Whereas in pursuance of the prize courts act, 1894, certain rules were made by the order of His Majesty in council, dated the 5th day of August, 1914, and amended by the orders of His Majesty in council of the 30th day of September, 1914, and the 28th day of November, 1914, respectively, which said rules and amended rules were by the said orders in council directed to take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the rules publication act, 1893, from the dates of the said orders in council, respectively; and Whereas the provisions of section 1 of the rules publication act, 1893, were duly complied with in respect of the said rules and amended rules, and the same were finally made by the orders of His Majesty in council, dated, respectively, the 17th day of September, 1914, the 28th day of November, 1914, and the 3d day of February, 1915;

and

Whereas it is expedient that the said rules and amended rules should be further amended; and

Whereas on account of urgency this order should come into immediate operation:

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers in this behalf by the said act or otherwise in him vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

1. That in order 9 (discovery, inspection, and admission of documents and facts) of the said rules:

In rule 1, the words "upon filing an affidavit" shall be omitted. In rule 1, instead of the words "any other party" there shall be substituted the words "any party other than the proper officer of the Crown."

2. That in order 11 (sale, appraisement, safe custody, and inspection of prize) of the said rules, in rule 1, the following words shall be omitted: "On account of the condition of a ship, or on application of a claimant, and on or after condemnation."

3. That in order 15 (evidence and hearing) of the said rules the following rule shall be added:

"21. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the proper officer of the Crown may apply to the judge for leave to administer interrogatories for the examination of any person whether a party to the cause or not."

4. That order 29 (requisition by Admiralty) of the said rules, as amended by His Majesty's order in council dated the 28th day of November, 1914, shall be, and the same is hereby, revoked, and in lieu thereof the following order shall have effect:

66 ORDER 29.-REQUISITION.

"1. Where it is made to appear to the judge on the application of the proper officer of the Crown that it is desired to requisition on behalf of His Majesty a ship in respect of which no final decree of condemnation has been made, he shall order that the ship shall be appraised, and that upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of this order, the ship shall be released and delivered to the Crown.

"2. Where a decree for the detention of a ship has been made in accordance with order 28, the proper officer of the Crown may file a notice (Appendix A, Form No. 55) that the Crown desires to requisition the same, and thereupon a commission (Appendix A, Form No. 56) to the marshal directing him to appraise the ship shall issue. Upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of this order the ship shall be released and delivered to the Crown. Service of this notice shall not be required before filing, but copies thereof shall be served upon the parties by the proper officer of the Crown as soon thereafter as possible.

"3. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the ship is required for th service of His Majesty forthwith, the judge may order the same to be forthwith released and delivered to the Crown without appraisement.

4. In any case where a ship has been requisitioned under the provisions of this order, and whether or not an appraisement has been made, the court may, on the application of any party, fix the amount to be paid by the Crown in respect of the value of the ship.

"5. In every case of requisition under this order an undertaking in writing shall be filed by the proper officer of the Crown for payment into court on behalf of the Crown of the appraised value of the ship, or of the amount fixed under rule 4 of this order, as the case may be, at such time or times as the court shall declare by order that the same or any part thereof is required for the purpose of payment out of court.

"6. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the Crown desires to requisition the ship temporarily, the court may, in lieu of an order of release, make an order for the temporary delivery of the ship to the Crown, and, subject as aforesaid, the provisions of this order shall apply to such a requisition; provided that, in the event. of the return of the ship to the custody of the court, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the release of the undertaking given on behalf of the Crown or the reduction of the amount undertaken to be paid thereby, as the case may be; and provided also that, where the ship so requisitioned is subject to the provisions of order 28, rule 1, relating to detention, the amount for which the Crown shall be considered liable in respect of such requisition shall be the amount of damage, if any, which the ship has suffered by reason of such temporary delivery as aforesaid.

"7. The proceedings in respect of a ship requisitioned under this order shall continue notwithstanding the requisition.

"8. In any case of requisition of a ship in respect of which no cause has been instituted, any person interested in such ship may, without issuing a writ, provided he does not intend to make a claim for restitution or damages, apply by summons for an order that the amount to be paid in respect of such ship be fixed by the court, and the judge may, on the hearing of such summons, order the ship to be appraised or to be valued, or give such other directions for fixing the amount as he may think fit.

5. That in Form 4 in Appendix A to the said rules there shall be omitted the words "commander of our ship of war" and the words "taken and seized as prize by our said ship of war."

6. This order shall take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of the rules-publication act, 1893, from the date hereof. (Dip. Corr., 72-73.)

Three days later, March 30, 1915, our Government addressed a note on the British violation of neutral rights:

American note, March 30, 1915, regarding British violation of neutral rights.

(The Secretary of State to the American ambassador at London.)

You are instructed to deliver the following to His Majesty's Government in reply to your Nos. 1795 and 1798 of March 15:

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the subjects treated in the British notes of March 13 and March 15, and to the British order in council of the latter date.

These communications contain matters of grave importance to neutral nations. They appear to menace their rights of trade and intercourse not only with belligerents but also with one another. They call for frank comment in order that misunderstandings may be avoided. The Government of the United States deems it its duty, therefore, speaking in the sincerest spirit of friendship, to make its own view and position with regard to them unmistakably clear.

The order in council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace.

This Government takes it for granted that there can be no question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is, of course, unlimited; and that sovereignty suffers no diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights, which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war.

A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation if, upon examination, a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's government or armed forces. It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service, and to condemn them if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war.

It is confidently assumed that His Majesty's Government will not deny that it is a rule sanctioned by general practice that, even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to un

blockaded territory be rigidly. enforced, innocent shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition, or confiscation.

Moreover, the rules of the declaration of Paris of 1856-among them that free ships make free goods will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement.

His Majesty's Government, like the Government of the United States, have often and explicitly held that these rights represent the best usage of warfare in the dealings of belligerents with neutrals at sea. In this connection I desire to direct attention to the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Peterhof, which arose out of the Civil War, and to the fact that that opinion was unanimously sustained in the award of the arbitration commission of 1871, to which the case was presented at the request of Great Britain. From that time to the declaration of London of 1909, adopted with modifications by the order in council of the 23d of October last, these rights have not been seriously questioned by the British Government. And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this Government in the present circumstances; and for Great Britain to make such a claim would be for her to abandon and set at naught the principles for which she has consistently and earnestly contended in other times and circumstances.

The note of His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs which accompanies the order in council, and which bears the same date, notifies the Government of the United States of the establishment of a blockade which is, if defined by the terms of the order in council, to include all the coasts and ports of Germany and every port of possible access to enemy territory. But the novel and quite unprecedented feature of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral posts and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties.

It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral power on the high seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with.

The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old form of "close" blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, is no longer practicable in face of an enemy

possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the established rules of war. If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or country, it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon. This traffic would, of course, include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country, except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade, since the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either entering or leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact but not of right investing.

The Government of the United States notes that in the order in council His Majesty's Government gives as their reason for entering upon a course of action which they are aware is without precedent in modern warfare the necessity they conceive themselves to have been placed under to retaliate upon their enemies for measures of a similar nature which the latter have announced it their intention to adopt and which they have to some extent adopted; but the Government of the United States, recalling the principles upon which His Majesty's Government have hitherto been scrupulous to act, interprets this as merely a reason for certain extraordinary activities on the part of His Majesty's naval forces and not as an excuse for or prelude to any unlawful action. If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it can not be supposed, and this Government does not for a moment suppose, that His Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part, in so far as they affect neutral rights.

It is thus that the Government of the United States interprets the language of the note of His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs which accompanies the copy of the order in council which was handed to the ambassador of the United States near the Government in London and by him transmitted to Washington.

This Government notes with gratification that "wide discretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may in the circumstances be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under the order "; that "the effect of the order in council is to confer certain powers upon the executive officers of His Majesty's Government"; and that "the extent to which these powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the measures of