« ПретходнаНастави »
when the facts are found by the court below this court is concluded
by such findings. Egan v. Hart, 188.
6. On error to a state court the opinion of that court is to be treated as
part of the record, and it may be examined in order to ascertain the
questions presented, as may also be the entire record, if necessary to
throw light on the findings. Ib.
7. The finding by the trial court, sustained by the Supreme Court of the
State that the stream across which the dam complained of was erected
was a non-navigable stream, was a finding of fact which is conclusive
here, and affords ground broad enough on which to maintain the judg-
ment below, independent of any Federal question; and this court is
consequently without jurisdiction. Ib.
8. No Federal right was set up in this case until after the final decision
of the case by the Supreme Court of Missouri; and then by a petition
for rehearing. Held, that the claim of a Federal right came too late,
so far as the revisory power of this court is concerned. Pim v. St.
9. The judiciary act of 1891 does not give the defeated party in a Circuit
Court the right to have his case finally determined on the merits both
in this court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Robinson v. Cald-
10. A writ of error from this court removes a cause from a Circuit Court
to this court, and it is then for this court to determine whether it may
entertain jurisdiction of the cause removed, and to dispose of contro-
versies in respect of the form of the writ, the parties, and the citation
and service, without interference from any other court. In re Chet-
11. This court may issue writs of certiorari in all proper cases, and will
do so when the circumstances imperatively demand that form of in-
terposition, to correct excesses of jurisdiction, and in furtherance of
12. Where a suit is brought on a contract of which a patent is the subject-
matter, either to enforce such contract, or to annul it, the case arises
on the contract, or out of the contract, and not under the patent laws;
and, if brought in a state court, this court is without appellate juris-
diction to review the judgment unless it appears that a right under
the laws of the United States was properly set up and claimed which
was denied by the state court. Wade v. Lawder, 624.
See NATIONAL BANK, 4;
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
Under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 7, an appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals from an interiocutory order or decree of the Circuit Court,
granting an injunction and ordering an account, in a patent case, may
be from the whole order or decree; and upon such an appeal the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals may consider and decide the case on its merits,
and thereupon render or direct a final decree dismissing the bill.
Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 518.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. It was alleged in the bill, and there was evidence to show, that the
complainant intended to import for his own use, from time to time as
he might need the same, ales, wines and liquors, the products of
other States, of the value exceeding two thousand dollars, which were
threatened to be seized by the state constables, claiming to act under
the dispensary law; and the agreed statement of facts contained the
following statements: "Previo to filing of bill and temporary in-
junction granted in this case the state constables seized, intended and
threatened to seize in future, all intoxicating liquors whatsoever com-
ing into the State from other States and foreign countries, and to
carry out in full all the provisions of the dispensary law of January 2,
1895; and the value of the right of importation of ales, wines and
other liquors, products of other States and countries, is of the value
of two thousand dollars and upwards; and the difference in the price
to the consumer, like the plaintiff, of such liquor bought at the state
dispensary of South Carolina and bought out of the State is about
fifty to seventy-five per cent in favor of imported liquors." Held, that
such statements sufficiently concede that the pecuniary value of plain-
tiff's rights in controversy exceed the value of two thousand dollars;
and that it cannot be reasonably claimed that the plaintiff must post-
pone his application to the Circuit Court, as a court of equity, until
his property to an amount exceeding in value two thousand dollars
has been actually seized and confiscated, and when the preventive
remedy by injunction would be of no avail. Scott v. Donald, 107.
2. Under the circumstances set forth in the statement of the case, and in
the opinion of the court, it is clear that the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of California could not re-
strain the prosecution of his suit in the state courts by the petitioner,
and, if Federal questions arose, it could not prevent this court, or a
justice thereof, or the presiding judge of the state court, from grant-
ing writs of error, by restraining the parties from applying therefor;
nor could it properly direct their dismissal, having been granted.
In re Chetwood, 443.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Under the act of July 20, 1892, c. 208, the grand jury in the southern divis-
ion of the District of Montana had jurisdiction to find the indictment
which forms the subject of discussion in this case; and, after such
indictment had been found, the court had authority to remit it to the
other division for trial. Rosencrans v. United States, 257.
E. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.
The doctrine of the civil law and that of the common law, touching the
respective rights and duties of proprietors of upper and lower land as
to the flow of surface-water are conflicting; and it is the duty of this
court, in cases involving such rights and duties, to follow the decisions
of the local state courts, although it may involve apparently contra-
dictory decisions. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad,
See NATIONAL BANK, 4.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.
See INFANT, 4.
District of Columbia. See WILL.
See INFANT, 4.
See BOUNDARY LINE.
The use of the land, the subject of this controversy, being a public use,
and within the authority granted by the original reservation, the
extent of that use is a matter for determination by the public authori-
ties of Burlington, and cannot be restrained by an adjoining lot owner,
without reference to his right to compensation for the injury to his
lots. Burlington Gas Light Co. v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern
Railway Co., 370.
1. When the managers of a national bank make arrangements with deposi-
tors in the bank to give them credit at the bank for larger sums
than appear upon the credit side of their accounts up to specified
amounts and for a fixed time, and the proper officers of the bank make
entries thereof in the books of the bank in good faith and in the belief
that they have a right so to do, such an entry is not a false entry within
the meaning of that term as used in Rev. Stat. § 5209, and the person
so making it is not guilty of a violation of that statute in so doing.
Graves v. United States, 323.
2. A receiver of a national bank, appointed by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency in pursuance of law, acts under the control of the officer appoint-
ing him, and does not, by application to the proper court touching a
sale of personal property of the bank, become an officer of that court,
or place the assets of the bank within its control. In re Chetwood, 443.
3. When a state court has acquired jurisdiction of an action or suit to re-
cover moneys alleged to be due a national bank, in the hands of a re-
ceiver, the receiver's subsequent discharge and the substitution of an
agent in his place by the act of the stockholders does not oust it. Ib.
4. In an action against a national bank upon a contract, each party relied
on section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, by which a national bank,
upon filing its articles of association and organization certificate with
the Comptroller of the Currency, becomes a corporation, with power
"to make contracts" and other corporate powers, but is prohibited to
"transact any business, except such as is incidental and necessarily
preliminary to its organization, until it has been authorized by the
Comptroller of the Currency to commence the business of banking."
The defendant relied on the prohibition. The plaintiff relied on the
exception to the prohibition, and also contended that under the gen-
eral power to make contracts, the contract sued on was valid as between
the parties, even if contrary to the prohibition. Held, that a judgment
for the defendant in the highest court of the State might be reviewed
by this court on writ of error. McCormick v. Market Bank, 538.
5. By section 5136 of the Revised Statutes, a contract of lease, at a large
rent, of an office to be occupied "as a banking office, and for no other
purpose," for the term of five years, determinable at the end of any
year by either party, executed by a national bank as lessee, after hav-
ing duly filed its articles of association and organization certificate
with the Comptroller of the Currency, but not having been authorized
by him to commence the business of banking, is void, cannot be made
good by estoppel, and will not support an action against the bank to
recover anything beyond the value of what it has actually received
and enjoyed. Ib.
6. A creditor who receives from his debtor a transfer of shares in a national
bank as security for his debt, and who surrenders the certificates to
the bank, and takes out new ones in his own name, in which he is
described as pledgee, and holds them afterwards in good faith as such
pledgee and as collateral security for the payment of his debt, is not
a shareholder, subject to the personal liability imposed upon share-
holders by Rev. Stat. § 5151. Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Co., 606.
7. The previous cases relating to the liability of such shareholders examined
and held to establish: (1) That the real owner of the shares of the
capital stock of a national banking association may, in every case, be
treated as a shareholder within the meaning of section 5151; (2) That
if the owner transfers his shares to another person as collateral secur-
ity for a debt due to the latter from such owner, and if, by the direc-
tion or with the knowledge of the pledgee, the shares are placed on
the books of the association in such way as to imply that the pledgee
is the real owner, then the pledgee may be treated as a shareholder
within the meaning of section 5151 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, and therefore liable upon the basis prescribed by that
section for the contracts, debts and engagements of the association;
(3) That if the real owner of the shares transfers them to another
person, or causes them to be placed on the books of the association in
the name of another person, with the intent simply to evade the re-
sponsibility imposed by section 5151 on shareholders of national bank-
ing associations, such owner may be treated, for the purposes of that
section, as a shareholder, and liable as therein prescribed; (4) That
if one receives shares of the stock of a national banking association as
collateral security to him for a debt due from the owner, with power
of attorney authorizing him to transfer the same on the books of the
association, and being unwilling to incur the responsibilities of a
shareholder as prescribed by the statute, causes the shares to be trans-
ferred on such books to another, under an agreement that they are to
be held as security for the debt due from the real owner to his credi-
tor the latter acting in good faith and for the purpose only of secur-
ing the payment of that debt without incurring the responsibility of
a shareholder-he, the creditor, will not, although the real owner
may, be treated as a shareholder within the meaning of section 5151;
and, (5) That the pledgee of personal property occupies towards the
pledgor somewhat of a fiduciary relation, by virtue of which, he being
a trustee to sell, it becomes his duty to exercise his right of sale for
the benefit of the pledgor. Ib.
CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24.
OFFICER IN THE ARMY.
OFFICER IN THE NAVY.
A lieutenant in the Navy, assigned by order of the Secretary of the Navy
to duty as executive officer of a vessel of the United States, furnished
by the Secretary of the Navy to the State of New York as a school
ship, is entitled to sea pay, as well while the vessel is attached to
a wharf in the harbor of New York, as while she is on a cruise, and
although this service is called, in the Secretary's order for his detail,
"employment on shore duty," and notwithstanding he is receiving
pay from the State as instructor in its nautical school upon the vessel.
United States v. Barnette, 174.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25.