ん

a

id dicère non licere consentit Grotius(x) De factis ut idem dicamus, eadem quæ in debitis obtinet ratio persuaserit."(y) His chapter "De servandâ fide pactorum publicorum, et an quæ eorum tacitæ exceptiones," begins: "Pacta privatorum tuetur jus civile, pacta principum bona fides. Hanc si tollas, tollis mutua inter principes commercia, quæ oriuntur e pactis expressis, quin et tollis ipsum jus gentium, quod oritur e pactis tacitis et presumptis, quæ ratio et usus inducunt."(z) [*155] *He then proceeds to comment upon the sophistry which defends a departure from the obligation of treaties: "Hæc pactis omnibus inesse credit clausulam salutarem, rebus sic stantibus, atque adeo a pactis recedi possc. I. Si qua nova causa, satis idonea, obveniat. II. Si res eo deducta sit, unde incipere non posset. III. Si ipsa pactorum ratio cesset. IV. Si necessitas ac utilitas Reipublicæ aliud flagitent."(a)

The last pretext he denounces as a detestable machiavellism"the beast of many heads, Reason of State, the bane of Princes," and characterizes the three former excuses as "totidem ruptæ fidei velamenta:”. and again in his boldest manner, "Promissum igitur si me audias, etiam tunc servandum, cum id servari Reipublicæ non expediat, imo periculosum sit."(b)

CXXXIII. Not less emphatic and decisive is the language of the great Republican State of North America: "Nations are at liberty" (says Mr. Chancellor Kent) "to use their own resources in such manner and to apply them to such purposes as they may deem best, provided they do not violate the perfect rights of other nations, nor endanger their safety, nor infringe the indispensable duties of humanity. They may contract alliances with particular nations, and grant or withhold particular privileges, in their discretion. By positive engagements of this kind a new class of rights and duties is created, which forms the conventional law of nations, and constitutes the most diffusive, and generally the most important branch of public jurisprudence. And it is well to be understood, at a period when alterations in the constitutions of governments and revolutions in States are familiar, that it is a clear position of the law of nations that treaties are not affected, nor positive obligations of any kind with other powers or with creditors weakened, by any such mutations. A State neither loses any of its rights nor is discharged *from any of its duties by a change in the form of its civil [*156] government. The body politic is still the same, though it may have a different organ of communication.”(c)

CXXXIV. Puffendorf, in his chapter "De mutatione et interitu civi

(x) Ib. 1. ii. c. ix. s. 8, n. 3. (y) L. J. P. 1. ii. c. xxv.-Variæ Quæstiunculæ. (z) Bynkershoek, Q. J. P. 1. ii. c. x. See, too, Burke's Tracts on the Popery Laws, c. iii. in fine, as to the ratification of the Treaty of Limerick.

(a) Ibid. (b) See too Cicero, De Off. 1. iii. c. v. 6, 11. (e) Kent's Commentaries on American Law, vol. i. pp. 25, 26. Wheaton (Elem. i., 33) speaks fully to the same effect: "Un état est un corps changeant quant au membres qui composent la société, mais quant à la société même, c'est le même corps dont l'existence est perpétuée par une succession constante de membres nouveaux. Cette existence continue tant qu'aucun changement fondamental n'a été introduit dans l'Etat."

tatum," adds the authority of Sweden to fortify these positions in one
of the best chapters of his treatise on "De Jure Natura et Gentium."(d)
CXXXV. We have, then, this opinion of the continuity of the right
and obligations of a State confirmed by the unanimous authority of the
most celebrated jurists and statesmen(e) of all countries. This accumu-
lation of authorities *must not be regarded as an idle parade of
[*157]
evidence, because, as has been already observed, a proposition
which is maintained by the concurrent voice of eminent jurists of various
civilized countries becomes ipso facto, as it were, a part of International
Law.(f)

CXXXVI. We arrive then, with confidence at the conclusion, that this reciprocal observance of good faith, whether it be plighted to the payment of debts or to the fulfilment of the stipulations of treaties(g) is binding upon all nations. This good faith is the great moral ligament which binds together the different nations of the globe.(h) Without this, war would be, as has been sometimes asserted, the perpetual destiny of mankind, and that miserable fiction of shallow declamation and specious sophistry would be reality and truth.

CXXXVII. It remains only to add a proposition which is indeed a corollary from the foregoing statements. If a nation be divided into various distinct societies, the obligations which had accrued to the whole, before the division, are, unless they have been the subject of a special

(d) L. viii. c. xiv.

(e) "L'unité permanente qui s'établit, et le developpemeut progressif qui s'opére par cette tradition incessante des hommes aux hommes, et des générations aux générations, c'est là le genre humain; c'est son originalité et sa grandeur; c'est un des traits qui marquent l'homme pour la souverainté dans ce monde, et pour l'immortalité au delà de ce monde.

"C'est de là qui dérivent et par là que se fondent la famille et l'état, la propriété et l'hérédité, la patrie, l'histoire, la gloire, tous les faits et tous les sentiments qui constituent la vie étendue et perpetuelle de l'humanité au milieu de l'apparition si bornée et de la disparition si rapide des individus humains.

"La République sociale supprime tout cela: elle ne voit dans les hommes que des êtres isolés et éphémères qui ne parissent dans la vie et sur cette terre, théâtre de la vie, que pour y prendre leur subsistance et leur plaisir, chacun pour son compte seul, au même titre et sans autre fin.

"C'est précisément la condition des animaux. Parmi eux, point de lieu, point d'action qui survive aux individus, et s'étende à tous; point d'appropriation permanente, point de transmission héréditaire, point d'ensemble ni de progrès dans la vie de l'espèce; lieu que des individus qui paraissent et passent, prenant en passant leur part des biens de la terre et des plaisirs de la vie, dans la mesure de leur besoin et de leur forcequi font leur droit."-De la Democratic en France, par M. Guizot, pp. 58-60. (f) Vide ante, Chapter VII. p. 58.

(g) "Item fœdera pacis et induciarum possunt sub hoc capite collocari, non quatenus servanda sunt postquam sunt facta; hoc enim potius pertinet ad jus naturale."-Suarez, De Legibus et Deo Legislatore, p. 109.

(h) "Je ne crois pas" (says Abbé Mably) "qu'il soit nécessaire de parler dans cet ouvrage de la fidélité scrupuleuse avec laquelle les Etats doivent remplir leurs engagemens; je ne fais pas ici un traité de droit natural. D'ailleurs que pourrois-je ajouter à ce que tout de savans hommes ont écrit sur cette matière? Exécuter ces promesses, c'est le bien de la société générale, c'est la base de tout le bonheur de chaque société particulière; tout nous le prouve, tout nous le démontre, cette vérité dont de mauvais raisonneurs veulent douter est connue des peuples les moins policés; et les princes malheureux qui se font un jeu de leurs sermens, feignent de la respecter, si leur ambition n'est pas stupide ou brutale."-Tome i. p. 111.

is

[*158]
agreement, rateably binding upon the different parts: (i) "Contra
*evenit" (as Grotius expresses himself) "ut quæ una civitas
fuerat, dividatur, aut consensu mutuo, aut vi bellicâ, sicut corpus imperii
Persici divisum est in Alexandri successores. Quod cum sit, plura pro
uno existunt summa imperia, cum suo jure in partes singulas. Si quid
autem commune fuerit, id aut communiter est administrandum, aut pro
rato portionibus dividendum."(k) And "so" (says Mr. Chancellor
Kent) if a State should be divided in respect to territory, its rights and
obligations are not impaired; and if they have not been apportioned by
special agreement, those rights are to be enjoyed, and those obligations
fulfilled, by all the parts in common."() So Mr. Justice Story, de-
livering a judgment in the Supreme Court of the United States, observed:
"It has been asserted as a principle of the common law, that the division
of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property;
and this principle is equally consonant with the common sense of man-
kind, and the maxims of eternal justice."(m) Lastly, it should be ob-
served, that this principle is in viridi observantia in International prac-
tice, and was incorporated into the treaty by which the modern kingdom
of Belgium was established.(n)

(i) "Das übrigens die Acte der Staatsgewalt eines früherern Herschers, welche des Verfassung des regierten Staates entsprechen, auch für der Nachfolger verbindlich sind, kann gewiss nach internationalem Recht in keiner Zweifel gezogen werden."-Heffters, s. 57, p. 111; Zacharia, Staats und Bundesrecht, s. 58.

(k) Grotius, 1. ii. c. ix. s. 10, p. 327.

(2) Kent's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 25.

(m) Terrett and others v. Taylor and Others, ix., Cranch's (American) Reports, 50; citing Kelly v. Harrison, 2 John. C. 29; Jackson v. Lunn, 5 John. C. 109 (American); Calvin's Case, 7 Co. 27.

(n) Wheaton's Hist. 546.

PART THE THIR D.

*CHAPTER I.

OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

[*159]

CXXXVIII. The Sources and the Subjects of International Law having been stated, it remains to consider the objects of this system of jurisprudence; that is, the rights which are to be ascertained, protected, and enforced by this law. (a)

CXXXIX. These rights flow as moral and logical consequences from the positions laid down in the first chapter with regard to the individuality and intercommunion of States, and from the definition of a State in the second chapter. Some of these rights concern more immediately the internal and domestic, others the external and foreign condition of a State. Moreover, the rights of nations, like the rights of individuals, admit of a general division into rights which relate to persons, to things, and to the mode of their enforcement.

CXL. These are rights properly so called-rights stricti juris; but the constant intercourse and increasing civilization of nations has given rise to a usage and practice which greatly mitigates the severity with which these rights, *abstractedly considered, might be exercised,

both with respect to the foreign community, in its aggregate [*160]

capacity, and with respect to the persons of the individual members belonging to it. This usage is called comitas gentium-the comity of nations-droit de convenance.

CXLI. With regard to the intercourse of individual members of different States, this COMITY has been suffered to grow up into what may be termed a jus gentium privatum; and which requires, on account of its magnitude and importance, a separate and distinct notice in another part of this work.

CXLII. With regard to a State in its aggregate capacity, questions of comity being much fewer in kind, and rarer in occurrence, may be

(a) "Jus gentium est sedium occupatio, ædificatio, munitio, bella, captivitates, servitutes, postliminia, fœdera, paces, induciæ, legatorum non violandorum religio, connubia inter alienigenas prohibita. Hoc inde jus gentium appellatur, quia eo jure omnes ferê gentes utuntur."-Decret. i., Dist. i. c. ix.

+

+

conveniently mentioned and distinguished in the general treatment of rights properly so called.

CXLIII. But with regard to both, the fundamental distinction between the usage of comity and the right stricti juris must never be forgotten.(b) *The violation of rights stricti juris may be redressed by [*161] forcible means, by the operation of war, which in the community of nations answers to the act of the judicial and executive power in the community of individuals. But the departure from the usage of comity cannot be legally redressed by such means. The remedy, where expostulation has failed, must be a corresponding reciprocity of practice on the part of the nations whose subjects are so treated. "Illud quoque sciendum est," observes Grotius; "si quis quid debet, non ex justitiâ propriâ, sed ex virtute aliâ, puta liberalitate, gratiâ, misericordiâ, dilectione, id sicut in foro exigi non potest, ita nec armis deposci."(c) It is, however, often a question of some nicety and difficulty to ascertain to which class an asserted claim belongs, because the usage which had its origin in the precarious concession of Comity may be, and in many instances has been transferred through uninterrupted exercise and the lapse of time, into the certain domain of Right.(d)

(b) "Non minus sollicitè separavimus ea quæ juris sunt, strictè ac propriè dicti, unde restitutionis obligatio oritur, et ea quæ juris esse dicuntur, quia aliter agere cum alio aliquo rectæ rationis dictato pugnat."-Grot. Proleg. s. 41.

In the case of The Maria, Lord Stowell observes (speaking of Art. 12 of the Order of Council, 1664, which directs, "That when any ship, met withal by the Royal Navy or other ship commissionated, shall fight or make resist, the said ship and goods shall be adjudged lawful prize:") "I am aware that in those orders and proclamations are to be found some articles not very consistent with the law of nations as understood now, or indeed at that time, for they are expressly censured by Lord Clarendon. But the article I refer to is not of those he reprehends; and it is observable that Sir Robert Wiseman, then the King's Advocate-General, who reported upon the Articles in 1673, and expresses a disapprobation of some of them as harsh and novel, does not mark this article with any observation of censure. I am therefore warranted in saying that it was the rule, and the undisputed rule of the British Admiralty. I will not say that that the rule may not have been broken in upon in some instances by considerations of comity or of policy, by which it may be fit that the administration of this species of law should be tempered in the hands of those tribunals which have a right to entertain and apply them; for no man can deny that a State may recede from its extreme rights, and that its supreme councils are authorised to determine in what cases it may be fit to do so, the particular captor having in no case any other right and title than what the State itself would possess under the same facts of capture."-1 Rob. Ad. Rep., 367, 368.

And again, further on in the same case, he says: "It is lastly said, that they have proceeded only against the merchant vessels, and not against the frigate, the principal wrong-doer. On what grounds this was done-whether on that sort of comity and respect which is not unusually shown to the immediate property of great and august Sovereigns, or how otherwise, I am again not judicially informed; but it can be no legal bar to the right of a plaintiff to proceed, that he has for some reason or other declined to proceed against another party, against whom he had an equal or possibly a superior title."-Ib. p. 376.

"De officiis innoxiœæ utilitatis, quæ, si primum illorum originem spectaveris, sunt imperfecta, per ea, quæ accedunt, autem in perfecta mutari atque transire possunt; paullo difficilior est disquisitio."-De Necessitate et Usu Juris Gentium Dissertatio, c. ii. s. 17.-Pestel.

See the part of this work which relates to COMITY for distinction between Jus Gentium and Jus inter Gentes. (d) Vide ante, p. 11.

(c) Grotius, 1. ii. c. xxii. s. 16.