nations, "quæ societatis humanæ vinculum continent," (i) and which are the subject of international jurisprudence, and the science of the international lawyer-jus inter gentes.(1) *The strength and virtue of that law (it has been well said) are such that no particular nation can lawfully prejudice the same [4] by any their several laws and ordinances, more than a man by his private resolutions the law of the whole commonwealth or state wherein he liveth; for as civil law, being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore overrule each several part of the same body, so there is no reason that any one commonwealth of itself should to the prejudice of anether annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath agreed.() X. To clothe with reality the abstract idea of justice, to secure by law within its own territories the maintenance of right against the aggression of the individual wrong-doer, is the primary object of a State, the great duty of each separate society. To secure by law, throughout the world, () the maintenance of right against the aggression of the national wrong-doer, is the primary object of the commonwealth of states, and the great duty of the society of + societies. Obedience to the law is as necessary for the liberty of states as it is for the liberty *of individuals. Of both it may be said with equal truth, "legum idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possumus."(m) [*5] XI. It has been said that States are capable of rights, and liable to obligations; but it must be remembered that they can never be the subjects of criminal law. (n) To speak of inflicting punishment upon a (i) Grot. de Jure B. et P. 1. ii. 26. () It is to the English civilian Zouch that we owe the introduction of this correct phrase, the forerunner of the terms International Law, now in general use. See Von Ompteda, Litteratur der Völkerrecht, s. 64. D'Aguesseau afterwards adopted the phrase jus inter gentes.-Tom. i. 444, 521; Instit. au Droit Public, vii. 2 partie, 1. (k) Hooker, ib., b. 1, s. 10. "Dicitur ergo humana lex quia proximè ab hominibus inventa et posita est. Dico autem proximè quia primordialiter omnis lex humana derivatur aliquo modo à lege eterna."-Suarez, Tractatus de Legibus et Deo legislatore, c. 3, p. 12 (ed. Lond. 1679.) "Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur; nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est: vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod verò naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peræquè custoditur; vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur."-Dig. lib. i. tit. i. s. 9. (1) "Dieselbe Kraft welche das Recht hervortreibt, bildet auch den Staat, ohne welchen das Recht nur ein unvollständiges Daseyn, eine prekäre Existenz hätte, ohne den der gemeine Wille, auf dem das Recht beruht, mehr ein Wunsch, als ein wirklicher, kräftiger Wille seyn würde."-Puchta, Instit. xi. 27. "Dennoch ist seine erste und unabweisliche Aufgabe die Idee des Rechts in der sichtbaren Welt herrschend zu machen."-Savigny, R. R. b. 1, k. ii. s. 9, 25. (m) Cic. pro Cluentio, 53. "Der Staat ist die Anstalt zur Beherrschung des Rechtes in einem bestimmten Volke, das höchste Rechtsinstitut dieser Nation."Kaltenborn, Völkerrecht, 259. (n) Savigny, R. R., 2, 94-96, has some excellent remarks on the analogous subject of the capacities and liabilities of corporations in a state. See Pinheiro Ferreira's Commentaries on Vattel, wherever the word "punir" Occurs. State, is to mistake both the principles of criminal jurisprudence and the nature of the legal personality of a corporation. Criminal law is concerned with a natural person; a being of thought, feeling, and will. A legal person is not, strictly speaking, a being of these attributes, though, through the medium of representation and of government, the will of certain individuals is considered as the will of the corporation; but only for certain purposes. There must be individual will to found the jurisdiction of criminal law. Will by representation cannot found that jurisdiction. Nor is this proposition inconsistent with that which ascribes to States a capacity of civil rights, and a liability to civil obligations. This capacity and liability require for their subject only a will competent to acquire and possess property, and the rights belonging to it. A legal as well as a natural person has this will. The greatest corporation of all, the State, has this will in a still greater degree than the minor subordinate corporations-the creatures of its own municipal law. The attribute of this limited will is consistent with the idea and object of a legal person. But the attribute of the unlimited will, requisite for the commission of a crime, is wholly inconsistent with this idea and object. The mistake respecting the liability of nations to *punishment, [*6] which appears in Grotius and Vattel, arises from two causes: First, from an indistinct and inaccurate conception of the true character of a State; secondly, from confounding the individual rulers or ministers with that of the nation which they govern or represent. The error may be fairly illustrated by an analogy drawn from municipal law. Lunatics and minors, like corporations, have no natural capacity of acting; an artificial capacity is therefore vested in their representatives, their guardians or curators. The lunatics and minors are rendered, by the acts of these representatives, capable of civil rights, and liable to civil obligations; but the possibility of their being rendered liable to punishment for the vicarious commission of crime, is a proposition as yet unknown to any human code of municipal law. Justice and law lay down the rule: "Ut noxa tantum caput sequatur."() It does not militate with this doctrine, to maintain that a State may be injured and insulted by another; may seek redress by war, or may require the deposition of the ruler, or the exile of the representative of another State; or may deprive a State of its territory, wholly or in part. These measures may be necessary to preserve its own personality and existence, the welfare of other States, and the peace of the world, and on these grounds, but upon no other, they may be defensible. These acts, when lawful, are acts, directly or indirectly, of self-defence, not of punishment. It has happened, that corporations have been subjected to calamities which at first sight resemble punishments.(p) Municipalities have been deprived of (0) It is hardly necessary to say, that the awful question of God's dealing with sinful nations does not enter into this discussion. "Nunquam curiæ a provinciarum rectoribus generali condemnatione mulctentur, cum utique hoc et æquitas suadeat et regula juris antiqui, ut noxo tantum caput sequatur, ne propter unius fortasse delictum alii dispendiis affligantur."-Nov. Majoriani, tit. 7; Hugo Jus Civile Antejust. p. 1386, s. 4: cited Savigny, R. R. 2, 321. (P) Savigny, R. R. 2, 318. their legal personality, or have been stripped of their *honours and privileges, as regiments have been deprived of their colours. But [*7] these acts, duly considered, are acts of the politician, not of a judge.(7) We read in Roman history of the punishment inflicted upon the city of Capua, which had revolted from Rome, and become the ally of Hannibal. Reconquered Capua was stained with the blood of her eminent citizens, and disfranchised of all her corporate privileges.(r) But this, and other less remarkable instances of the like kind in Roman history, did not purport to be, and were not judicial applications of criminal law; but were rather acts of state policy, intended to strike a salutary terror equally into foes and subjects.(s) A very different principle appears in the pages of Roman jurisprudence, in which the obligation arising from the commission of a crimeobligatio ex delicto-is distinguished from the obligation arising from the possession of a benefit obtained by the commission of a crime-obligatio ex re, ex eo quod ad aliquem pervenit.(1) The latter, but not the former obligation may bind a corporate body. Under what circumstances States become responsible for the guilty acts of their individual members, (u) will be considered *hereafter. But even in these cases the State is not punishable, though liable [*8] to make compensation for the injury which it has sanctioned. XII. Vattel describes with simplicity and truth the province of Inter (7) Livy, lib. xxvi. c. 16: De supplicio componi," &c. (r) C. 17: "Cæterum habitari tantum, tanquam urbem, Capuam, frequentarique placuit: corpus nullum civitatis, nec senatus, nec plebis concilium, nec magistratus esse sine consilio publico, sine imperio, multitudinem, nullius rei inter se sociam, ad consensum inhabilem fore." (s) C. 17: "Confessio expressa hosti quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendas pœnas ab infidelibus sociis, et quam nihil in Annibale auxilii ad receptos in fidem tuendos esset." (t) Dig. xliii. t. xvi. s. 4: “De vi.—Si vi me dejecerit quis nomine municipum in municipes mihi interdictum reddendum Pomponius ait, si quid, ad eos pervenit." (u) "Solere pænæ expetendæ causa bella suscipi, et supra ostendimus et passim docent historia: ac plerumque hæc causa cum altera de damno reparando conjuncta est, quando idem actus et vitiosus fuit et damnum reipsa intulit, ex quibus duabus qualitatibus duæ diversæ nascuntur obligationes."-Grotius, lib. ii. c. 20, s. 28. "Sciendum quoque est, reges, et qui par regibus jus obtinent, jus habere pænas poscendi non tantum ob injurias in se aut subditos suos commissas, sed et ob eas quæ ipsos peculiariter non tangunt, sed in quibus vis personis jus naturæ aut gentium immaniter violant."-Ib. lib. ii. c. 20, s. 40. "Et eatenus sententiam sequimur Innocentii, et aliorum qui bello agunt peti posse eos qui in naturam delinquunt: contra quam sentiunt Victoria, Vasquius, Azorius, Molina, alii, qui ad justitiam belli requirere videntur, ut qui suscipit aut læsus sit, in se aut republica suâ, aut ut in eum qui bello impetitur jurisdictionem habeat. Ponunt enim illi puniendi potestatem esse effectum proprium jurisdictionis civilis, cum nos eam sentiamus venire etiam ac jure naturali, qua de re aliquid diximus libri primi initio. Et sane si illorum a quibus dissentimus admittatur sententia, jam hostis in hostem puniendi jus non habebit, etiam post justè susceptum bellum ex causâ non punitivâ: quod tamen jus plerique concedunt, et usus, omnium gentium confirmat, non tantum postquam debellatum est, sed et manente bello; non ex ullâ jurisdictione civili, sed ex illo jure naturali quod et ante institutas civitates fuit, et nunc etiam viget, quibus in locis homines, vivunt in familias non in civitates distributi."-Ib. lib. ii. c. 20, s. 40 (4). C. 21: "De communicatione pœnarum." national Jurisprudence: "Le droit des Gens" (he says) "est la science du droit qui a lieu entre les Nations et les Etats, et des obligations qui répondent à ce droit."(x) The same favourite expounder of International Law does not hesitate to class among these obligations binding upon the national conscience, the duty of succouring another nation unjustly invaded and oppressed. The fact that no defensive alliance formally subsists between the two nations cannot, he says, be alleged as an excuse for the neglect of this duty. The nation that renders the succour, is keeping alive that benevolent spirit of mutual assistance, the application of which she herself may one day need. To perform her duty to another is, in truth, to strengthen the foundations of her own security; and in the case of the nation, *as in the case of the individual, duty and true self-love point to the same path.(y) [*9] The whole edifice of this science, pronounced by the still higher authority of Grotius to be the noblest department of jurisprudence,(z) may be said to rest upon the sure foundations-first, of moral truth; and, secondly, of historical fact : 1. The former demonstrates that independent communities are free moral agents. 2. The latter, that they are mutually recognized as such in the universal community of which they are individual members. (a) XIII. A TREATISE on International Jurisprudence appears to admit of the following general arrangement: (x) Prélim. s. 3. (y)" Ainsi quand un Etat voisin est injustement attaqué par un ennemi puissant, qui menace de l'opprimer, si vous pouvez le défendre sans vous exposer à un grand danger, il n'est pas douteux que vous ne deviez le faire. N'objectez point qu'il n'est pas permis à un souverain d'exposer la vi de ses soldats pour le salut d'un étranger, avec qu'il n'aura contracté aucune alliance défensive. Il peut lui-même se trouver dans le cas d'avoir besoin de secours; et par conséquent mettre en vigueur cet esprit d'assistance mutuelle, c'est travailler au salut de sa propre Nation."-Liv. ii. c. i. s. 4. (2) Grotius, Proleg. 32: "In hoc opere quod partem jurisprudentiæ longè nobilissimam continet." Aristoteles, Eth. lib. i. c. 2 : "'Αγαπητὸν μὲν καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ καλλιον δε καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.” (a) Domat, Traité des Lois, c. xi. s. 30. Kaltenborn, Kritik des Völkerrechts, s. 295. "Possunt autem gentium præcepta ad unum principium revocari, quo quasi fundamento suo nituntur. Oportet enim esse gentes vel respublicas, quæ se invicem ut liberas et sui juris nationes agnoscunt. Hac agnitione sine quâ jus gentium ne cogitari quidem potest efficitur, ut illæ civitates personarum ad instar habeantur, quæ non minus quam singuli homines caput habentes suo jure utuntur, et mutuo juris vinculo inter se junguntur. Hujus vinculi definitio atque ponderatio juris gentium argumentum est."-Doctrina Juris Philosophica, &c., Warnkoenig, s. 145, p. 189. 1. An inquiry into the origin and nature of the Laws which govern international relations (leges.) 2. The Subjects of these laws. The original and immediate subjects are States considered in their corporate character. 3. The Objects of these laws. These objects are Things, Rights, and the Obligations which correspond to them (Res, Jura, Obligationes.) 4. Certain Subjects of these laws which, though only to be accounted as such mediately and derivatively, yet, for the sake of convenience, require a separate consideration. These Subjects of International Law are the following individuals who are said to represent a state : 1. Sovereigns. 2. Ambassadors. Also another class of public officers who are not clothed, accurately speaking, with a representative character, but who are entitled to a quasi diplomatic position, namely 3. Consuls. 4. Lastly, the International Status of Foreign Spiritual Powers, especially of the Pope, requires a distinct consideration." XIV. Public International Rights, like the Private Rights of an Individual, are capable of being protected and enforced by Legal Means. *These Legal Means are of two kinds, aptly expressed by jurists as being (1) viâ amicabili, and (2) viâ facti. 1. Viâ amicabili. 2. Viâ facti. 1. Negotiation. 2. Arbitration. 1. Reprisals. 2. Embargo. [*11] When war has actually begun, we enter upon the jus belli, which is to be considered with reference to 1. The Rights of Belligerents; 2. The Rights of Neutrals "Sequitur enim de jure belli: in quo et suscipiendo, et gerendo, et deponendo, jus, ut plurimum valet, et fides. (a) For the wars (as Lord Bacon says) are no massacres and confusions, but they are the highest trials of right."(b) Grotius points out, with his usual sound and true philosophy, the proper place, object, and functions of war in the system of International Law (c) "Tantum vero abest ut admittendum sit, quod quidam fingunt, in bello omnia jura cessare, ut nec suscipi bellum debeat nisi ad juris consecutionem, nec susceptum geri nisi intra juris et fidei modum. Benè Demosthenes bellum esse in eos dixit, qui judiciis coerceri nequeunt; judicia enim vigent adversus eos qui invalidiores se sentiunt: in eos qui (a) Cicero de Rep. lib. ii. c. 14; and he adds, " horumque ut publici interpretes essent lege sanximus." (b) Bacon's Works, vol. v. p. 384 (ed. Basil Montagu.) (c) Grotii Proleg. 25, De Jure Belli et Pacis; though he illogicially misplaces the treatment of it in his great work, beginning, as indeed he admits, with the end of his subject. |