The procuring of money for another, with his consent obtained by fear induced by a threat to do or continue an unlawful injury to his property e. g. to continue a "boycott" constitutes the crime of extortion under sec. 552, 553 Penal Code. People v. Wilzoz, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 403.

It is not the actual sentence but the possible one which determines the grade of the offense. People v. Borges, 6 Abb. Pr. 132.

Threatening to publish a person's name in a "deadbeat" book held not an offense under Section 1526 R. S. of Missouri. Barr, 28 Mo. App. 84.

State v.

A threat to accuse another of crime, if made for the purpose of inducing payment of a just debt, is not within the statute of blackmailing. State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80.

It is not a crime to demand reasonable compensation for property maliciously destroyed and at the same time to threaten to accuse the offender of the crime of destroying it. Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556.

It was held an offense under the postal laws of the United States to send a postal card on which was written "You owe us $1.80 long past due. We have called several times for the amount. If it is not paid at once, we shall place the same with our lawyer for collection." U. S. v. Bayle, 40 Fed. Rep. 664.

It has been held to be an offense to send a letter threatening to tar and feather one unless he quits the city. State v. Compton, 77 Wis. 460.

Under the South Carolina Act of 1791 it is swindling to obtain horses from an ignorant man by threats of a criminal prosecution, and also by threats of his life. State v. Vaughn, 1 Bax (S. Car.) 282.

In Michigan the judges were equally divided on the question whether the threatened accusation must be in a judicial tribunal. See People v. Braman, 30 Mich. 459.

In Indiana statute against blackmailing does not embrace the case of a threat to accuse of crime, made by letters, for the purpose of inducing payment of money justly due. State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80, 41 Am. Rep. 791.

To make out the crime of blackmailing under § 558 of the Penal Code it is not necessary to show that the threat was against the

person to whom the letter was directed, or that the writer was the one threatening to do the wrongful act. The offense may be committed by sending a letter conveying a threat of some other person, providing it is sent for the unlawful purpose mentioned in Section 558. The People v. Thompson, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 520, 97 N. Y. 313.

Nor is it necessary to constitute the crime that the threat did, or should or calculated to inspire fear, and no precise form of words is required to convey the threat; it may be done by threat or innuendo. Id.

Parol proof is admissible to show that, by the language used the writer intended to make a threat to expose or impute a deformity or disgrace. People v. Gillian, 50 Hun. 35. Affd. 115 N. Y. 643.

An indictment for threatening to accuse one of committing a crime, need not set out the exact words of the defendant. Com. v. Philpot, 130 Mass. 59.

Proof of prisoner's handwriting is not sufficient evidence of the sending of a threatening letter. Rex v. Howe, 7 C. & P. 268. But when accused left a letter at a gate in the road near prosecutor's house, where it was found and handed to the prosecutor, it was held sufficient to go to the jury on the question of sending. Reg. v. Grimwade 1 C. & K. 592, 47 E. C. L. 592.

It is sufficient to prove that the prisoner sent the letter to another person with intent that such person should deliver it to the prosecutor. Rex. v. Paddle R. & R. C. C. 484; Lawson v. State, 49 Md. L. 256, 60 Am. Rep. 606.

The intent to extort, where the statute covers ground broader than that of mere extortion, must be proved. This generally appears upon the fact of the letter itself; but if not, such facts as will justify the jury in finding such unlawful intent must be proved. Evidence of the truth of the threatened accusation is not admissible in behalf of the defendant. Co. v. Buckley, 148 Mass. 27 But it may be shown in defense that the letter was sent as a practical joke. Morris v. State, 95 Ind. 73.

As to necessary averments in an indictment for threatening to accuse of a crime under the Penal Code of Ohio see Elliott v. State, 36 Ohio S. 318.

It has been held that the indictment must aver the sending of the letter and the person to whom it was sent (Reg v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 218, 2 C. & K. 398) who was the person threatened and

from whom the money or other property was demanded (Rex v. Dinkley R. & M. C. C. 90.) must properly describe the property demanded as obtained (Major's Case, 2 Leach 772, 2 East P. C. ch. 23, § 3, p. 1118) must aver the guilty knowledge of the sender of the letter (Girwood's case, 1 Leach 142, 2 East P. C., ch. 23, 4, p. 1120) the malicious intent of the sender to extort money or other property, or to do an unlawful act (Landa v. State, 26 Texas App. 580; Com. v. Moulton, 108 Mass. 307; Com. v. Dorns, 108 Mass. 488; State v. Harper, 94 N. Car. 936) and the nature of the threat contained in the letter. (People v. Jones, 62 Mich. 304) but not necessarily the exact words (Com. v. Philpot, 130 Mass. 59) and the letter itself should be set out in haec verba in the indictment except where the necessity has been removed by statute. (People v. Rathburn, 21 Wend. 5, 33; People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427; Com. v. Blanding, 3 Pick. Mass. 304.)

Where threatening letters are written, and mailed, in one County and directed to and received by the person to whom they are addressed, in another County, the indictment for sending such letters should be found in the latter county. People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427.

COURT OF APPEALS.

Feb. 26, 1907.

THE PEOPLE v. EDWARD SEXTON.

(187 N. Y. 495.)

(1). MURDER-CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

A defendant indicted for a homicide may be found guilty upon evidence which is wholly circumstantial, and where it appears, upon a review of such evidence, that the uncontradicted and unexplained facts and circumstances, proved upon the trial, not only establish the existence of a powerful motive for the commission of the crime by the defendant, but form so complete and strong a chain of evidence as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, every hypothesis save that of defendant's guilt, a verdict convicting him of murder in the first degree will be sustained.

(2). TRIAL-CROSS EXAMINATION BY PROSECUTION OF ITS OWN WITNESS. While it is the general rule that a party may not impeach his own witnesses, it is not erroneous for the trial court, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, to permit the district attorney, in examining hostile and unwilling witnesses for the prosecutionthe wife and daughter of a defendant indicted for a homicideto ply them with leading questions and even cross-examine them, in order that the whole of the truth may be elicited, especially where such witnesses contradicted none of their earlier statements tending to favor the defendant, but simply reiterated them. (3). INDICTMENT-WHEN DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS NOT ERRONEOUS-LEGALITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE UPON WHICH INDICTMENT IS FOUND-CODE CRIM. PRO. § 313.

A motion to dismiss an indictment may be made in any case where it is claimed that the legal evidence received by a grand jury is insufficient to support an indictment, or that illegal evidence is the sole basis therefor, for this is a constitutional right notwithstanding the provisions of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the contrary; and the right to make such a motion implies the right to have an adverse decision reviewed by the Court of Appeals upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction in a capital case; but where the moving affidavits are vague and unsatisfactory and the court's attention is directed to no

illegal evidence that was presented to the grand jury, and the general charge that the evidence was insufficient is supported by no direct or definite statements, a denial of the motion upon the grounds that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the indictment, and that none of the evidence was illegal, will be sustained.

(4). RECEPTION, BY GRAND JURY, OF THE UNSWORN TESTIMONY OF INFANTS UNDER TWELVE YEARS OF AGE-WHEN EXAMINATION AS TO INTELLIGENCE OF SUCH WITNESSES BY GRAND JURY IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH LAW-CODE CRIM. PRO. § 392. The fact that two of the witnesses, who were examined before the grand jury, were children under the age of twelve years, although they were neither sworn nor examined as to their intelligence, pursuant to the statute (Code Crim. Pro. § 392), by the justice who presided at the term during which the defendant was indicted, does not affect the validity of the indictment, where the justice, before whom a motion to dismiss was made, and who examined the minutes of the grand jury decided that there was sufficient other evidence to sustain the indictment; but where it appears from the affidavit of the district attorney, upon the motion to dismiss the indictment, that the statute was literally complied with in the examination of the children before and by the grand jury, such examination is a sufficient compliance with the statute, since a grand jury, although a part of the court with which it is convened, is a distinct body clothed with authority to conduct the examination of witnesses in any way that does not conflict with established legal rules; and, as the statute (Code Crim. Pro. § 392) authorizing the unsworn testimony of children under twelve years of age is not in derogation of any constitutional right of a citizen, the grand jury has the power to determine for itself the qualifications of such witnesses so long as there is due observance of the statutory safeguards enjoined upon other tribunals in similar circumstances.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court, rendered April 29, 1904, at a Trial Term for the county of Ontario, upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree.

Royal R. Scott for appellant. It was improper and illegal to permit the district attorney to cross-examine and impeach his