taining formal findings that the property was owned by or held for the benefit of I. G. Farbenindustrie A.G. of Germany, an enemy national.

The vesting of this property has given rise to extensive domestic litigation and in 1957 and 1958 to some international litigation. The former will be set forth to the extent necessary for a complete understanding of the latter.

On October 1948 a Swiss holding company, known as I. G. Chemie, or Interhandel, brought suit against the Attorney General, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking the return of the vested stock. Plaintiff alleged it was the owner of the property and that it was not an enemy. The district court ordered plaintiff to produce for inspection certain records, admittedly relevant, which were found to be within plaintiff's control. After extensive proceedings in the hierarchy of the U.S. courts consuming over 7 years, during which only a partial production was made of the required records, the district court in 1956 finally dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals affirmed. On August 6, 1957, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by Interhandel with the Supreme Court of the United States.

While this petition was pending, proceedings were instituted by Switzerland before the International Court of Justice on October 2, 1957. In its application Switzerland asked for a ruling that the United States is under an obligation to restore the assets of Interhandel, or in the alternative, that the Court should determine the enemy or nonenemy character of the Interhandel assets in the General Aniline & Film Corp.; and, as a further alternative, Switzerland asked the Court to determine that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration or conciliation. On October 3, 1957, Switzerland requested the International Court to indicate certain interim measures of protection, designed to prevent the United States from selling the shares of General Aniline & Film Corp. On October 11, 1957, the United States filed with the International Court a preliminary objection which was limited to the sale of the vested stock. In the objection we informed the International Court that the United States had determined that the sale or disposition of the vested shares of General Aniline & Film Corp. is a matter essentially within its domestic jurisdiction.

Hearings were held before the International Court on October 12 and 14, 1957, on the Swiss request for the indication of interim measures. On October 14, 1957, after the conclusion of the hearings, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition of Interhandel for a writ of certiorari. This was brought to the attention of the International Court by a letter dated October 19, 1957, from the U.S. Ambassador at The Hague, in which was included the statement that "the Government of the United States of America is not taking action at the present time to fix a time schedule for the sale of such shares." By its order of October 24, 1957 (I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 105), the International Court found that there was no need to indicate interim measures of protection, in view of the judicial proceedings pending in the United States. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the International Court to pass upon the invocation of our automatic reservation with regard to the issue of the sale or disposition of the vested shares of General Aniline & Film Corp.

In June 1958 the United States filed four preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the International Court. Our first two objections were concerned with the question whether the dispute had arisen before the date on which our acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction had become effective; the third was on the ground that Interhandel had not exhausted the local remedies available to it in the U.S. courts; and the first part of our fourth objection was limited to the sale or disposition of the vested stock and was based on the reserved right of the United States to determine whether a dispute involves a matter essentially within our domestic jurisdiction, while in the second part of that objection we requested the International Court to rule, in the exercise of its powers under article 36, paragraph 6 of its statute, that under recognized principles of international law the wartime seizure of stock is a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. In our paper filed with the International Court we reaffirmed our pledge, previously made in the oral proceedings of October 12, 1957, that during the pendency of proceedings before the International Court we would not dispose of the proceeds of any sale of the vested shares. And, in amplification of our limited invocation of the automatic domestic reservation, we emphasized to the International Court that General Aniline & Film Corp. is an American corporation with all its physical assets in the United States; that it is engaged in production essential to the defense efforts of the

United States; that its stock was vested under the war powers of the United States; and that under the mandate of the Trading With the Enemy Act vested shares must be sold only to American citizens, unless the President in the public interest should otherwise determine.

On June 16, 1958, after the filing of these preliminary objections, the Supreme Court reinstated Interhandel's suit in the district court (Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)). Accordingly, section 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act now restrains the Attorney General from selling the vested shares. Thus, our invocation of the automatic domestic jurisdiction reservation lost its practical significance, and during the oral proceedings of November 1958 we stated to the International Court that that objection had become academic and moot. In its judgment of March 21, 1959, the International Court upheld our third preliminary objection, based on Interhandel's failure to exhaust local remedies, and disposed of the case in that manner. The International Court, therefore, did not find it necessary to pass upon our invocation of the automatic reservation.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Attorney General.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I wish to insert in the record statements by Senator Javits and Senator Keating, who were scheduled to appear, but were unable to do so.

(The statements referred to are as follows:)

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS

I wish to present a statement on behalf of Senate Resolution 94, which I have cosponsored with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, which would repeal the Connally reservation and recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal disputes arising out of the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, and the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. Out of World War II there developed among the American people a determination to seek a peaceful world order based on the constant cooperation of freedom-loving nations. The United States took the lead in erecting a structure of international relations out of the establishment of permanent institutions which would develop methods of harmonizing the interests and actions of the world powers. It was expected that the strong nations of the world would lead the way, by their example, to international justice, and that by a process of evolution the adherence of these sovereign states to a minimum code of international behavior would acquire the force of law.

In his state of the Union message in January 1959, President Eisenhower referred to this objective and said: "It is my purpose to intensify efforts during the coming 2 years to the end that the rule of law may replace the obsolete rule of force in the affairs of nations."

In April of that year, Vice President Nixon declared: "The time has now come to take the initiative in the direction of establishment of the rule of law to replace the rule of force."

This concept was clearly enunciated in 1946 by the then Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who said:

"International order * * * resembles domestic order in resting upon a basis of law, and thus in turn rests upon the confidence and support of people. The processes in the international society are different because of the sovereign character of the entities that comprise it; it depends to a much greater degree on good faith and intelligence. But the central role of the judiciary is in both cases the same-it is to make the law a living and vital factor."

He was referring to the International Court of Justice which had been created in 1945 under article 7 of the United Nations Charter as one of the "principal organs" of that body, on a level in prestige and authority with the Security Council and the General Assembly. Thus with the establishment of the World Court, the United States had forged an instrument of extraordinary potential for effectuating the rule of law in place of the rule of force in the conduct of international relations. Since that time, 30 nations have accepted the compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, without reservation. The United States, how

ever, although a member of the Court, has reserved the right, under the Connally assertion of 1946, to determine for itself "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America," thus withdrawing such disputes from the jurisdiction of the Court and in effect leaving the United States free to decline to go before the Court in an international legal dispute in which it is involved. Reservations in substantially the same terms were made by France, India, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Union of South Africa. The U.S.S.R. and its bloc of satellite nations do not accept the jurisdiction of the Court.

It is noteworthy that in the years between 1919 and 1939 more international agreements were concluded to settle international disputes than at any prior time in the history of the world. Up to 1928, over 130 such treaties were signed, exclusive of those between the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states, most of them incidentally after 1924. This is significant because it offers eloquent testimony to the mounting sentiment among the nations of the world for peace and security. It is highly fitting, therefore, that the United States which wears the mantle of leadership in the effort to achieve peace and security through the rule of law should place the full weight of its prestige behind the World Court by accepting its jurisdiction without the Connally reservation. Toward this aim, I strongly urge the adoption of Senate Resolution 94.

The Senate of the United States can also demonstrate its determination to replace the rule of force by the rule of law by encouraging the inclusion of a provision in every treaty or other international agreement which we negotiate calling for the impartial settlement of disputes and disagreements by the International Court of Justice. I believe that the Senate, in its constitutional rule of advising the President in his treaty-making functions, would give effect to U.S. leadership by adopting a resolution which I have introduced; namely, Senate Resolution 146, stating its sense that this be done.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNETH B. KEATING

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I want to commend the committee for scheduling these hearings on the Connally amendment.

Just a few weeks ago I made a speech on the floor of the Senate in which I said that the Senate must not shirk its duty in respect to revision of the Connally amendment if our country is to play its proper role in the advancement of the rule of law in international relations. Since then, I have heard from many of my constituents on the subject. There are understandably divided feelings on this issue. What troubles me are the misapprehensions with which many of the critics of revision approach this matter. I want today to discuss some of these erroneous assumptions with the committee.

The most common assertion of the opponents of revision is that the present amendment is necessary to keep the International Court of Justice from exercising jurisdiction over domestic matters. This contention completely overlooks the numerous other safeguards against intrusion into our domestic affairs which would remain even if the veto power were deleted from the U.S. declaration of adherence.

The most important of these is the provision in the United Nations Charter declaring that nothing therein "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter ***." Another unmistakable limitation is the language in the remainder of the U.S. declaration of adherence stating that the declaration shall not apply to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America."

The committee may wish to consider as part of its recommendations an addition to this language specifying borderline matters which we consider to be within our domestic jurisdiction, such as immigration, tariffs, and changes in the value of currency. Professor Sohn of Harvard University, in an article in the current issue of the American Bar Association Journal, points out that such matters have traditionally been considered by the United States as matters of domestic jurisdiction, while they are considered to have "important international consequences" by other nations. There may be other subjects of this nature which would be added from time to time, or the committee might consider

a general reservation of matters "which have been traditionally considered by the United States as matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States," to borrow Professor Sohn's language.

Even such a revised declaration would remove the most obnoxious feature of our present declaration-its self-judging language, and would be an unmistak able forward step in our efforts to promote an international rule of law.

But apart from this and beyond the broad provisions of the United Nations Charter and the remainder of the U.S. declaration which I have discussed, there are still other limitations to prevent the International Court from sticking its nose into our domestic affairs. Article 36 of the Statute of the Court specified that the Court's jurisdiction shall apply only to "legal disputes" concerning "treaties," "any question of international law," "a breach of an international obligation" and "the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation." A report of the American Bar Association's Section on International and Comparative Law explains that "since the Court's 'compulsory' jurisdiction is limited to international 'legal' disputes, no reservation is necessary to avoid consideration by the Court of political or sociological disputes. The Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is only a 'declaration' of aspirations, not a treaty. Since it created no obligations, and made no law, it could not be a proper basis for a claim before the Court. Nor could the U.S. Constitution or its laws be the basis for such a claim because they create no international law or obligations."

There can be added to these "safety" factors against interference in domestic matters, the right of the United States to terminate or amend any revised declaration on 6 months' notice, and the right as a permanent member of the Security Council to veto any attempts to enforce an unwarranted judgment against the United States.

Let me say that I would oppose any cession of domestic jurisdiction to a world court. It is clear to me, however, that no such surrender of sovereign authority is contemplated. The decisions of the International Court of Justice could in no way alter our Constitution, the laws we have enacted thereunder, or any of the liberties and privileges of our fellow Americans. If the situation were otherwise I would not be here urging revision of the Connally amendment, and I do not believe that any committee of this Senate would give its support to such an effort.

Another common assertion is that the International Court of Justice is under the control of the Communists. This, of course, is simply untrue. Only 1 of the 15 judges of the Court is from the Soviet Union and only 1 other is from an Iron Curtain country, Poland. The other 13 judges come from Argentina, Australia, Free China, France, Greece, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Indeed, under the Statute of the Court no two judges may be nationals of the same state.

According to experienced observers, these judges have acted with a high degree of impartiality. It has been said by one commenator that "the scales of justice at the international level have generally been balanced with as pleasing a degree of impartiality as ever graced an American courthouse." (Samore, "National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings," 34 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 193 (1956)). In its appraisal of the record of the World Court, the American Bar Association committee concluded that the Court "has acted with conservatism and has given more reason for more confidence in its judicial standing, scholarship, and impartiality than has in fact been generally accorded it by the various nations."

It must be conceded that the personnel of the Court can change. However, all new members must be elected by a majority of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Unless both these groups fall under Communist domination, there is little danger that the Court will fall under such domination. And if, heaven forbid, the United Nations became a Communist tool, we would not long remain members of either that body or the Court.

Another oft repeated theme of some of the opposition mail I have received is that the United States has nothing to gain by strengthening the International Court of Justice. This simply is not in accord with the facts.

First of all, under article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice any nation has the right to invoke against the United States any veto power we reserve. This is because the Statute of the Court provides that the obligations assumed by any nation thereunder shall exist only in "relation to

any other state accepting the same obligation." The U.S. assertion of the right to be judge in its own case, therefore, has given other member states a reciprocal right in any case to which the United States is a party.

This reciprocity hurts our interests more than the reservation helps them. The report of the American Bar Association's section of international and comparative law points out that "This [reservation] cripples the United States more than others because its foreign interests are the largest. From a strictly selfish, economic point of view, the United States should be doing all it can to strengthen international law and to advance, not discourage, means of enforcing international obligations."

In short, since we can reasonably expect to be plaintiff more often than defendant in cases before the International Court of Justice, we will be victim more often than beneficiary of the veto power.

This is well illustrated by a case cited in one of Roscoe Drummond's columns last year. In that case, the United States attempted to hale the Soviet Union before the International Court of Justice for damages caused by shooting down an unarmed American plane over the Sea of Japan. As Drummond explains, "Moscow blandly denied the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that it was a 'domestic matter.' The Court had to agree on the premise that so long as the United States reserved to itself the right to decide when an issue was ‘domestic,' the right must be conceded to all other countries."

France, which followed the precedent of the United States, had a similar experience in a suit which it brought against Norway. In that case Norway, which had no such reservation in its declaration of adherence, was allowed to invoke the French reservation on the grounds of reciprocity and thereby to defeat the French claim. It is noteworthy that France has since withdrawn its reservation.

Equally important as these practical considerations, is the tremendous prestige which would inure to the United States in the world community by a step which demonstrated our confidence in the principles of international justice. The advancement of the rule of law in the settlement of international disputes is a goal uniquely related to our American heritage. Our land was settled by people escaping tyranny. Our Government was established and nurtured by men dedicated to freedom and justice. While we have not yet achieved equal justice for all our citizens, we have made constant progress. In our Nation, there is a passion for justice and a feeling almost of reverence toward the law.

In my opinion, one of the reasons we have engaged Russia in a cold war is to protect and perpetuate our heritage of freedom under law. This ideal of a rule of law gives an almost spiritual purpose to our struggle against communism. If Russia and its ally, Red China, were ever victorious in the cold war-one of their first measures would be to destroy the rule of law. I believe we have a duty to future generations of the world to preserve and foster the rule of law in the settlement of disputes among nations as well as people. This is a sacred mission stemming from our inheritance of the blessings of freedom and justice.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that the committee will recommend to the Senate a revision of the Connally amendment which will be entirely consistent with our dedication to the principles of international justice.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Herbert W. Briggs, professor of international law at Cornell University.

Professor Briggs, will you come forward, please.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT W. BRIGGS, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Briggs, under our limitation of time, I wonder-I know you have a very thorough prepared statement-could we introduce that into the committee's record in toto and would you summarize it for us so that we might have some time to ask you questions.

Mr. BRIGGS. I would be most happy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in this statement I am expressing my own personal views, although I am president of the American Society of International Law.