subsisting obligation against the railroad company, and that interest had only recently been paid on it.

Nor was any reversible error committed with respect to the evidence of the witness Buchanan that he saw the defendant in Paris in the summer of 1902. It is insisted that the evidence of the witness McConville is based upon a portion of this evidence although it had been stricken out by the court. It was proper for McConville to state from what source he received his information as to the whereabouts of the defendant, even if the person who gave it to him had not been produced as a witness. The defendant was under indictment and was traveling under many aliases, and his apprehension under the present indictment was being sought. How he happened to escape apprehension for so long a time, and the efforts which were made to locate him, were proper facts to be developed upon the question of defendant's flight, which, if established, was some evidence of his guilt.

The defendant is plainly guilty, and we see no reason for disturbing his conviction, and it must be affirmed.

PATTERSON, P. J., INGRAHAM, MCLAUGHLIN and LAMBERT, JJ., concurred.

Judgment affirmed. Order filed.

SUPREME COURT—APP. DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT, Feb. 8, 1907.

THE PEOPLE v. MANNIE GLUCK.

(117 App. Div. 432.)

(1). GRAND LARCENY-SECOND DEGREE.

The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree for failing to pay for or return upon demand a diamond ring which he had purchased on conditional sale. The defense was that the diamond was not of the weight represented by the complainant, but in this respect the defendant was contradicted by the contract of conditional sale. It was shown that he had paid the first installment by a check which was uncollectible, and had refused to return the ring upon demand. On all the evidence, Held, that the judgment of conviction was right and should be affirmed.

(2). SAME-PENAL CODE § 528.

That as the defendant did not make the payment at the time the ring was delivered, nor return the same when demanded, he was guilty of larceny under section 528 of the Penal Code.

(3). SAME.

When a defendant in a criminal action has offered himself as a witness, the prosecution on cross-examination may prove specific acts tending to discredit him or impeach his moral character. Thus, he may be asked if he had not been engaged in selling worthless steamship tickets to poor immigrants. There is a distinction between evidence of previous arrest, indictment or accusation of wrongful acts, and evidence of the commission of the wrongful acts themselves. It is only evidence of the former character that the authorities condemn, and it is well settled that acts showing disregard of law and contempt of the rights of others may be shown on cross-examination to affect the credibility of the witness and impeach his moral character. PATTERSON, P. J., and HOUGHTON, J., dissented, with opinion.

APPEAL by the defendant Mannie Gluck, from a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the county.

of New York, entered on the 4th day of October, 1906, convicting the defendant of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree.

Isadore L. Pascal, for the appellant.

E. Crosby Kindleberger, for the respondent.

MCLAUGHLIN, J.:

The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree upon which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in State's prison of not less than one nor more than four years.

The validity of the judgment appealed from is attacked principally upon the ground that, taking all the evidence together, it is insufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged and for which he was convicted.

The evidence, in substance, tends to show that on the 4th of January, 1906, the defendant went to the place of business of the complaining witness (one Behrens) for the purpose of purchasing, as he said, a diamond ring, and on being shown several loose stones, selected one to be set in a ring; that the stone thus selected was set in a ring and on the following day Behrens delivered it to the defendant, who at that time signed a memorandum stating that one fourteen-karat solid gold tooth ring, Roman colored, set with solitaire diamond, weighing 3-4 L. 1-16 1-64, value $175, was consigned by John Behrens & Co. to defendant, returnable on demand; that the same was not sold, nor did title thereto pass; that the conditions on which the consignment was made were in writing, which the defendant read carefully before he signed the same, and received the ring; that concurrently with the execution of this writing another one was signed by defendant, stating that he was to deposit

with Behrens & Co. $30 on the execution of the agreement and certain sums on certain dates thereafter, until the total deposits amounted to $175, when Behrens & Co. were to deliver to him one diamond ring; that all the deposits then made were to become the property of Behrens & Co., who, in case defendant. defaulted in any payment, was to deliver an article of the same nature, reasonably worth the sum deposited.

It was also made to appear that at the time the ring was delivered to the defendant he gave to Behrens & Co., or Behrens, the complaining witness, five dollars in cash and a check of a third party, payable to his own order, and which was indorsed by him, for twenty-five dollars, which was not paid, the same being returned to Behrens marked "N. G.; " that subsequently Behrens, in the presence of his son, demanded the return of the ring, and the demand was refused.

The material part of the evidence offered on the part of the People was not disputed, but the defendant testified that when he purchased the ring Behrens weighed the diamond selected and told him it weighed a karat and a quarter, and that after the ring had been delivered to him he ascertained, by having it weighed, that this was not its correct weight and he thereupon stopped payment of the check referred to and refused to make further payments; that subsequently he offered to return the ring if Behrens would give back the five dollars he had paid and return the check. This Behrens denied, and he was corroborated by his son as to the conversation which took place at the time the demand was made for the return of it, after the check had been dishonored. That a demand was made for the return of the ring was not denied by the defendant.

This, in substance, is the testimony offered by the respective parties, from which it appears that the defendant signed a memorandum at the time he accepted the ring, which showed the weight of the diamond to be a little less than three-fourths of a karat. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the defendant to apply

to other jewelers to ascertain the weight of the stone, nor could he in any way have been deceived upon that subject. He knew from the statement signed that the stone was not represented to weigh one and one-quarter karats, and, therefore, the jury was justified in finding that his stopping payment of the check was not for the reason assigned by him, but in pursuance of a purpose to obtain possession and keep the ring without paying for it.

The charge of the learned trial court was as favorable to the defendant as could be reasonably asked. He charged the jury that it must acquit if it reached the conclusion that the defendant offered to return the ring, or if he did not receive it as bailee. The defendant obtained the ring from Behrens & Co. He did not pay for it, and it was specifically agreed that until the deposits amounted to the price asked, viz., $175, the title to the ring was to remain in Behrens & Co., to whom the same should be returned on demand. He did not make the payment agreed at the time the ring was delivered, nor did he return the ring when demanded. Having failed to return the ring when demanded, he was, under the provisions of section 528 of the Penal Code, guilty of larceny.

The judgment of conviction, therefore, should be affirmed. unless there is merit in defendant's contention that errors were committed in the admission of evidence. During the defendant's direct examination, he testified that he had been arrested in connection with a ticket agency of a steamship line but was discharged. On cross-examination he was asked, and permitted to answer against objection and exception, if the steamship ticket business that he was connected with was not that of selling to poor Jewish immigrants worthless orders for steamship tickets and if he did not receive, in one instance, thirty-three dollars for selling worthless orders for such tickets. The first question he answered that he did not get money on false tickets from any one, and to the second question, that he sold on order