Statement of the Case.

"SEC. 20. That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may make all needful regulations for the carrying into effect of this act.

"SEC. 21. That this act shall go into effect on the ninetieth day after its passage; and all wooden packages containing ten or more pounds of oleomargarine found on the premises of any dealer on or after the ninetieth day succeeding the date of the passage of this act shall be deemed to be taxable under section eight of this act, and shall be taxed, and shall have affixed thereto the stamps, marks and brands required by this act or by regulations made pursuant to this act; and for the purposes of securing the affixing of the stamps, marks and brands required by this act, the oleomargarine shall be regarded as having been manufactured and sold, or removed from the manufactory for consumption or use, on or after the day this act takes effect; and such stock on hand at the time of the taking effect of this act may be stamped, marked and branded under special regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury; and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may authorize the holder of such packages to mark and brand the same and to affix thereto the proper tax-paid stamps."

The first indictment against Kollock set forth that pursuant to the authority conferred on the Commissioner of International Revenue by the sixth section of the act of August 2, 1886, "the said Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, did, on the twelfth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, prescribe certain regulations, in substance and to the effect, among other things, that the wooden or paper packages in which retail dealers in oleomargarine were required by said act of Congress to pack the oleomargarine sold by them, such retail dealers, should have printed or branded upon them in the case of each sale the name and address of the retail dealer making the same; likewise the words 'pound' and 'oleomargarine' in letters not less than one quarter of an inch square, and likewise a figure or figures of the same size indicating (in connection with said words pound' and 'oleomargarine') the

Statement of the Case.

quantity of oleomargarine so sold, written, printed or branded on such wooden or paper packages and placed before the said word pound,' and that the said words 'oleomargarine' and 'pound so required to be printed or branded on such packages as aforesaid in the case of each sale as aforesaid and the said figure or figures so indicative of quantity as aforesaid in the case of each sale as aforesaid and so required to be written, printed or branded on such packages as aforesaid should be so placed thereon as to be plainly visible to the purchaser at the time of the delivery to him, such purchaser, by such retail dealers of the oleomargarine sold to such purchaser, by them, such retail dealers.”

And thus continued:

"That on the fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six, and at the District aforesaid, one Israel C. Kollock, late of the District aforesaid, being then and there engaged in business as a retail dealer in oleomargarine at a store of him, the said Israel C. Kollock, situated on Fourth street southeast, in the city of Washington, in the said District, did then and there and at said store knowingly sell and deliver to a certain Florence Davis one half of one pound of oleomargarine as and for butter, which said one half of one pound of oleomargarine was not then and there and at the time of such sale and delivery thereof packed in a new wooden or paper package having then and there printed or branded thereon the name and address of him, the said Israel C. Kollock, in letters one quarter of an inch square and the words 'pound' and 'oleomargarine' in letters of like size and a figure or figures of like size written, printed or branded thereon indicative (in connection with said words 'pound' and 'oleomargarine') of the quantity of oleomargarine so sold and delivered to her, the said Florence Davis, as aforesaid, and which said one half of one pound of oleomargarine at the time it was so knowingly sold and delivered to her, the said Florence Davis, as aforesaid, by him, the said Israel C. Kollock, as aforesaid, was then and there and at the time of the sale and delivery thereof as aforesaid packed in a paper package upon which there had not

Opinion of the Court.

been printed, branded or written any or either of the marks and characters aforesaid so required by the said regulations to be placed thereon as aforesaid, as he, the said Israel C. Kollock, then and there well knew, against the form of the statute, etc."

Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson and Mr. Henry E. Davis for petitioner.

Mr. Solicitor General opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

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By the terms of the act, manufacturers of oleomargarine are required to pack it in wooden packages “marked, stamped and branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the proval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe"; and all sales by manufacturers and wholesale dealers must be in "original stamped packages."

Retail dealers are required to "pack the oleomargarine sold by them in suitable wooden or paper packages, which shall be marked and branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe."

And fine and imprisonment are denounced on "every person who knowingly sells or offers for sale, or delivers or offers to deliver, any oleomargarine in any other form than in new wooden or paper packages as above described, or who packs in any package any oleomargarine in any manner contrary to law, or who falsely brands any package or affixes a stamp on any package denoting a less amount of tax than that required by law."

Kollock was convicted as a retail dealer in oleomargarine of knowingly selling and delivering one half pound of that commodity, which was not packed in a wooden or paper package bearing thereon any or either of the marks or characters provided for by the regulations and set forth in the indict

Opinion of the Court.

ment. It is conceded that the stamps, marks and brands were prescribed by the regulations, and it is not denied that Kollock had the knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of such stamps, marks and brands. But it is argued that the statute is invalid because it "does not define what act done or omitted to be done shall constitute a criminal offence," and delegates the power "to determine what acts shall be criminal" by leaving the stamps, marks and brands to be defined by the Commissioner.

We agree that the courts of the United States, in determining what constitutes an offence against the United States, must resort to the statutes of the United States, enacted in

pursuance of the Constitution. But here the law required the packages to be marked and branded; prohibited the sale of packages that were not; and prescribed the punishment for sales in violation of its provisions; while the regulations simply described the particular marks, stamps and brands to be used. The criminal offence is fully and completely defined by the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with, the law itself, and was specifically authorized thereby in effectuation of the legislation which created the offence. We think the act not open to the objection urged, and that it is disposed of by previous decisions. United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238; United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211.

In the last case Caha had been convicted of perjury, under section 5392 of the Revised Statutes, in a contest in a local land office in respect of the validity of a homestead entry, the oath having been administered by one of the land officers before whom the contest had been carried on. It was contended that the indictment alleged no offence, because the statute made no provision for such a contest before those officers, and, therefore, it could not be said that the oath was taken in a "case in which a law of the United States authorized an oath to be administered."

But it was held by this court, in view of the general grant

Opinion of the Court.

of authority to the land department to prescribe appropriate regulations for the disposition of the public lands; the rules and regulations prescribed by that department for contests in all cases of such disposition, including homestead entries; and the frequent recognition by acts of Congress of contests in respect to that class of entries, that the local land officers in hearing and deciding upon a contest as to a homestead entry constituted a competent tribunal, and the contest so pending before them was a case in which the laws of the United States authorized an oath to be administered.

As bearing on the case in hand, we cannot do better than to quote at length from Mr. Justice Brewer, delivering the opinion, (p. 218) as follows:

"This is not a case in which the violation of a mere regulation of a department is adjudged a crime. United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, is in point. There was an act of Congress making false testimony in support of a claim against the United States perjury, and the defendant in that case was indicted for making a false affidavit before a justice of the peace of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in support of a claim against the United States. It was contended that the justice of the peace, an officer of the State, had no authority under the acts of Congress to administer oaths, and that, therefore, perjury could not be laid in respect to a false affidavit before such officer. It appeared, however, that the Secretary of the Treasury had established, as a regulation for the government of his department and its officers in their action upon claims, that affidavits taken before any justice of the peace of any of the States should be received and considered in support of such claims. And upon this the conviction of perjury was sustained, Mr. Justice McLean alone dissenting. was held that the Secretary had power to establish the regulation, and that the effect of it was to make the false affidavit before the justice of the peace perjury within the scope of the statute, and this notwithstanding the fact that such justice of the peace was not an officer of the United States. Much stronger is the case at bar, for the tribunal was composed of officers of the government of the United States; it was created

It