PARTIES.
1. The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill of complaint, or
that will enable the court to dispense with the presence of all the
parties, when numerous, except a determinate number, is not only an
interest in the question, but one in common in the subject-matter
of the suit a community of interest growing out of the nature and
condition of the right in dispute. Scott v. Donald, 107.
2. The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persous not parties
to the suit; as this is not a case where the defendants named repre-
sent those not named; and there is not alleged any conspiracy between
the parties defendant and other unknown parties; but the acts com-
plained of are tortious, and do not grow out of any common action
or agreement between constables and sheriffs of the State of South
Carolina. Ib.
See INFANT, 1, 2, 3.
PATENT FOR INVENTION.
See JURISDICTION, A, 12; B.
PERPETUITIES.
See TRUST, 1.
PLEADING.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
POLICE POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 28.
PRACTICE.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 7;
JURISDICTION, A, 4, 5, 6, 7. '
PUBLIC LAND.
1. A bill in equity against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, to restrain them from exercising
further jurisdiction with respect to the disposition of certain public
lands, and from further trespassing upon the plaintiff's right of quiet
possession thereof, and to compel the Secretary to prepare patents
therefor, to be issued to the plaintiff, in accordance with law, and to
the end that the plaintiff's title may be quieted and freed from cloud,
and for further relief, abates, as to the Secretary, upon his resignation
of his office, and cannot afterwards be maintained against the Com-
missioner alone. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 28.
2. In 1858, C. located a bounty land warrant issued to L. under the act of
March 3, 1855, c. 207, taking a certificate of location, which was re-
corded in the office of the recorder in the county in which the land
was situated. No patent was issued. In 1884, under authority of
the act of June 23, 1860, c. 203, but without notice to C., the Secretary
of the Interior cancelled that warrant. It was admitted that the
assignment upon it, purporting to be that of L., was a forgery. On
the records of the land department up to 1886 it appeared that a full
and equitable title to the land had passed to C., and in that year D.
having obtained conveyances from C., applied to the land department
for leave to purchase on payment of the regular price and his applica-
tion was granted. Meanwhile the land had been sold for non-payment
of state taxes, and the tax title had passed into H. D. commenced
suit against H. to quiet title, and the Supreme Court of Iowa sus-
tained the decree of the trial court in his favor. Held, (1) That as
the Supreme Court of the State held that the equitable title appar-
ently conveyed by the proceedings in the United States Land Office
in 1858 was of no effect, and the tax titles based thereon of no validity,
it was apparent that a right claimed under the authority of the United
States was denied, and, therefore, this court had jurisdiction; (2) That,
though a formal certificate of location was issued in 1858, there was
then in fact no payment for the land and the government received
nothing until 1888; that during these intervening years whatever
might have appeared upon the face of the record the legal and the
equitable title both remained in the government; that the land was,
therefore, not subject to state taxation; that tax sales and tax deeds
issued during that time were void; that the defendant took nothing
by such deeds; that no estoppel can be invoked against the plaintiff ;
that his title dates from the time of payment in 1888; that the
defendant does not hold under him and has no tax title arising sub-
sequently thereto; and that there was no error in the decision of the
Supreme Court of the State. Hussman v. Durham, 144.
3. Congress did not intend by the statutes under which the Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Company received its grants of public land, to vest
the lands absolutely in the company, without a right to the Govern-
ment to reacquire them on failure of the company to comply with the
conditions of the grant; and no express provision for a forfeiture was
necessary in order to fix the rights of the Government, and to authorize
reentry in case of breach of condition. Atlantic & Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Mingus, 413.
4. The act of April 20, 1871, c. 33, 17 Stat. 19, did not alter, amend, or
repeal the act of July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 292, in these respects,
except so far as it permitted a foreclosure of any mortgage which
might be put upon the lands by the company to operate upon lands
opposite and appurtenant to the then completed part of the road, and
so far as it gave assurance that no forfeiture would be insisted upon
for conditions then broken. lb.
5. When the United States grant public lands upon condition subsequent,
they have the same right to reënter upon breach of the condition
which a private grantor would have under the same circumstances,
which right is to be exercised by legislation. Ib.
6. Lands in the Indian Territory belonging to the Indians did not pass
under the grant to the railroad company; and the United States were
not required by the statutes to extinguish the Indian title for the
benefit of the railroad company, nor could they be reasonably expected
to do so. Ib.
7. As to Indian grants made subsequent to the grant to the railroad com-
pany, there was no restriction upon the right of the government to
dispose of public lands in any way it saw fit prior to the filing of the
map of definite location; and if it assumed to dispose of lands within
the grant, after the rights of the railroad company had attached, such
action would be void, but it would be no answer to the obligation of
the company to complete its road within the stipulated time. Ib.
8. Congress did not exceed its powers in forfeiting this grant. Ib.
9. In view of the fact that many years have passed since the certification
of the lands in controversy, and since the railroad company, in reli-
ance upon the title which it believed it had acquired, disposed of them,
and that other parties have become interested in them, and have dealt
with them as private property, the appellees are justified in saying
that they have large claims upon the equitable consideration of the
courts. United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co., 463.
10. The act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556, providing for the adjustment
of land grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of rail-
roads, and the act of March 2, 1896, 29 Stat. 42, operated to confirm
the title to purchasers from a railroad company of lands certified or
patented to or for its benefit, notwithstanding any mere errors or
irregularities in the proceedings of the land department, and notwith-
standing the fact that the lands so certified or patented were, by the
true construction of the land grants, although within the limits of
the grants, excepted from their operation; provided that they pur-
chased in good faith, and paid value for the lands; and provided,
also, that the lands were public lands in the statutory sense of the
term, and free from individual or other claims. Ib.
11. Anterior to any claim of right under its grant by the Winona and St.
Peter Railroad Company, by virtue either of filing its map of definite
location or of surveying and staking its line upon the ground, a
preemption filing was placed upon the land. This filing was never
cancelled. The claimant entered into possession and continued so
either personally or through a tenant until after the construction of
the railroad, and until after the railroad company had conveyed the
land to a land company, and until an action of ejectment was brought
by the land company. The court below was of opinion, in which
this court concurs, that the land company could not be considered a
purchaser in good faith from the railroad company; that it took its
conveyance with notice, from possession, of all the rights and the
claims of the party so in possession; that it therefore did not bring
itself within the protecting clauses of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 376,
24 Stat. 556; and that there was nothing to stay the right of the
Government to have the certification, so erroneously issued, cancelled.
Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. United States, 483.
12. This case distinguished from United States v. Winona & St. Peter Rail-
road Company, ante, 463. Ib.
13. The Spanish law did not, proprio vigore, confer upon every Spanish
villa or town, a grant of four square leagues of land, to be measured
from the centre of the plaza of such town. United States v. Santa Fé,
675.
14. Although, under that law, all towns were not, on their organization,
entitled by operation of law, to four square leagues, yet, at a time
subsequent to the organization of Santa Fé, Spanish officials adopted
the theory that the normal quantity which might be designated as the
limits of new pueblos, to be thereafter created, was four square
leagues. lb.
15. The rights of Santa Fé depend upon Spanish law as it existed prior
to the adoption of that theory.
Ib.
16. An inchoate claim, which could not have been asserted as an absolute
right against the government of either Spain or Mexico, and which
was subject to the uncontrolled discretion of Congress, is clearly not
within the purview of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, creating the
Court of Private Land Claims; but the duty of protecting such im-
perfect rights of property rests upon the political department of the
government. Ib.
See EQUITY, 1, 2.
RAILROAD.
It is settled law in this court that the relation of fellow-servants exists
between an engineer operating a locomotive on one train and the
conductor on another train on the same road. Oakes v. Mase, 363.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
RECEIVER.
See NATIONAL BANK.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
See PUBLIC LAND, 1.
SPANISH LAND GRANTS.
See PUBLIC LAND, 13, 14, 15, 16.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
Where Congress has expressly legislated in respect to a given matter, that
express legislation must control, in the absence of subsequent legisla-
tion equally express, and is not overthrown by any mere inferences or
implications to be found in such subsequent legislation. Rosencrans
v. United States, 257.
TAX AND TAXATION.
1. In enforcing the collection of taxes one rule may be adopted in respect
of the admitted use of one kind of property, and another rule in respect
of the admitted use of another, in order that all may be compelled to
contribute their proper share to the burdens of government. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Indiana, 304.
2. The amount of penalty to be enforced for non-payment of taxes is a
matter within legislative discretion. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14 to 18, 23, 25.
TERRITORY.
1. The act of April 4, 1874, c. 80, legislating for all the Territories, secures
to their inhabitants all the rights of trial by jury, as they existed at
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