THE RETURN OF THE SHIMONOSEKI INDEMNITY By Payson J. Treat, Professor of History, Leland Stan- ENGINEERING OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA By David G. Montt, South American Statistician of the Babson Statistical Organization, Wellesley Hills, Massa- chusetts; Foreign Trade Expert of the Massachusetts State Board of Labor and Industries, Boston, Massachu- WHAT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS WOULD SECURE By John F. Downey, Dean Emeritus University of Minne- By the Members of the Seminar on International Rela- Vol. 8 THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT JULY, 1917 No. 1 THE RETURN OF THE SHIMONOSEKI INDEMNITY By Payson J. Treat, Professor of History, Leland Stanford Jr. University Rarely does an article appear dealing with the relations. of the United States with China or Japan in which stress is not laid upon the manifestations of national good will in the return to China of a large portion of the Boxer indemnity and, still earlier, of the unclaimed portion of another indemnity, and of the return of the whole sum received from Japan under the Shimonoseki Convention. Each of these incidents presents a suggestive topic for the student of international relations, and today, when the relations of Japan and the United States are the subject of so much discussion, it may be well to recall an incident concerning which much misunderstanding still persists. This so-called Shimonoseki indemnity was based upon the Convention of October 22, 1864, signed by a representative of the Shogun of Japan and by the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands. This called for the payment of $3,000,000 within fifteen months after the exchange of ratifications, or for the opening of an additional port in Japan if both parties agreed. The origin of this convention must be sought in that most interesting period of Japanese history which falls between the opening of Japan in 1854 by Commodore Perry and the restoration of the Mikado in 1868. With many of the events of this period we are not concerned. The inextricable confusion of foreign and domestic affairs following the negotiation of the treaties, the rapid rise of hostility to the Tokugawa family, the Shogunate, and its foreign policy, the crystallization of this 1 THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 8, NO. 1, 1917 hostile sentiment around the Mikado and his court at Kyoto, and the friction which developed at the treaty ports, all present interesting and difficult subjects for investigation. The opposition to the Tokugawa Shogunate was led by the western clans, notably those of Choshiu and Satsuma. They found a valid excuse in the fact that the second series of foreign treaties, those of 1858, had been negotiated by the Shogunate without the Mikado's approval. At that time, in order to secure the support of the increasingly powerful Mikado, the Shogunate had receded from its former sound position that foreign relations should be inaugurated because of their manifest advantages for Japan and had asserted that the relations were a temporary evil which must be endured during the weakness of Japan, but that soon the foreigners would be expelled. On this understanding, in 1859, a qualified approval of the treaties was obtained. There can be little doubt that the Shogunate had not altered its former views, but that it hoped to temporize and eventually convert the anti-foreign kuge and daimyo to a better understanding of the needs of Japan. It was this weak concession on the part of the Shogunate, based on the belief that it must secure in some manner the Mikado's approval, which occasioned most of its later difficulties, which caused it to play a dual rôle in its relations with the treaty powers and with the Mikado, which gave a good excuse for the reiterated demands that the period of temporary foreign intercourse be brought to an end, and which permitted the great clans of the west to carry on their anti-Shogunate propaganda under the guise of loyalty to the Mikado. In April, 1863, when the Shogun obeyed an imperial command to go up to Kyoto to discuss affairs with the Mikado, the anti-foreign party succeeded in forcing the Shogun to agree to the expulsion of the foreigners, although he realized full well that such a proceeding could only result in disaster. On their part, the hostile nobles questioned the good faith of the Shogun and after conferences which continued for over a month the Mikado on June 5 handed down a decree which ap |