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AGNEW v. UNITED STATES.
Opinion of the Court.
should have contained a copy of at least one of them, but it does not, and instead there is a brief statement that they were bonds of "the Globe Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Company, Citrus County, Florida, each of the value of one thousand dollars, payable in gold coin of the United States, in ten years from date or on call, at or after the expiration of two years from date, drawing interest at eight per cent, semiannually, in gold coin, payable on the 15th day of December and June in each year, according to tenor of coupons attached, upon presentation and surrender of said coupons respectively; default in payment of coupons and continuing default for two months, the whole becomes due; all bearing even date and of the same tenor and same term, ten years; executed in pursuance of vote of the stockholders and board of directors; secured by first-mortgage bond upon all property of even date, present and future, acquired by the company, the right to redeem after two years being optional with the company; said bonds dated 11th December, 1893; signed by John A. Bishop and Herbert A. Bishop, the original having been withdrawn by order of the court, to be returned to the receiver of the First National Bank of Ocala."
Agnew's guarantee was in these words:
"Know all men by these presents that for and in consideration of the sum of ($5) five dollars cash in hand paid by the First National Bank of Ocala and for other good and valuable consideration I hereby guarantee to the said bank the payment on demand of both principal and interest of fifteen (15) bonds of the Globe Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Company, numbered from one (1) to five (5), both inclusive; eleven (11) to fifteen (15), both inclusive, and twenty-one (21) to twenty-five (25), both inclusive, for one thousand ($1000) dollars each, total fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars, and bearing interest at the rate of eight (8%) per cent per annum. It is agreed and understood that I hereby guarantee the payment of the principal of these bonds, payable on demand, with accrued interest.
"This agreement and contract is to be binding on me, my heirs, executors, administrators or assigns."
Opinion of the Court.
"Bonds of the Globe Phosphate Mining and Manufacturing Co. Nos. 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77 and 79 are to be included in the above guarantee, and I hereby guarantee principal and interest on all of the above-described bonds."
The evidence was to the effect that five Globe Phosphate bonds, numbered from one to five, were purchased by Agnew for the bank at fifty cents on the dollar and credited at par. But Agnew testified that he purchased them for himself. It also appeared that two lots of Globe Phosphate bonds, of $10,000 each, were purchased at twenty-five cents on the dollar, and that Agnew was credited on his personal account with $10,000, in each instance, and the bonds placed in the assets of the bank; and that the bonds were subsequently sent away to be used as collateral security, and the guarantee forwarded to be put with them. The evidence further tended to show that the bonds were of little, if any, value, and that Mr. Agnew's financial condition was such as to place his guarantee in the same category. And although Agnew testified on his own behalf he did not refer to the subject of the guaranty, or his intentions and ability in regard to it, while it appeared that the credits of these bonds were never consented to nor authorized at any meeting of the directors or stockholders.
The bonds were payable in ten years with an option to the company to pay after two years, it being also provided that for default in payment of interest, which was payable semiannually, continuing two months, the whole might become. due. If the president of the bank received a personal credit of $20,000 for these bonds, under the circumstances disclosed, the court was not required to instruct as requested that from his guaranty that the bonds and interest should be paid, the jury might find that there was no intent to injure and defraud the bank in the transaction.
The true view of this branch of the case was fairly covered by the charge of the court as follows: "There is testimony. tending to show that the defendant at the time he was thus depositing the bonds, gave a guarantee that the bonds were good, and that he would guarantee the payment of principal
Opinion of the Court.
and interest. You can take that into consideration, and such guarantee can only be considered as determining the value of those bonds at that time and the intent of the party in such transaction... As I say again, gentlemen, the only difficult question for you to determine is the intent of the accused. The question of the intent is to be determined by the facts and circumstances and the surroundings at the time of the transaction; but, gentlemen, the law presumes that every party who in any way attempts anything by any guarantee or anything of that kind which is dependent upon future successful operations, takes the risk of the success, and that if a person commits an offence with the intent of temporarily injuring or defrauding another party or a banking institution, although it may be his intent at the time to finally recompense or prevent any injury resulting from such act, he is not protected by such intent to finally correct the temporary wrong deed; or, in this case, if you are satisfied that at the time he placed those bonds there he knew that they were worthless or of a very small value and had a large value charged to the bank and placed to his account if he did that with the intent, for the time being, to injure the bank and take a wrongful advantage of the credit of the bank, no matter if at that time he had an intent to in the future remedy any injury that might come to the bank, it would not protect him in your finding or from your finding, what the intent was at that time."
We have carefully explored the evidence and considered the errors assigned, whether pressed in argument or not, and have been unable to discover any adequate ground for the reversal of the judgment.
SCOTT v. DONALD.
SCOTT v. DONALD.
GARDNER v. DONALD.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
Nos. 411, 412, 413. Argued October 21, 22, 1896. — - Decided January 18, 1897.
Where a suit is brought against defendants who claim to act as officers of a State and under color of an unconstitutional statute commit acts of wrong and injury to the property of the plaintiff, to recover money or property in their hands unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the State, or for compensation for damages, such suit is not an action against the State within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Although the question of the jurisdiction of the court below has not been certified to this court in the manner provided by the fifth section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, yet, as the case is before it in a case in which the law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States under another clause of that statute it has jurisdiction of the entire case and of all questions involved in it. Damages are the compensation which the law awards for an injury done; and exemplary damages are allowable, in excess of the actual loss, where a tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.
The intentional, malicious and repeated interference by the defendants with the exercise of personal rights and privileges secured to the plaintiffs by the Constitution of the United States, as alleged in the complaint, constitutes a wrong and injury not the subject of compensation by a mere money standard, but fairly within the doctrine of the cases wherein exemplary damages have been allowed, as those allegations of the complaints, though denied in the answers, have been sustained.
The statute of South Carolina of January 2, 1895, entitled "an act to further declare the law in reference to, and further regulate the use, sale, consumption, transportation and disposition of alcoholic liquids or liquors within the State of South Carolina, and to police the same," recognizes liquors and wines as commodities which may be lawfully made, bought and sold, and which must therefore be deemed to be the subject of foreign and interstate commerce, and is an obstruction to and interference with that commerce, and must, as to those of its provisions which affect the plaintiff's, stand condemned.
That statute is not an inspection law, and is not within the scope of the act of August 8, 1890, c. 728.
Statement of the Case.
Whether those provisions of the act which direct that so-called contraband liquors may be seized without warrant by any state constable, sheriff or policeman, while in transit or after arrival, whether in possession of a common carrier, depot agent, express agent or private person, and which subject common carriers to fine and imprisonment for carrying liquors in any package, cask, jug, box or other package, under any other than the proper name or brand known to the trade, and which forbid the bringing of any suit for damages alleged to arise by seizing and detention of liquors would be lawful in an inspection law otherwise valid, is not decided.
So far as these actions are concerned, the damages recovered were for acts committed under the alleged authority of the act of 1895, and cannot be affected by the provisions of the subsequent act of 1896, even if the invalidities of the former act were thereby remedied a matter on which no
opinion is expressed.
IN the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina, in February, 1895, two suits at law were brought by James Donald against J. M. Scott, and one by Donald against Gardner etc., wherein plaintiff sought to recover damages caused by the action of the defendants, who were state constables of the State of South Carolina, in seizing and carrying away several packages of wines and liquors belonging to the plaintiffs, and, at the time of the seizure, in the possession of railroad companies which as common carriers had brought the packages within the State.
It appeared that one of the packages, consisting of a case of domestic California wine, came by rail from Savannah, Georgia, whither it had been imported by the plaintiff; another, consisting of a case of whiskey, in bottles, made in Maryland, and imported by the plaintiff by way of the Baltimore Steam Packet line; and another, consisting of one barrel of bottled beer, made at Rochester, New York, and imported by the plaintiff into the State of South Carolina by way of the Old Dominion Steamship line.
Demurrers to the several declarations or complaints were interposed and overruled. Thereupon issues of fact were joined, and, trial by jury having been duly waived, the causes were tried and determined by the court, and resulted in findings and judgments in favor of the said plaintiff for the sum of three hundred dollars and costs in each case, respec