I have quoted enough of the international law as made by the Republic of the United States to show that the policy of recognition without intervention, and would conclude that branch of the case by quoting one line from Moore's Digest of International Law, volume 1, page 96, which contains the report of Mr. Clay from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June, 1836, which says that our recognition of new States gives no just ground of umbrage or cause of war.

The second question which arose under the resolution I have offered for an appropriation for a diplomatic corps to the republic of Ireland is, whether or not the legislative branch of the Government has the right to take the initiative in such recognition. I respectfully contend that to make a complete recognition of a foreign State or a new-born Republic requires the action of both the executive and the legislative branches of our Government. The House of Representatives, the Senate, or the President may initiate such recognition, but can not complete it. The President may receive a minister from a new Republic and appoint an American minister to that Republic, but if the Senate declines to confirm that minister, he is powerless to act, and the recognition is not complete. But even if the Senate should confirm the minister and the House of Representatives, not being in sympathy with that recognition, could refuse an appropriation, and in that way would prevent the recognition from being complete. This is the doctrine announced by both Webster and Clay, and the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly indicated in the case of 6 Cranch, which I cited, that either Congress or the President can initiate such proceedings.

I admit the power given under the Constitution to the President to receive foreign ministers. I admit also that the Executive has generally assumed to initiate such proceedings, but that custom has granted it by reason of the fact that the political party controlling the legislative branch of the Government has been in sympathy, and have also had their representative in the White House. This proceeding has also grown from the fact that the Executive power has gradually encroached upon the legislative power by reason of the aggressiveness of the Executive and the indifference of the legislative branch of the Government.

I cite the case of Texas to show that final action was taken by our Government in conformity with the rule of recognition without intervention, and also to show the soundness of my other proposition, that either branch of Congress may take the first step toward the recognition of a new State. Rawle, in his writing on Constitutional Law, makes it very plain. He says the President has power to initiate recognition, but that the legislative power is greater, and gives as one of his reasons, that recognition might be regarded as a cause for war, and as Congress and not the President can declare war the power of recognition is greater in Congress than in the President. This is the position taken by Henry Clay, when he introduced the same resolution for the Republic of Buenos Aires, which I have presented for the Republic of Ireland. Mr. Clay, then a Member of the House, in 1819, asked for appointment of diplomatic representatives to the Republic of Greece, and in his speech follows the policy announced by Jefferson as to recognition, and also follows the opinion by Rawle, as to the power of Congress to initiate recognition, and

Foreign Relations, vol. 4, p. 846.) This whole correspondence was sent to the American Senate upon the request of that body. See also Secretary Adams to Mr. Rush, our minister to England (Inst. to U. S. Ministers, vol. 9, p. 119); also letters of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe (Madison's Writings, vol. 3, p. 267), which also explains the American policy of our right and duty in the matter of recognition. Secretary Adams insists that in this policy America has "taken the lead of the whole civilized world." (See Secretary Adams, May 27, 1823, to Mr. Anderson, Inst. to U. S. Ministers, vol. 9, pp. 274–283.) The United States recognized the Republic of Colombia in June, 1822, and the result was that the principal nations of Europe admitted all of the vessels of Spanish-American nations under their own colors. Venezuela was recognized in 1835, and Ecuador in 1838. (See Senate Doc. 40, 54th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 12-13.) Buenos Aires was recognized by the United States in 1823, and after that claimed sovereignty over both Uruguay and Paraguay. But the United States, still carrying out its policy of "recognition without intervention," recognized Uruguay in 1836, and Paraguay in 1852, and so far as I have been able to ascertain, Buenos Aires did not even protest. Chili was recognized in 1823 on the same day with Mexico, January 27. Brazil was recognized September, 1822, and it will be noticed that although the form of government was monarchial, while it has been the policy to be more prompt to recognize those countries who stood for self-determination, this Government has seldom, if ever, failed to recognize the rights of the nation on account of its form of government.

The recognition of the Central American States by the United States, beginning with Guatemala in 1844, Salvador in 1849, Nicaragua in 1849, Costa Rica in 1851, Honduras in 1853, is but another chapter in history of American policy. To show the difference between the policy of a republic and a monarchy in matters of recognition, it was more than two years after recognition by the United States of Buenos Aires, Colombia, and Mexico before England recognized the independence of these States, and the reason for this difference of opinion between a republic and a monarchy was a difference of principle. Mr. Canning, Lord Lansdowne, and Sir James Mackintosh, English statesmen, declared that it was the principle of the monarchy that they would not recognize a new Spanish American province as against Spain so long as any "struggle in arms" continued. They declared first that no independence can be recognized "so long as a substantial struggle is being maintained by the former governing state for the recovery of its authority." If this was the policy of the United States of America, no new republic could ever be born until it had well established its own independence and secured recognition from its parent State and it will be seen at a glance how this difference of policy has made for self-determination. This difference of policy of the United States for recognition without intervention has made a difference in civilization. In other words, it shows the wisdom the policy announced by Webster in his great declaration of principles made when he sought to make an appropriation for a minister to Greece, in his great oration on the occasion of the visit of Kossuth to this country, namely, to put it in plain language: As kings would stand together, it became the duty of republics to stand together in the interest of our form of government.

I have quoted enough of the international law as made by the Republic of the United States to show that the policy of recognition without intervention, and would conclude that branch of the case by quoting one line from Moore's Digest of International Law, volume I, page 96, which contains the report of Mr. Clay from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June, 1836, which says that our recognition of new States gives no just ground of umbrage or cause of war.

The second question which arose under the resolution I have offered for an appropriation for a diplomatic corps to the republic of Ireland is, whether or not the legislative branch of the Government has the right to take the initiative in such recognition. I respectfully contend that to make a complete recognition of a foreign State or a new-born Republic requires the action of both the executive and the legislative branches of our Government. The House of Representatives, the Senate, or the President may initiate such recognition, but can not complete it. The President may receive a minister from a new Republic and appoint an American minister to that Republic, but if the Senate declines to confirm that minister, he is powerless to act, and the recognition is not complete. But even if the Senate should confirm the minister and the House of Representatives, not being in sympathy with that recognition, could refuse an appropriation, and in that way would prevent the recognition from being complete. This is the doctrine announced by both Webster and Clay, and the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly indicated in the case of 6 Cranch, which I cited, that either Congress or the President can initiate such proceedings.

I admit the power given under the Constitution to the President to receive foreign ministers. I admit also that the Executive has generally assumed to initiate such proceedings, but that custom has granted it by reason of the fact that the political party controlling the legislative branch of the Government has been in sympathy, and have also had their representative in the White House. This proceeding has also grown from the fact that the Executive power has gradually encroached upon the legislative power by reason of the aggressiveness of the Executive and the indifference of the legislative branch of the Government.

I cite the case of Texas to show that final action was taken by our Government in conformity with the rule of recognition without intervention, and also to show the soundness of my other proposition, that either branch of Congress may take the first step toward the recognition of a new State. Rawle, in his writing on Constitutional Law, makes it very plain. He says the President has power to initiate recognition, but that the legislative power is greater, and gives as one of his reasons, that recognition might be regarded as a cause for war, and as Congress and not the President can declare war the power of recognition is greater in Congress than in the President. This is the position taken by Henry Clay, when he introduced the same resolution for the Republic of Buenos Aires, which I have presented for the Republic of Ireland. Mr. Clay, then a Member of the House, in 1819, asked for appointment of diplomatic representatives to the Republic of Greece, and in his speech follows the policy announced by Jefferson as to recognition, and also follows the opinion by Rawle, as to the power of Congress to initiate recognition, and

gives the same reason for the rule announced by Rawle. Daniel Webster offered an appropriation for the Republic of Greece two or three years later, and announced both rules for which I am contending. First, our duty to assist republics by recognition without intervention, and the power and duty of the Congress to initiate relations with new States. The Supreme Court in the case cited in 6 Cranch clearly indicate their opinion that either the President or Congress can initiate the movement for recognition.

But it is claimed by some opposing this resolution that Henry Clay changed his opinions when he came as a Senator, to the Texas case. This is not sustained by the history of the case. I have quoted above from the report made by Senator Clay in 1836, about 16 years after he had introduced the resolution for Greece, and that resolution makes no mention of the Executive. Jackson was President, and opposed to recognition of Texas in any way, just as President Wilson is opposed to any recognition of the Republic of Ireland.

The resolution is as follows: "Resolved, That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States whenever satisfactory evidence shall have been received that it has in successful operation a civil government," etc.

President Jackson, in December of the same year, sent his message to Congress, really opposing recognition, but calling attention to the fact that both Houses, acting separately, had passed the above resolution. (Moore's Digest of International Law, vol. 1, p. 98.) The President (p. 99) agrees with the proposition I contend for. He agrees that recognition should be left to Congress, and then proceeds to give his reason for not taking the initiative: "Prudence therefore seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude" (p. 101). Here was a clear conflict of opinion between the Executive and the Legislature, however it is interesting to note which opinion prevailed. The language of the resolution was changed so as to read "whenever the President of the United States should receive satisfactory evidence that Texas is an independent power," etc. This bill was passed by Congress about 10 weeks after the President had given Congress his reasons why it ought not to be done, and within three or four days after this bill passed President Jackson appointed our first American minister to Texas.

Of course Mexico protested, and our Secretary of State in replying to his protest, said, "The two branches of the legislative department, to which the subject had been referred by the late President concurred as to its propriety" (page 102), and further: "The United States, in recognizing Texas acted in perfect accordance with their ordinary and settled policy." He further promised neutrality, in other words our settled policy of "Recognition without intervention." Then, Mr. Chairman, I think I have shown, first, the settled policy of the United States of recognition without intervention; second, that such recognition can not mean war; third, that Congress has equal power with the President in taking the "first step" in recognition of a new State.

Then if I am correct the only question is one of policy or expediency We have as a House declared by a two-thirds vote, and the Senate by a unanimous vote save one, "that the Republic of Ireland should have been granted self-determination. There was no protest from the parent state. The evidence shows by a vote of the people that

they desire self-government, and they have established a de facto government, capable of transacting governmental business, and are transacting governmental business now. It is not my purpose to dwell on the expediency in this case, the record in this case will show the righteousness of self-determination. Ireland has never been a willing subject of the King. Conquered for a time in war, and then debauched by the act of union, according to Gladstone, the blackest and foulest bribery known to history. Her people ask only for a kind word from us while she seeks to establish our constitution as hers. That constitution established on the Emerald Isle will help for peace on earth. It stands for civil and religious liberty, it separates church and state. It costs us nothing; it endangers us in no way. If we follow the path of the fathers, we will comfort those who have fought with us and believe in our form of Government, with malice toward none, and speaking for myself alone, to deny this crumb of comfort to those oppressed as we were, is to deny the faith of our ancestors who made us free.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: There are so many here from far away, asking to be heard in favor of the resolution, that I am going to simply take not over 10 minutes more to give a brief skeleton of the questions of international law that are involved in my resolution, and I will ask the committee to allow me to revise my remarks simply for the purpose of citing the authorities, which if I should take the time of the committee to do it now, would consume all of this session.

I address myself first, if the chairman and the committee please, to the question as to whether this resolution, which makes an appropriation for a diplomatic corps to the republic of Ireland, is a measure which, if passed, under international law would be considered a cause for war. That is the constant answer that is made to me when I suggest the recognition of this new republic.

I had the honor of serving with Mr. Cushman K. Davis in the Senate, who was regarded then as one of the leading modern writers upon international law, and he sums up the question as to whether the recognition of a new State is a cause for war. I was fighting at that time for recognition for the Republic of Cuba, and Senator Davis was opposed, for political reasons, but the question arose directly and not collaterally, as to whether it would be a cause for war against Spain. Mr. Senator Davis at that time took ground strongly in favor of the position that I had taken, and following the line laid down by all the precedents in the past, that it was not a casus belli; and in his book on page 112 he says:

It is to be regretted that in the discussions of the subject of the recognition of the Cuban belligerency in the public press and on the platform it has been too often assumed that such recognition of belligerency or of independence is a hostile act, which would pre ipitate the United States into war. We never thought of making war when the belligerency of the Confederate States was recognized by the powers of Europe. Spain never made it a cause of war when the belligerency, and afterwards the independence, of republic after republic, from the Mexican line to Cape Horn, which had wrested themselves from her sovereignty, were recognized by the United States and all the powers of Europe.

I intend to insert also the opinion of Moore upon international law, and his language is so plain that it can not be misunderstood. It is upon the question of the exercise of our right to recommend, or rather,