and relied upon the power and efficacy of the receipt given by the defendant to him when he parted with his money. In other, words, it depends upon the strength of the legal presumption and how far that goes, and I have made a careful examination of this subject along those lines. We start in with the Constitution of the State of New York, article 7, section 7, which says: The lands of the State now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged or be taken by any corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed." Section 222 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law, as amended by Laws of 1905, and in effect April 22, 1905, provides: "Foresters, inspectors, game protectors and fire-wardens shall upon the discovery of a trespass upon the forest preserve forthwith report the same in writing to the superintendent of forests. They shall have the power to arrest without warrant any person detected in trespassing on lands of the forest preserve, and to take such person immediately before a magistrate having jurisdiction for trial, and they shall report such action to the superintendent of forests. "Actions may on the order of the commissioner be maintained in the name of the People through special counsel whose compensation shall be fixed by the commission to recover damages for trespass or waste on lands in the forest preserve, or to prevent trespass or injury thereto, with relief by temporary or final injunction, or to recover possession of lands belonging to the State within the forest preserve. Moneys recovered in such an action shall be paid to the commission, which after paying the expenses of collection, shall pay to the game protector or firewarden upon whose information the action was brought fifty dollars, or if the net balance be less than one hundred dollars, one-half thereof. "A person who cuts or causes to be cut or carries away or causes to be carried away any tree, timber, wood or bark from State lands in the forest preserve is guilty of a misdemeanor; he shall also be liable to a penalty of ten dollars for each tree cut, taken away or destroyed by him or under his direction. The penalty so incurred may be recovered in the action to recover damages for trespass or in a separate action." 66 "§ 216. Forest Preserve.-The forest preserve shall include the lands now owned or hereafter acquired by the State within the county of Clinton, except the towns of Altona and Dannemora, and the counties of Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Hamilton, Herkimer, Lewis, Oneida, Saratoga, St. Lawrence, Warren, Washington, Greene, Ulster and Sullivan, except "I. Lands within the limits of any village or city, and "2. Lands, not wild lands, acquired by the State on foreclosure of mortgages by loan commissioners." There is evidence in the case as it now stands that James Gallagher paid $3,750 in cash to this defendant, who, with Harvey N. Gaylord, signed a receipt of which the following is a copy: "FORESTPORT, N. Y., Aug. 13, 1905. "Received of James Gallagher $3,750.00 for logs cut on lots 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 19, New Survey, Nobleboro Patent. "CHARLES A. KLOCK, "State Game Protector. "H. N. GAYLORD, "State Game Protector." Although this receipt is dated August 13, 1905, it in fact was made and delivered to Gallagher July 25, 1905. At the time of the delivery of a similar receipt to Albert Herrig, the night before, the defendant, Charles A. Klock, stated in the presence of Gallagher that it was just as good and effective as if given by the commissioner himself. This is substantially the only representation made by the defendant Klock to Gallagher. Harvey N. Gaylord, who was present at that interview, stated that he did not believe it was worth a damn and, as he thinks, read section 222 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law; but, notwithstanding this, Gallagher the next morning paid his money and took the receipt. It further appears from the evidence that no part of this money ever reached the proper authorities. From, the Constitution of the State and from section 222 of the Forest, Fish and Game Law, it appears that the defendant Klock had no right to sell said timber or to take the money, as the lots mentioned in the receipt were within the forest preserve. There is a legal maxim that, Everyone is presumed to know the law," and also that, "Ignorance of the law does not excuse." The determination of this motion depends on whether or not this maxim applies to Klock and Gallagher in this case. These maxims are long established and are recognized by text writers and by the courts of this State. Bishop, in his Criminal Law, section 294, in speaking of this maxim, says: "The rule under this sub title, unlike the next, is arbitrarycompelled by necessity, the great master of all things. Without it justice could not be administered in our tribunals. It is in general that every person is presumed to know the laws of the country wherein he dwells, or wherein, if residing abroad, he transacts business. And within limits not well defined, this presumption is conclusive. Its conclusiveness comes from necessity, as just said, or as it is sometimes laid down from consideration of public policy beyond which it cannot extend, though the authorities do not show precisely how broad is the foundation of the policy. Yet it is safe to state that in neither criminal nor civil cause in any circumstances can any one justify his act by the naked showing that when he did it he did not know the existence of the law he violated. Nor even in general is the excuse valid that he endeavored to ascertain the law and was misled by advising counsel. Ignorantia juris non excusat' is, therefore, a rule in our jurisprudence as in the Roman whence it is derived." Best on Evidence says, in section 45: "We will merely add one other instance which places this matter in the strongest light. If the abstract question were proposed: 'What is the most unjust thing that could be done?' the answer probably would be, 'The punishment of a man for disobeying a law with the existence of which he was not acquainted.' And yet that must constantly occur everywhere; there being no rule of jurisprudence more universal than this, that every person in a country must be conclusively presumed to know its laws sufficiently to be able to regulate his conduct by them. Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat.' "Hard as this may seem it is indispensably necessary in order to prevent infinitely greater evils; for the allowing violations of the criminal, or contraventions of the civil code, to pass without punishment or inconvenience, under the plea of ignorance of their provisions, would render the whole body of jurisprudence practically worthless. If none were amenable to the laws but those who could be proved to be acquainted with them, not only would ignorance be continually pleaded, in criminal cases especially, but persons would avoid acquiring a knowledge which carried such perilous consequences along with it." Wigmore treats this as a rule of substantive law rather than of evidence. See § 2490 et seq. Greenleaf on Evidence, section 20, volume III, says: "If a criminal act is done through mistake or ignorance of the law it is, nevertheless, punishable as a crime. Ignorance of the municipal law is not allowed to excuse anyone who is of the age of discretion and compos mentis, from the penalty for the breach of it, for every such person is bound to know the law of the land regulating his conduct, and he is presumed so to know. Ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat' is a maxim of law recognized from the earliest times, both in England and in the Roman Empire." Such is the tenor of text writers. The maxim is also discussed by the courts in the following cases which show its application to a variety of transactions. Chancellor Kent, in Lyon v. Richmond, 2 John. Ch. 51, 60, says: "The courts do not undertake to relieve parties from their acts and deeds fairly done on a full knowledge of facts though under a mistake of the law. Every man is to be charged at his peril with a knowledge of the law; there is no other principle which is safe and practicable in the common intercourse of mankind." January 15, 1816. In New York Cent. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelsey, 13 How. 535, when notice of trial was for wrong date, Justice Hubbard said: "The time of the commencement of the circuit in Otsego or in any other county of the state is a part of the public law and must be presumed to be known by all." In Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. 625, the defendant was arrested for misdemeanor for illegal voting, he having been theretofore convicted of felony and not pardoned. On trial, defendant offered to prove that he had a letter from the Governor of the State in answer to his request for pardon, stating that, inasmuch as he was a minor when convicted and discharged, he consequently did not lose his right of citizenship, and that he was given the same advice by attorneys. The evidence was excluded. Held not error. Potter, J., in an exhaustive opinion, says: "It would be difficult for the court to lay down a rule applicable to one misdemeanor, or to a class of misdemeanors, in which ignorance of the law would be a defense, that should not extend to all; or to draw a line between the cases where it might be an excuse, and where not. No such distinguishing line has been attempted on the argument; the books furnish none. No one would dare to |