Mr. MANION. No; there isn't any, and if I might venture this observation, which springs out of the discussion this morning on all sides: The attempt to start world government through an international court is putting the cart before the horse.

If you look at the Constitution of the United States, the first body of government that is created is legislature, and the second body is the executive, and the last body in logical and legal order is the court.

The court has business to do because of legislation and because of executive action and because of the Constitution which it is called upon to construe.

Now here what we are really doing is starting the processes of world government beginning with the Court, without status to construe, without executive orders to enforce, and without a constitution of government all of which should provide the backdrop for any judicial body. All that is missing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are putting up the roof without any supporting structure under it?

Mr. MANION. That is precisely true.

COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I brought up a moment ago the question about the two powerful entities in the world, the entity represented by the United States and its allies, which we call the free world on the one hand, and the Russian complex on the other, the Russian bloc and its influence. As you pointed out in your statement, the Russians have completely ignored the question of the World Court because they have nothing to do with it.

Nevertheless they have two judges. They have two Communistcontrolled judges on the Court. How effective could a court of this kind be in helping with the establishment of world peace when one of the two powerful factions in the world, that is, the Russian complex, is not a party to it and will have nothing to do with it?

What contribution toward world peace can that make?

Mr. MANION. You see the world peace is disturbed now, as you implied, precisely because of the Communist menace. Yet this medium is not available to settle that controversy. We have been told here that a person should not be a judge in his own case. But the Communists are proceeding to be judge in somebody else's case. They have got two judges on the Court and they expect to have no causes of action in front of the Court and will not submit to its jurisdiction. This movement does not reach the real threat to world peace, which is the Communist conspiratorial threat, and anything short of that won't contribute to world peace in my judgment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, you feel that before any such court or institution of that kind could finally have any chance for success, first, there would have to be substantial universal agreement so far as the power in the world is concerned that the Court is essential and that its jurisdiction should be submitted to, and secondly, that these agreements and the structure of world association should be sufficiently constructed so that the Court could act only as an interpreter of those agreements if they are realistic and if they are conceded by all the parties.

Maybe I have confused that statement a little bit.

Mr. MANION. No, you are right, and as Secretary Dulles pointed out many times in his speeches and writings, the only sanction for international law is morality, the natural moral law, and it lay in the hope that nations would subscribe to that.

As long as there was a possibility that this common denominator of morality would prevail in the world, then there was hope that a court or other international body acting upon that moral conviction would function.

But here we have now an organization in the world which is as powerful-some people say even more powerful-than we are physically, which proceeds upon the basis of amorality which is diametrically at war with the very thing Secretary Dulles said is a condition precedent to international justice.

It is unrealistic to talk about a court functioning under circumstances where we have this powerful body, this conspiratorial apparatus which is at war with the very concept of justice and morality.

CURBING JUDICIAL OR OTHER EXCESSES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me that in the history of the world legislative bodies that have acquired authority have in the main sprung up, been created, and have seized their authority as a result of either judicial excesses or the excesses of sovereigns who may go through the form of having somebody to administer the King's justice and also call him a judge. And those excesses which are arbitrary and whimsical and uncontrolled have been the very things in the past that have caused people to rise up and say, "We will set up our own legislative bodies to write the rules and then we will, as a matter of convenience, establish courts to interpret them."

Mr. MANION. Yes, that was the basis of it

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is something along the line of what you said. We were talking about not having any structure before we put the roof up.

Mr. MANION. That is precisely true.

That was the history of the British Revolution and it was the genesis of the 1689 bill of rights.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it has been characteristic of a great many countries.

Mr. MANION. Yes, indeed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where excess, whether strictly judicial or whether the courts were only acting as the tools of the sovereign who might claim absolutism, got to the point where the people could not stand such whimsy or such caprice on the part of the sovereign or his so-called courts, then they had to take the power away from them. They had to circumscribe them. They had to set up their own legislative bodies in the protection of what they believed to be the moral law, basically in those cases the moral law itself.

I don't know that I have anything else to say at the moment.
Do you have any questions, Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to thank you very much. I'm sorry to hold you here, but I thought it would be better to question you now

so you would not have to come back to go on with your testimony at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. MANION. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that. I preferred to stay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We will adjourn until 3 o'clock this afternoon according to the statement of the chairman, at which time the testimony will continue.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m. of the same day.

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Present: Senators Green (presiding) and Carlson.)

Senator GREEN. This meeting will reconvene. We have a good many witnesses, so I want to impress upon those who testify that the rule that we established at the beginning of this morning of not more than 10 minutes each will apply, that is, for the presentation. If there are questions, of course, the testimony will be prolonged. This morning we ran well over that figure and there are a number of witnesses to be heard from and I think it only fair that we should inform the witnesses that they are limited to 10 minutes.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, you wouldn't object if the members used more than 10 minutes for questioning?

Senator GREEN. No; I am not suggesting anything of the kind. You may ask as many questions as you wish.

The next witness scheduled was Mr. David Ginsberg, board member, Americans for Democratic Action. I understand that Mr. Ginsberg, who was here this morning, did not find it possible to return this afternoon. His statement will, therefore, be inserted in the record at this point.

(The statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF DAVID GINSBERG, BOARD MEMBER, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIO

ACTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is David Ginsberg and I am an attorney engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D.C. I am privileged to appear in support of Senate Resolution 94 both as an individual and as a board member of Americans for Democrtaic Action.

When the United States filed its declaration of adherence to the Statute of the International Court of Justice in 1946, it did so with a reservation that our declaration did not apply to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America." Senate Resolution 94, introduced by Senator Humphrey, would delete the words "as determined by the United States of America", but leave the domestic jurisdiction exclusion otherwise untouched. The underlying justification for Senate Resolution 94 is that no litigant-citizen or nation-should be the judge in his own case.

It would be hard to find individual or organizational witnesses who would lend added dignity or strength to the list of persons and groups already committed to the resolution. Senate Resolution 94 has been strongly endorsed by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Attorney General Rogers, "and the administration as a whole." The organized bar of the United States, speaking through the American Bar Association, and the American Society of International Law, have long favored the repeal of what is called the "self-judging reserve clause." And with materials contained in a recent article in the American Journal of International Law by its editor in chief, Professor Briggs of Cornell University ("United States and the International Court of Justice: A Reexamination," April 1959) and a section report of the

American Bar Association ("Self-Judging Aspect of the United States' Domestic Jurisdiction Reservation With Respect to the International Court of Justice," August 1959) such scholarly background data as the committee may need to analyze the problem is already in the committee files.

The issue before the committee is not whether the United States should permit questions of domestic jurisdiction to be decided by the International Court; the Statute of the Court and the U.N. Charter both forbid this, and the proposed change in the formula of our adherence cannot alter that constitutional framework. The issue is whether we are prepared to permit the Court itself to determine whether particular disputes submitted to it are international in scope. The Statute of the Court already provides: "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Under our 1946 declaration of adherence, however, we insisted on reserving for self-determination questions which the Statute declares should be decided by the Court.

Repeal of the self-judging reservation would not then give the Court power to intervene in domestic matters. It would simply affirm the Court's existing authority to determine whether a matter is within its jurisdiction.

The practice of the Court over the years has been both judicial and judicious. The history of the Court and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, makes clear the sensitive regard of the Court for all matters of jurisdiction. It has never sought to aggrandize power. There exists no case in which the Court has taken jurisdiction over a domestic issue. Fears aroused by frequent references to questions of immigration, trade and tariff barriers, and the Panama Canal are baseless; in the present state of international law, questions in these areas could reach the Court, if at all, only if the United States assumed explicit new international legal obligations with reference to them. Our need for the processes of the Court is greater than that of other nations. Yet we who have have most to gain by providing a more certain means for the judicial resolution of international disputes continue to deny the Court its proper place in international affairs. Our commitment to the rule of law, our profound concern with the extension of the rule of law, our democratic heritage, our leadership of the free world, our enormous private and public investments abroad, our military bases abroad, all proclaim that self-interest, if no larger interest, demands that we take steps to make of the International Court a more useful judicial body.

Continued adherence to the self-judging reservation disables the United States from using the Court in procedures to establish its rights against other nations. It is true that only 5 other nations of the 39 which have accepted the Court's jurisdiction have attached similar reservations; it is also true that the United Kingdom, France, and India have withdrawn their earlier reservations. But the rule of reciprocity gives the self-judging reservation a crippling effect because any nation we may seek to bring before the Court can invoke against us our own domestic jurisdiction reservation and thus prevent the Court from deciding the case.

No Communist nation has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Our efforts to settle aerial incidents, violations of human rights under World War II peace treaties, and other disputes, peacably, through the Court, have thus been thwarted by the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Only by accepting the Court's jurisdiction—not by insisting on determining it ourselves— can we hope to provide an example for the world community and lead and persuade other nations, perhaps in the long run even some or all of the Communist nations, to join in the resolution by the Court of international legal disputes. The fundamental evil of the self-judging reservation is that it leaves the United States open to the charge that it is giving lipservice only to international judicial processes.

Fears of arbitrary action by foreign judges will not withstand even a preliminary examination. Candidates for the Court are nominated by the national groups on the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and elected by an absolute majority in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Both the nominators and the judges elected (men like Lauternacht, Hackworth, and Alvarez) have been scholarly and responsible jurists. They are not the product of power politics; they have spoken and speak for a consensus of informed world opinion. This committee knows that the bench of the Court includes a judge from the United States. In the unlikely event that the United States is one day not

represented by a permanent member on the Court, the Statute of the Court expressly provides that ad hoc judges may be chosen by one party whenever the national of another is on the Court, or by both parties if neither has a national on the Court (art. 31). They are appointed by the parties, and are directed to take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues. A secret conspiracy against a litigant is not only absurd to contemplate but a practical impossibility.

Finally, Senate Resolution 94 expressly provides that the declaration may be terminated on 6 months notice. It is thus frivolous to suggest that the United States can by adherence to the Court under Senate Resolution 94 be subjected to policies and laws on matters of domestic concern contrary to our own laws and practices.

The merits of the question are indeed so clear that this committee itself rejected the self-judging reservation 14 years ago and reported the declaration of adherence for favorable Senate action without any self-judging reservation. The arguments against Senate Resolution 94 would undermine the foundations of the International Court itself. The appeal is to unfounded and irrational fears; the source is a renascent isolation. In the vanguard of attack are forces which have plagued every President from Wilson through Eisenhower in their efforts to secure adherence to the Court and the extension of the rule of international law. They cry out against what they call the threat of foreign usurpation of our law but they exhibit no more respect for our own Supreme Court and for the rule of law within our own Nation.

The availability of a forum for the judicial settlement of legal disputes between nations is not a panacea for our international problems. The International Court may be able to solve certain international legal disputes which are in their nature justiciable; that Court cannot make international policy or resolve political or economic disputes. After Senate Resolution 94 is adopted, as I hope it will be adopted, the problem of Berlin and the problem of Germany will still be with us; the issues of disarmament and inspection will still persist; the difficulty of assisting underdeveloped countries in their entry into the 20th century will still confront us, and the contest with the Soviet Union for primacy in men's minds will continue unabated. Moreover, most disputes between states will continue to be dealt with by negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, good offices, and similar means. What then will have been accomplished? Only this: we shall have given our own people and the world community one more instrument, the proud and ancient instrument of an independent judiciary, for the solution of certain types of international legal disputes. And this, in the present stage of world affairs, will be a major accomplishment.

Senator GREEN. The first witness will be Mr. R. Roy Pursell, president of the Congress of Freedom, Omaha, Nebr.

Mr. Pursell, I am glad to see you.

STATEMENT OF R. ROY PURSELL, PRESIDENT, CONGRESS OF

FREEDOM

Mr. PURSELL. Mr. Chairman and honorable Senators, may I say my name is R. Roy Pursell of Plymouth, Mich., representing the Congress of Freedom. It is a great pleasure to appear before you to urge that you not repeal the Connally amendment for the following

reasons:

Such repeal would submit the United States of America to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (called the World Court) of matters in controversy between the United States and other nations.

Let us see what might happen on three items that likely would be before the World Court if we would experiment and remove this protection of our national territory: