The CHAIRMAN: I shall ask you to refrain from harsh forms of criticism, of the kind to which you have just given utterance.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: Mr. Chairman, I have uttered no injurious words. I have compared the remarks made by Minister of State Dr. David with the statements made by Ambassador Gerard and have stated: Thus speaks an American Ambassador, and thus a German Minister of State. I believe that this is material to the question. (Repeated calls from the

audience.)

The CHAIRMAN: I beg that I be not interrupted. That this is justifiable, as a matter of fact, I in no way deny. Consequently, I have also held that it was appropriate that, where one of the authorities of the former government was accused of having been detected in a barefaced attempt to deceive, issue be taken therewith. But, your Excellency, it is the tone which makes the music, and it was for this reason that I made the remark that harsh forms of criticism should be avoided in the statements which are made here for the purpose of materially refuting the public charge against the old government.

Delegate DR. COHN: (On a point of order of business): I should not like to have the impression go abroad that the committee entertains the view that the remarks made by Secretary of State Dr. Helfferich in the course of his polemic have anything whatsoever to do with the purpose of the proceedings. Dr. Helfferich's task is to give us information concerning Wilson's peace move and the attempts to bring about peace in the second half of the year 1916, and concerning the possibilities of peace which may have offered themselves as the result of these events. Any statement which Dr. David is supposed to have made some few days ago has absolutely nothing to do with the question, nor have the other tirades which Dr. Helfferich engaged in concerning events of a period much later than 1916 anything whatsoever in common with the thing to be proved.

Since the Chairman has at once interfered, and has stated in so many words that Dr. Helfferich's polemic attempts have a certain connection with the thing to be proved, I consider it to be my bounden duty to contradict the correctness of this view in express terms.

The CHAIRMAN: In opposition to the view just expressed by Dr. Cohn, I maintain my opinion in all respects.

Delegate DR. SINZHEIMER: Your Excellency just read a statement taken from Gerard's book in a very pointed way. Now I should like to ask you to read Gerard's remarks made by him in connection with the dinner, and in which he states that, on this date and shortly beforehand, the definite assurance was given him that the unrestricted U-boat would, under no circumstances, be launched. I ask you to be good enough to read this statement, too. It is possible that Dr. David's remark is based on this premise.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: I have not the book before me, nor have I this remark so absolutely literally in mind as all that. That Mr. Gerard asserts that at that time quieting assurances were given him is probably true. But I have reason to doubt whether such assurances were given to him. Moreover, the only thing that interests me is that Mr. Gerard, in terms, and, in fact, in the very words which I used, recognizes the uprightness of the then chief of the political department.

Delegate DR. SINZHEIMER: I had requested your Excellency to be good enough, since in the course of your tirade against a remark that was made outside, you were relying upon passages read out of a book, that you would read further passages too. I note that that has not been done.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: I note that I can not read whole volumes to the committee. (Merriment.)

Delegate DR. COHN: There is no need here for complete citations from Gerard's book. I should only like to request Dr. Helfferich, in connection with this very Gerard dinner, to tell us here what his own participation was, so far as the events of this dinner are concerned, and to tell us about the peace talk which he addressed to Mr. Gerard at that time. It is quite possible that Mr. Gerard intentionally limited his encomiums concerning uprightness to the Imperial Chancelor v. Bethmann-Hollweg.

The CHAIRMAN: Is your Excellency in a position to meet the desire expressed by the remarks of Dr. Cohn? Or would you prefer to come back to this point only after your own statement has been made, and consequently, postpone an explanation on matters which have just come up, to that time?

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: I should prefer, first of all, to continue with my statement, and to limit the individual points which may arise here to the so-called cross-examination which is to follow.

The CHAIRMAN: Then I shall ask you to proceed at once.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: Ladies and gentlemen, before I proceed I must at least say this much: If I took up the remark made by Minister of State Dr. David, there was a very vital reason for me to do so in the capacity of a witness who has been asked to testify here; for, if a gentleman who, in his capacity as Minister of State, takes part in the sessions of this committee, and is entitled to enter into the discussion of matters here, takes occasion to speak in public concerning matters which still remain points regarding which I have yet to testify, and characterizes these matters as "established facts," referring beyond any question of doubt to this investigating committee at the same time, this, to me, constitutes a premature meddling in the matter which I can not allow to pass without protest. It was for this reason that I mentioned this incident in the course of my remarks. I may now venture, perhaps, to continue with the discussion of the matter before us.

Minister of State DR. DAVID: May I say a word in reply?

The CHAIRMAN: Minister Dr. David, I shall have to ask you to allow the witness, for the present, to terminate his remarks in connected form, and reserve all comments which have to do therewith, until a later phase of the hearing.

Minister of State DR. DAVID: That was my purpose too. For this reason, I shall not at present go into the matter of remarks made by the witness. But since the witness has stated here again and again that I made improper remarks on Sunday, I shall simply state briefly, and for the moment, that I shall not fail to answer him in kind. (Laughter from the audience.)

The CHAIRMAN: I ask that all expressions of approval or disapproval be refrained from. I have already had repeated occasions to express this urgent request. I now ask that this urgent request be literally complied with. I shall otherwise find myself under the obligation of clearing as much of the hall as is set apart for the audience.

I now ask your Excellency to continue.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: Reverting now to the issue before us, I should like to express my view that, even without the launching of the unrestricted. U-boat war, Wilson's new peace move would not only have failed to lead to a peace which would have been acceptable to us, but would, in all probability, have terminated in bringing our relations with the United States to a crisis. It was only if President Wilson had been prepared to exert the entire weight of the power of the United States by way of pressure upon the Entente, in order to force it to a complete reconsideration of its attitude, and only if, in so doing, he had been able to meet with the support of the American people and of its representatives, that any prospect of bringing about peace could have come into being. Is there today anyone who still believes that President Wilson would have been ready to exert such pressure upon the Entente? Is there anyone who still believes this today, in view of the fact that he treated our peace proposal with unfavorable criticism in his message to the Senate, and considered that the end and aim of the Entente, the purpose of which was destruction and disintegration, was entitled to discussion; in spite of his statement to the effect that the restoration of Poland was a matter which could be taken for granted; in spite of the fact that, as early as the spring of 1916, he had felt himself too weak to bring England back to the limits of international law in her mode of conducting ocean warfare because of the fact that the business interests of the United States were so interwoven with those of the Entente; and in spite of the testimony given us by his Secretary of State Lansing with regard to the fourteen points which, in October, 1918, he guaranteed us as a basis for peace, and which, later, on the occasion of his conferences with the Entente in Paris, hardly came to be mentioned at all? It is very certain that Wilson would, perhaps, have exerted pressure for the purpose of bringing about peace, but

the pressure would not have been exerted upon the Entente, but upon us. Already, in October, 1916, he had indicated in a speech that the condition of remaining neutral would soon come to an end and that the war had assumed such proportions as, sooner or later, to make a maintenance of the neutral attitude by the neutral Powers impossible. Even in his note of the 21st of December, 1916, there was to be found a passage which stated that the interests of the United States had been deeply affected by the war, and that the United States was frankly bound to take counsel as to the methods best adapted to the safeguarding of its interests in case the war should continue. On the day that this note of the 21st of September, 1916, was delivered, and even before the question of the unrestricted U-boat war had been reconsidered by us, Secretary of State Lansing stated to the representatives of the American press, in the course of an interview with them, that America was on the verge of war. Everyone understood what this meant; it meant on the verge of war with Germany. And on the very same day, on which quite a good deal of excitement existed as the result of this announcement, he sought to weaken its effect, to tone it down; but the announcement could not be lived down.

As a result of all this, we see how great the danger was at that time, even without the U-boat war, that President Wilson, in carrying out the part of peace mediator to which he laid claim, would, in the end, have brought us a mediation with the butt of his rifle, and that it is quite possible that, in the further course of his mediation-personally, I might go as far as to say that it is quite probable he might have confronted us with the alternative of submitting to those conditions which suited him or seeing the United States go over to the camp of our enemies. That is the logical inference which I have ventured to draw from the announcements of Wilson and Lansing, and which I have ventured to bring to your attention, provided that you have not been aware of it up to this time. This conclusion, moreover, is confirmed by the well-known dialogue between Wilson and McCumber before the American Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs. The significance of the colloquy has been made the subject of much comment of late. I believe that, in view of what I have just stated, this significance stands out still more clearly. In this colloquy President Wilson, after considerable parrying and counter-parrying, finally admitted that he believed that the war with Germany would have come about in any event and irrespective of the U-boat war.

It certainly seems as if, in spite of all this, and in spite of our experiences at Versailles, there will always be people in Germany who will sing the praises of Wilson as an upright man and as a man who favored peace, and who will place the blame for the prolongation of the war upon their own country. This policy of self-flagellation, of self-abasement, has actually come to be a German disease.

The CHAIRMAN: I would ask you to confine yourself to facts, as much as possible, which have an actual connection with Wilson's peace mediation

move.

Witness DR. HELFFERICH: I will venture to express the hope that the testimony given before this committee, and the facts thereby established, may, to a certain extent, counteract this injurious disease.

And now I have to answer the question of the Chairman concerning the actual results of the U-boat war.

The answer is not easy. We all know how matters turned out; yet that is not the point which interests us, but to know how it happened that things terminated as they did. In this connection, we must examine the technical, economic, military, and political effects, and the technical, economic, military, and political counter-effects which manifested themselves on our side as well as on the side of our enemies. The ultimate result which we have all experienced is but the sum of these complicated forces.

Another point of difficulty is that even today we have not a clear conception of many elements of the situation in which our enemies found themselves. The British statistics, and the announcements made by the British concerning all matters of an economic nature, were excellent and without a flaw up to the time that the U-boat war began. Then, with regard to all interesting points, they stopped short; and, up to the present time, I have been unable subsequently to obtain absolute clarification concerning these matters.

Even with regard to the sinkings, that is, with regard to the purely technical results, doubts have been raised as to the correctness of the figures which have been published by our Admiralty. Recently, Delegate Gothein made a comparison of the figures of the Admiralty Staff with the figures published by the British Admiralty. I have before me an excerpt from the published statement of the British Admiralty, and I can establish the following with the aid of this excerpt-we are speaking now only of British ships, and not of neutral ships.

The number of British merchant ships lost during the war-including fishing craft, which, however, did not figure to an important extentwas 7,831,000 tons, and 8,008,000 tons of merchant shipping were damaged, making a total of 15,839,000 tons.

So that this makes 15,838,000 tons of lost and damaged ships, of a total English tonnage of about 20,000,000 tons at the beginning of the war.

Recently, Delegate Gothein, if I understood him correctly, made the statement that a disproportionate amount of tonnage had been lost by running upon mines. If I understood him correctly, he assumed that the greater part had been destroyed by mines

(Delegate GOTHEIN: That was a mistake!)

-It was, as a matter of fact, a mistake. 673,000 tons were destroyed by