France, he stated the circumstances of his being repulsed from Paris. The refusal to receive a minister he pronounced a "denial of a right "_" the refusal to receive him by France, until her demands were acceded to, without discussion and without investigation, was to treat us, neither as allies, nor as friends, nor as a sovereign State." In the language of Barras, he saw sentiments "more alarming than this refusal, because more dangerous to our independence and Union; studiously marked with indignities towards the Government; designed to separate the people from the Government, and to be repelled with a decision which will prove that we are not fitted to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, and regardless of national honor, character, and interest."

He communicated his intention to institute another mission to France, adverted to a recent decree contravening the treaty, and recommended measures of defencea naval establishment-the regulation of private vessels armed for the purpose of defence; the equipment of the frigates, and a provision of vessels of inferior force to sail as convoys; the fortification of the seaports to guard against sudden incursions; an increase of the cavalry and artillery-arrangements for a provisional army, and a vigorous augmentation of the revenue. In all these recommendations, it is seen, that the suggestions of Hamilton to the Cabinet governed.*

* May 14, 1797. McHenry wrote to Hamilton: "I received your letters and papers. I added to them, but changed nothing, for the train of ideas in both ran in the same channel and embraced the same objects. The speech extenuates nought,-recommends proper measures, promises a fresh attempt at negotiation, and declares the principles by which the administration mean to be governed-in other words, that the President will follow the principles of the late administration. It is not perhaps precisely such a speech as you would have written—a little too plain. It may, however, be better fitted on that account for the occasion."

The French decree alluded to in the Speech gave unequivocal evidence of the feelings engendered in the Councils of France by the Democratic party. Restrained, by the advice of Monroe, from acts of immediate and more direct insult and violence, in hope of the election of Jefferson, France issued this decree, immediately after receiving intelligence of his defeat. It declared enemies' goods in neutral vessels lawful prize, gave to the Minister of Justice the power of deciding whether the treaties with neutrals affected by it still subsist, or had been modified; declared that the treaty with the United States had been modified by the recent treaty with Great Britain-added to the articles of contraband those enumerated in that treaty-declared every American holding a commission from the enemies of France, as well as every seaman on board such vessels, a pirate-" without suffering the party to establish that the act was the consequence of threats or violence;" and enforced the requisition in the treaty of seventy-eight as to the evidence of neutral property, with additional restrictions.

The Senate, though many of its members were changed, evinced the same elevated temper with their predecessors. Their address fully accorded with the Speech. They declared their belief, that the conduct of the Government had been just and impartial to foreign nations, and that the internal regulations, which had been established to preserve peace, were proper, and had been fairly executed. An unsuccessful effort was made to expunge this declaration.

In the House of Representatives an Address of a similar import was presented, when an amendment proposed by Nicholas, and framed with a subtlety not his own, gave rise to a vehement debate. It expressed a desire for the continuance of peace, regret as to the dismissal of Pinck

ney, a belief that an ordinary negotiation was intended to be suspended to bring into operation an extraordinary mission; satisfaction at the prospect of a negotiation; confidence that a mutual spirit of conciliation and a disposition to place France on the footing of other countries, by removing the inequalities which may have arisen in the operation of our treaties with them, would produce a proper accommodation; a disbelief of any serious expectation on her part of withdrawing the support of the peo. ple from their constitutional agents; and indignation, if any such attempt should be made.

The objects of this amendment were, to weaken the impression of the Speech; to divert attention from the conduct of the French as to the treaty with Great Britain; and to prove, that France had by that treaty and by the act of seventeen hundred ninety-four to preserve neutrality, suffered injuries, indicating hostility to her, and predilection for Great Britain. In support of it, the pretensions of Adet were largely defended; and it was insisted, that all the measures proposed by the Executive had in view an eventual appeal to arms.

War the opposition earnestly deprecated; urged, as a preventive measure, the stating to France their ultimatum, and taking the consequences. Was this course pursued, Giles declared, "he should not be one of those that would ask others to support his opinions, he would stand by his country in the storm, and share its fate."

The Federalists pronounced this amendment an entire and unworthy concession to the insolent demands of the Directory; declared that the answer ought not to be a spiritless expression of civility, but should manifest their determination to sustain the violated rights and honor of the nation. War they did not seek, but preparations for self-defence, should a second negotiation fail. They deVOL. VII.-3

nied the allegation, that any inequality existed towards France, as the treaty with Great Britain expressly reserved in full force, the provisions of that of seventeen hundred seventy-eight. They repelled the assertion, that Pinckney was rejected, for the reason that he was not invested with extraordinary powers, because the Directory knew his character before they received his letters of credence, and had offered him designed indignities. The conduct of France was truly to be imputed to the vote on the treaty with England, and to the feeble Address of the previous session, which exhibited a timid reluctance to express our sense of injury. As to the act of seventeen hundred ninety-four, which Fauchet asserted, had "wounded liberty," and of which Adet had complained, it was an act to protect from invasion, suppress insurrection, prevent revolution.

After a long debate, the proposed amendment was rejected, but the assurance of a disposition to place France on the same footing with other countries was retained, with the qualification, if any inequalities should be found to exist.

An amendment was then offered by which an expectation was expressed, that France would make compensation for the injuries committed on the neutral rights of the United States. This amendment was opposed by some on the ground that it was an interference with the Executive, by others, as leading to war.

Giles said, "this proposition would serve to perplex the business instead of dissipating difficulties. We were to demand from France compensation for spoliations or what? We will go to war, for that must be the consequence." Gallatin hoped this proposition would not have been brought forward. If they voted in favor of it, they might be saying, if you do not allow compensation for injuries,

we will seek other redress. If against, it would appear as if they intended to abandon the claim. He was in favor of making some concessions, but as war must be the consequence if France refused to comply, he must vote against the amendment. Bayard was surprised, after it had been recommended to the President to make certain concessions to France, that a provision in favor of our own citizens should be opposed. "Surely to express the hope that France would compensate our wrongs, could not give offence."

"When we call upon you," Smith observed, " for your views, you reply, we must concede to France the article respecting free ships-but you must not speak of spoliations that would be an ultimatum.' You ask, why should we triumph in your dilemma? You then confess it. What is that dilemma? You do not wish to ask for indemnification, lest you should admit that we had received injuries from France. Would you justify those injuries? Do you allege that the Executive has provoked them? To demand compensation, you assert, will involve a war, yet you expect the Executive to make such a demand. Does not this hold out the idea, that this House is for peace and the Executive for war? This had not been said, but it had been continually insinuated. We will usurp the right of making a peace proposition, but we will throw the obloquy of the war proposition upon the Executive-we will hold out the olive branch, but the Executive shall brandish the sword. When British spoliations were complained of, you proposed sequestration, a prohibition of commercial intercourse-but now we are not to express a hope for redress. You call this an offensive proposition. We think, that to cherish a doubt that it will be granted would be a greater insult. To betray fear, to evince an utter want of spirit