United States, was given to so great an extent; the small states were afraid of being swallowed up by the larger; and it was policy, it was wisdom. When the state of Connecticut is referred to, if any thing can be found which is applicable to you, it is extremely wise; but when any thing is found to accord with my views, it won't do at all-they are a family who all came from the same parents; they are a singular kind of people, wise as it respects themselves, but have no wisdom as it respects others. Of whom are the people of this state composed? I can scarcely pass my eye in a line that it does not cover a great many eastern gentlemen. The western part of the state contains a very great proportion of inhabitants from Connecticut; and will these gentlemen come here and sanction a power which their ancestors and forefathers never gave? I trust in God they never will. We have been told of the great state of Virginia, which in point of talent is unrivalled by man; and there, I must inform my honourable friend from Otsego, (Mr. Van Buren) they have the same restrictive power that I recommend, and no other; and still he is willing to allow that they go on very well, and derive many advantages from their present constitution. All the experience and wisdom of Jefferson, cannot make an impression on their minds, sufficient to induce them to alter their constitution. Does Jefferson tell where this power should be lodged, or what extent of power should be exercised by that department of government? I would willingly risk this question, if that patriot were here himself-I know his views of democracy were for taking power from the people, when it can be safely lodged in other hands; but nothing can be gathered from him, which would sanction the measure here contended for. My honourable friend from Dutchess (Mr. Tallmadge) has said, that commentators have sanctioned the principle for which he contends. I have lived long enough to learn, that the best commentator is experience. Notwithstanding all that may be said in favour of the speculations of jurists, who are like medical men, wise in theory, but when they come to give medicine, two to one that they kill the patient for want of experience. I never believed in commentators as much as my honourable friend appears to, who refers us to ancient republics, which existed centuries before we were born. We are told that a Cæsar arose: to be sure he did. And a Brutus was there! When that state arrives here, there will be not only one Brutus, but many. He says such was the experience of democracy at that age; but will iny honourable friend say that they had any notions of liberty according to the acceptation of the present age?

Had Rome any idea of the habeas corpus act? Was she acquainted with the nature of trial by jury, or had she any knowledge of the fundamental principles of government? You can get nothing from antiquity-the only free government, and melancholy to add, is the one which we now enjoy. May the result of our deliberations serve to unite its parts, and render it an imperishable charter, of the rights and liberties of generations to come.

If any thing can be gained by experience, or example, you have eight states equal in political knowledge, territory, population, and wealth, to any other states in the union, putting their veto where I do; and requiring a majority of the legislature only, to put that veto at rest. Now I ask the Convention whether the jurisprudence of New-York is more wisely managed for public and private rights, than that of other states. I ask whether there is any other in the union which is so interesting, or any which presents itself as so worthy of imitation? After all, I ask this Convention, What is republican government, and how is it to be sustained? If virtue be not the rock, on which you build the house; all your checks and balances will be unavailing. If the great community at large are profligate in manners, and destitute of religion--without a sense of public virtue-the body politic corrupt and rotten-it is immaterial about your checks and balances-all must go down together. Where would be your governor with his private secretary and door-keepers, the people being exasperated? A mere feather in a storm. The judiciary would not lift an arm. When the tyrant of democracy arrives, it will be when the body politic is corrupted. Sometimes with an hundred thousand foot, she will creep like an insect, and at other times, in opposition to a hundred thousand, she will overturn all before her. If the ship can be preserved, for she is al

ways in a tempest, it must be by the two anchors of religion and morality. Without these anchors, she must soon be wrecked, and with them she is safe. Now let us go back and enquire, whether there is no danger to be apprehended from putting this qualified negative into the hands of an individual, to so great an extent as has been urged. During the recent war, you have seen striking examples of the evils which may be anticipated, to result from the measure proposed. What was the conduct of the governors in some of the eastern states? They refused to obey the mandate of that power, which they were bound in duty to obey, in executing the law of the United States-willing to defend their own fire-sides against the grasp of the robber, the plunderer, and the assassin; but not willing to go across into the enemy's territory for offensive war. They declared that the constitution of the United States contained no such power-that they had the power of defence, but not of conquest. Had the whole union at that time force or power enough to compel that governor to do his duty? Had he been under a monarch, his refusal would scarcely have been heard, till his head had answered for it. Nor has the government of New-York power to enforce her laws-we have had an example of that kind but yesterday. When your legislature had passed a law ordering your comptroller to settle with a public agent, he would not do it, pretending there was an ambiguity in its construction. Now what is the situation of your governor, and what is to be expected from him? He comes in by a party, that party passes laws, he will have no objection to them, because he is deep in the interests of that party which brought him into office, and without which he could not have been thus elevated. We have an example in our present chief magistrate, who has friends that will swim or sink with him.-A law cannot be passed because you cannot find two-thirds of your legislature in favour of it. What better can you expect, while you have a man possessing this negative power to so great an extent, as to arrest the passage of any law which does not exactly correspond with his views of the subject, by saying it is unconstitutional or inexpedient. This is an outrageous power of an individual which may be exercised to destroy our liberties and our privileges-Nay, every thing that is dear to posterity. I will not let you unlock your treasury-you shall not have the sinews of war to defend yourselves. Would you consider yourselves safe under such circumstances, to be thus controlled by a chief magistrate, liable to be misled by the frailties of human nature, or driven astray by the whirlwinds of passion?

If a law be passed, in violation of our constitution, it is but a law of an hour; it finds its grave the next hour. Are there no other evils to be apprehended from giving to your executive this unlimited control, in addition to his personal influence? Should it be determined to continue his tenure of office for three years, and in the appointing power, to give him the right of nominating to of fice, it will be clothing an individual with more power than I would trust in the hands of any man on the face of the earth. The subject, then, resolves itself into this absurdity; that the majority of the representatives of the people, in senate and assembly, are to do wrong-of course, you are to presume that the minority do right. Now, in truth, the argument is the other way, when the majority act, and prima facie it is so, we are to suppose that they act rightly, and the minority wrong. It has been said, and truly too, that when men have once recorded their votes on the journals of the legislature, they will not be likely to record them in a different way, because an individual differs in opinion from a majority of them.-He will always know whether the minority is sufficient to sustain him, if not, he will not act at all; because, should the law pass both houses, he would be placed in difficulty. He would do as the great father of the nation did, on an important question, I allude to the national bank. What did the great Washington do on that occasion? He was met by Mr. Jefferson, who persuaded him that the law ought not to pass: he was met by another influential friend, who convinced him that it ought to pass-he finally permitted it to sleep till it was too late to arrest it, and by that act he lost credit which I heartily wish he had retained.

Now you will have many questions coming up, and by the report of the chairman of the committee, if the governor does not within ten days return the

bill, it becomes a law; if near the close of the session you will never have it returned. I am anxious that he should be bound to determine pro or con without any latitude in the exercise of his power.

I feel very sensible that I have trespassed upon the patience of the Convention, and I now ask an apology. I have stated, and I repeat it again; that whatever may be the decision of the Convention on this question, I shall cheerfully acquiesce in it from that principle which has governed me through life, and which, I trust in God, will govern me, while I believe in this great truth and principle of republicanism; that the majority are to rule and govern the minority; and that it is the bounden duty of the minority to suppose the majority right. It will not wound my feelings for a moment, if, in taking this question, I should stand alone. I shall console myself with the reflection, of a conscientious discharge of my duty, according to my best judgment, in which, however, I may have been mistaken.

Mr. RADCLIFF said, that after the full discussion the subject had received, it had not been his intention to trouble the committee with any remarks respecting it; and he should not now trouble them, if some observations and statements had not been recently made, which appeared to him to be incorrect, or founded in mistake.

He regretted that gentlemen had seen fit, on this question, to travel back and assign reasons for the vote already taken. In strictness, it appeared to him improper and out of order, and it had led to many personal and unpleasant remarks. The Convention had agreed, without debate, and by an unanimous vote, to abolish the council of revision; and if thereby they had consigned it to the tomb, they had done it at least in respectful silence, and he wished its ashes had not so soon been disturbed. But since gentlemen had thought proper to assign their reasons for that vote, after it was taken, without intending to follow the example, he would take the liberty to say, in justice to himself, that the reasons assigned by the chairman of the committee who made the report, although entitled to some considerable weight, were by no means the principal reasons which governed his vote on that occasion. There were other and more important reasons, in his opinion, for abolishing that council, and some of them would apply to other subjects which would probably be discussed in the Convention, when it would be more in order to consider them.

He did not propose to trespass on the patience of the committee, by entering into the general merits of the question, and he had been anticipated in some of the remarks he had intended to make, by the honourable gentleman from Queens, who had preceded him. Both the substitute reported by the select committee, and the amendment offered by the gentleman from Dutchess, admitted the propriety of a check. It was no disparagement to the legislature, to say, that a proper check ought to exist; and there was abundant wisdom to shew the necessity and utility of it. To answer a valuable purpose, it ought to be efficient; but if the amendment of the gentleman from Dutchess prevailed, it would be rendered altogether nugatory; it amounted to nothing more than to ask the opinion or advice of the governor; for the legislature, by a bare majo ty, night still pass any bill to which he might object. It would therefore give to the governor no actual power, or control, over their proceedings; and if the object was simply to obtain his opinion or advice, that might as well be obtained in any other way, without a constitutional or formal provision for the purpose. What would be the plain language of such an appeal to the governor? Would it amount to more or less than to say, Sir, we have passed this bill, according to the forms of the constitution, we present it for your approbation, but remember, if you do not approve it, the same vote which has passed it already, can pass it again-A proceeding like this would be trifling with the executive and in its operation a nullity.

The honourable President of this Convention had referred to the opinions and views of the members of the Convention who framed our present constitution, and stated that they were unwilling to vest the power of a qualified negative, as now proposed, in the hands of the executive alone, because it might be abused, or arbitrarily exercised; and that, therefore, they had associated the chancellor and judges with him in the council of revision. Mr. R. entertained

the highest respect for the distinguished men who composed that Convention, and would consider their views on the subject of high authority; but he was persuaded the statement now made was founded in error, and that reasons of a very opposite nature induced that Convention to associate the chancellor and judges with the governor in the council of revision. By looking into the proceedings of that Convention, and from the best information he could obtain, it appeared that they considered the executive as a weaker department of the government-as too dependent in his office both on the legislature and the people for a firm exercise of this power, and therefore they sought for more independent men to exercise it, and made the chancellor and judges, holding their offices by a permanent tenure, members of the council. This he understood was the true reason of introducing the chancellor and judges into the council of revision. But whilst that Convention was anxious thus to strengthen and fortify this department, they seem not to have been aware that they committed a greater error in connecting the judiciary with the legislative and executive departments, than they would have done if they had confided this power to the executive alone. The policy of that Convention seems to have been to endeavour to strengthen the hands of the executive. They had various propositions as to the term of his office, and with the same view they finally adopted the longest term, that of three years.

He did not think there was any danger that this power of a qualified negative would be often abused in the hands of the executive, and he agreed in the opinion expressed by other gentlemen, that there was more reason to fear, that it would not be exerted as often, and energetically, as it ought.

How, enquired Mr. R. is this power to be exercised? Not in private, nor by any secret cabal; but openly and publicly, in the most responsible manner. The reasons of the governor for objecting to a bill must be in writing, and they are to be placed on the journals of the legislature, and published to the world. Even with bad men, this would be an effectual check against the abuse of such

a power.

The honourable gentleman from Dutchess (Mr. Livingston,) had called the attention of the committee to the constitutions of several other states in the union, and seemed to suppose that their authority added great weight to the argument in favour of his amendment. The gentleman has placed too much stress on these examples. It will not be difficult to shew, that no inference favourable to his position can be drawn from them. The constitution of Virginia had been placed foremost in the list of those to which he directed the attention of the committee, and the gentleman took occasion to pronounce a handsome eulogium on the statesmen and civilians of that state, to which Mr. R. was ready to subscribe, but the gentleman would find little support to his argument from this example. The constitution of that state is so different from ours and from any that our people would submit to, that it can afford no reason by analogy in favour of his amendment-It is one of the most aristocratic or high toned governments in the union. The right of suffrage is there limited to the higher class of freeholders, and the governor is not elected by the people but appointed by the legislature, and that annually-He is, therefore, the immediate agent or representative of the legislature, and entirely dependent on them for his support and continuance in office. To give to a governor, thus appointed, a negative on the acts of the legislature, would be inconsistent and absurdIt would be to give to the agent, the creature of the legislature, a power to control his political creator. The same observations apply to the states of NorthCarolina, South-Carolina, Maryland, and New-Jersey, in all of which the governors are appointed by the legislature, and yet the gentlemen seems to have relied on some or all of those states in support of his position.

In Delaware and Rhode-Island, it is true, the governor is chosen by the people, and he has no negative, but these states are so limited in their territory and population, that nothing on this subject contained in their constitutions, can well be considered applicable to the state of New-York. These considerations, and the observations already made in regard to small states, by gentlemen who preceded him, furnished a full and satisfactory answer to any inferences drawn from these examples. In Ohio the governor is also clected by the

people, and he has no negative; but before we recognize her example as proper to be imitated by us, we should inquire into the operation of her government in this respect. It has been justly said that experience is the guide to wisdom. Can the gentleman inform us what has been the practice or experience under the constitution of the state of Ohio, so as to throw light on this subject? He believed we could have little information as to the conduct of the government of that state in relation to the particular question now before us, but we knew enough of the proceedings of her legislature, on some subjects, to admonish us to be on our guard against imitating her example. Has she not passed laws impairing the obligation of private contracts, and in different forms invading the rights of property. Nay, has she not passed laws in direct hostility to laws of the United States, and is she not now engaged in a controversy with the government of the union on the subject of those laws? Let us beware of such an example.

These are all the states in the union the constitutions of which have no checks on the legislature. Let us next recur to those which have checks similar to that proposed by the gentleman from Dutchess.

The first and oldest of that class is Tennessee, the next Kentucky. The first of these was set apart from North-Carolina, the latter from Virginia. The people of these states may well be supposed to have had a partiality for the institutions of the states to which they formerly belonged; and yet, in the formation of their constitutions, they departed from them, and adopted the principle of a qualified check, as now proposed by this amendment. Thus far they furnish an argument in favour of the correctness of the principle. But has the experience of these states been shewn to be such as to recommend their governments as models proper for us to adopt ?-Have their laws in all respects been wise and salutary? Some of them of a recent date, must be considered by all of us of a very different character, and the observations already made in regard to Ohio, in a great degree apply to them. But we have the states of Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Alabama, and what, inquired Mr. R., do we know of their laws, or the operation of the particular provision in question, in their constitutions? They are all of recent origin, without experience, and some of them scarcely organized. The constitution of Connecticut is but of yesterday, and can furnish no guide.

Mr. R. next called the attention of the committee to the states which had. adopted the check as recommended by the report of the committee. They were Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Maine, Georgia, Louisi ana, and Mississippi. The constitution of Massachusetts had long contained this provision, and lately, on a revision of her constitution, they had continued it. Maine, on separating from her, had also adopted it. Pennsylvania had at first been without it, but in forming her present constitution, she too had adopted it. These were principally old states, and if the authority of new states was better in the opinion of any gentlemen, three of them were among the number. From this review it appeared, that the argument drawn from the experience of our sister states, was manifestly in favour of the proposition recommended by the report of the committee.

He had hoped there would have been the same unanimity in adopting this report of the committee, that there had been in abolishing the council of revision. Such a result would have made the most favourable impression on the public mind. He thought it unwise to hazard important changes upon thecry alone, and dangerous to refine too much on the established principles of government. This he apprehended was the error committed by the framers of our present constitution. A spirit of too great refinement, he believed, had been the cause of some of the provisions contained in that constitution, of which we principally complained. When the regular departments of government are once arranged and truly organized, we ought not to be apprehensive of trusting each with the powers properly belonging to it. We ought to avoid a spirit of innovation. The power now under consideration properly belonged to the executive department; and whilst he was in favour of making every proper amendinent to the constitution, called for by the occasion, he was unwilling to remove ancient land-marks, and resort to new and untried expedients. He hoped the report of the committee would prevail.