city is the owner of the fee in the streets adjoining the appellee's property, and the city should not have been enjoined from enforcing the ordinance against the appellee.

We think fee to the

It is sought to distinguish this case from the Ryerson case and the Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. case, on the ground that the lots of appellee were conveyed to him prior to the passage of the act of 1833, concerning plats. there is no valid distinction as to where the streets in the original town of Chicago rests, by reason of the date when the canal commissioners conveyed the abutting lots, but that it must be held that the fee in all of the streets in the original town of Chicago rests in the city of Chicago.

The decree of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN, dissenting.

JOHANNA GODSCHALCK, Plaintiff in Error, vs. HENRY WEBER, Defendant in Error.

Opinion filed October 28, 1910-Rehearing denied Dec. 14, 1910.

1. RES JUDICATA-doctrine is not limited to questions actually decided. The doctrine of res judicata extends not only to the questions which were actually decided in the former case, but to all matters properly involved which might have been raised and determined and to all grounds of recovery or defense which the parties might then have presented, whether they did so or not.

2. SAME when dismissal of bill is res judicata. A decree dismissing, after a hearing on the merits, a bill to establish title in complainant to land held by her brother in his name is res judicata of a subsequent bill for substantially the same relief, where complainant bases her claim in each case upon the same contract although the second bill alleges a different reason from the first bill for the taking of the title in the brother's name, and where no ground for relief is urged in the second bill that did not exist at the time of the first adjudication.

3. SAME-what does not destroy force of decree as res judicata. The fact that a bill which was dismissed after a hearing upon the merits would have been insufficient, had the defense of the Statute of Frauds been raised by demurrer or plea, to warrant a decree for any relief does not destroy the force of the decree as res judicata.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Douglas county; the Hon. WILLIAM C. JOHNS, Judge, presiding.

E. J. MILLER, for plaintiff in error.

HUGH CREA, CHARLES G. ECKHART, and HUGH W. HOUSUM, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: This writ of error brings up for review a decree of the circuit court of Douglas county dismissing upon demurrer a bill whereby the plaintiff in error sought to redeem çertain real estate from a lien thereon, to have an accounting of the rents and profits thereof and to have a conveyance of the title made to her. It appears from the allegations

of the bill in its final form, that Joseph Fulmer, the father of the plaintiff in error, died about 1863 in Vigo county, Indiana, owning one hundred and forty-five acres of land. there and certain personal property, and leaving a widow and eight children, the plaintiff in error being then about twelve years old. The personal estate was never sold and the widow and children continued to reside on the land without partition. Ruben H. Fulmer, a brother of plaintiff in error, by reason of his age became the manager of the land, controlled the estate, used the personal property and the proceeds as his own, and made large profits. Plaintiff in error remained at home and assisted in doing the work until she was thirty-one years old, when she married and removed to Douglas county, Illinois. Prior to March 10, 1887, Ruben informed the plaintiff in error that if she would select a farm he would buy the place for her and pay for it for her share in her father's estate. Thereupon she contracted for the eighty acres of land in question in this case for $3080, and on March 10, 1887, the contract was consummated, and by virtue of the agreement between the plaintiff in error and her brother the deed to the land was taken in his name, with the agreement that he should hold the paper title until the plaintiff in error and her husband should pay off the mortgage which was on the land at the time of the purchase thereof, to the amount of $1500, which mortgage was given by the said Ruben H. Fulmer, with the consent and at the instance of the plaintiff in error, as a part of the purchase price of said land. The said Fulmer agreed to convey the said land to the plaintiff in error as soon as she would pay off said $1500 mortgage. The greater part of the purchase money except the $1500 mortgage was advanced by the brother, but the money so adyanced was due the plaintiff in error from her father's estate, from the rents and profits of the home farm and for her interest in the farm. Of the purchase money $155 was paid by the husband of the plaintiff in error. Her