the benefit of his creditors, under the direction of the court, according to the provisions of the act, obtain a discharge of his debts. In a suit of Sturges against Crowningshield, on a contract made in the state of New York, antecedent to the passing of the act, it was decided that a debtor, who had conformed to the provisions of this act, was not thereby discharged from his debts. Two questions were made in the case; one, that the constitution having given congress the power of establishing uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States, by implication, divested the state governments of the power of legislating on the same subject. The other, that the law was unconstitutional, in as much as it impaired the obligation of contracts. On the first, the court decided, that in as much as congress had not exercised that power by any law in force at the time of passing the act of 1811, the states were not then divested of the power of making laws on the subject of bankruptcies. On the second, that the act of 1811 was a law, impairing the obligation of contracts within the prohibition of the constitution, on the ground that any law, discharging the debtor from his contract without a performance, was impairing its obligations. The chief justice, aware that this decision might be construed to impugn the principles of the statutes of limitation, observed, that such was not the opinion of the court; but that these statutes, being grounded upon the principle that the length of time specified in them was presumptive evidence of the fulfilment of the contract, were valid. The court also took a distinction between this statute and an insolvent act, which went merely to exonerate the person of the debtor from imprisonment, admitting the latter to be valid, because it did not discharge the contract, but merely regulated the mode of its enforce ment. In consequence of this decision, many suits were brought in the state of New York, against debtors who had availed themselves of the provisions of the act of 1811. In the supreme court of that state, the opinion was admitted to be. decisive, of all cases which came precisely within its principle; but a distinction was taken between contracts made before, and those made after the passing of the act. The latter, Chief Justice Spencer remarked, were made with a full knowledge of the existence of the law, and with reference to it, and were consequently subject to its provisions. This opinion was over-ruled by the supreme court of the United States, and the law declared invalid, in relation to contracts made both before and after its enactment. Case of Cohens vs. Virginia. The peculiar organization of the district of Columbia, gave rise to an interesting constitutional question, decided by the supreme court of the United States, in 1821. In order to secure to the several branches of the federal government perfect freedom and safety in the exercise of their respective functions, the framers of the American constitution had provided that congress should have power to exercise exclusive legislation over ten miles square of territory, which should thereafter become the permanent seat of government. Such district having been established, the national legislature, for all the purposes of municipal regulation, exercised the same powers over it, as the state governments do over their respective citizens. One mode, in which it was contemplated that this constitutional provision might be carried into effect, was by establishing a district legisla-. ture, to be chosen and supported by its citizens, whose acts should be subject to be revised by the national government. This would give congress and the executive all the requisite security in the exercise of their powers; and be at the same time analogous to the general system of state governments. Another was that congress should exercise direct municipal legislation over the territory. When the district was first designated, it embraced only two villages of any considerable magnitude, and not sufficiently numerous for the convenient exercise of internal legislation; Congress were therefore induced to adopt the latter mode; and the district of Columbia, since the year 1800, has been governed by a legislature, none of whom, have a permanent residence in the district, in the choice of whom, its citizens have no voice, and over whose deliberations they have no control. Congress have hitherto exercised this power with such paternal solicitude for their favorite object, that the citizens of the district have readily acquiesced in their disfranchisement. This anomaly in the American system produced a singular collision, between congress exercising the functions of a municipal legislature for the district, and the govern ment of Virginia. The former, had authorized the city of Washington to set up, and draw a lottery within its limits, for the purpose of raising money to be appropriated to some improvements for the convenience of its citizens; the latter had passed a law prohibiting under a penalty the sale of any lottery tickets, other than those authorized by them, within their jurisdiction. The house of P. & M. Cohens, in Norfolk, having opened a lottery office, and sold tickets in the Washington lottery, were prosecuted in the borough court of Norfolk, by a suit 4 in behalf of the state, for the penalty. The defendants * Pinkney, of Maryland; Ogden, Emmet, and Wells, of New York; and Jones, of Columbia. consider as an independent sovereignty to every intent, except where a portion of its authority is delegated to the federal government, and this attempt to draw a state as a defendant, into the courts of the United States, as an assumption of power not warranted by the constitution, and destructive of the independence of the states. The question was elaborately argued before the supreme court, on a motion to dismiss the cause for the want of jurisdiction. The counsel for the state contended that the appellate jurisdiction, given by the constitution to the supreme court, according to the obvious meaning of the term, was the removal of a cause from an inferior to a superior court, established by the same authority. That the state courts in cases cognizable before them were supreme and independent, no power being given by the constitution to the federal judiciary, to arrest a cause originally cognizable before the state courts, in its progress, or revise their proceedings after its termination. They objected to the court's assuming jurisdiction by implication, merely because it might be convenient, or beneficial to exercise it. A second point made, was, that a state was not liable to be made a defendant in a suit, by one of its citizens. Such power, it was contended, was not among the judicial powers given by the constitution. A third objection was, that the law authorizing the drawing of a lottery, was a mere municipal regulation for the district of Columbia, and not a public act of general concern, to which the judiciary power of the United States extended, in such manner as to control the decisions of the state courts. The sum in controversy on this occasion, was of very little moment. The principles which it involved, were of vital importance. If the acts of congress were subject to be impeded or counteracted by twenty-four different legislatures, and judiciaries, without control, the general government might as well at once cease its operations. On the other hand, if the acts of the state legislatures, and their judiciaries, were subject to be annulled by the supreme court, they could be considered in no respect as independent sovereignties. Opinion of the court. In delivering their opinion, the court remark, that two distinct and independent legislative and judicial authorities, acting on the same subject, the one having no control over the other, is a palpable absurdity in a political system. Questions arising between the general and state governments will present themselves, and for ever exist, unless there be some constitutional tribunal established, to decide them. They consider themselves as possessed of this power; and if possessed of it at all, they remark, it must necessarily extend to a review of the decisions of the state courts, whenever the constitution or laws of the United States come in question. This, they consider, can only be done by a removal of the cause, after a decision in the state courts, into the supreme court of the United States. The process by which this is effected, is a mere continuation of the original suit, and does not impugn the principle of that amendment of the constitution, which protects states from being sued, in those cases where they were originally defendants. The court therefore overruled the motion for the dismissal of the cause. On the merits, they decided that a grant to the city of Washington, of the privilege of drawing a lottery within the district, for local purposes, did not necessarily imply a right to sell tickets, where, by the laws of a particular state, they were prohibited; that there was nothing in the laws of Virginia upon the subject, which in terms, or by necessary implication, contravened the constitution or laws of the United States; they therefore affirmed the judgment of the borough court, against the defendants. State magistrates acting under laws of the U. S. Another important judicial question arose, in respect to the agency which a magistrate, appointed under the authority of a state, could legally exercise, in relation to executing the laws of the United States. This question was differently decided by the courts in different states; but was never finally determined in the supreme court. The first congress sitting under the constitution had provided, that a state magistrate, upon oath being made to him that an offense against the laws of the United States had been committed, might issue a warrant to apprehend the offender, and hold him to trial before the United States courts. By virtue of this act, a justice of the peace in the state of Maryland, for the county of Baltimore, had issued a warrant to apprehend a person, charged with the crime of piracy, and to hold him for trial before the circuit court. On application to the state tribunals he was discharged, on the ground that congress could confer no judicial powers on any officer, acting under state authority, and that the law of the United States by which such power was attempted to be conveyed, was unconstitutional and void. Another reason given by the court was, that the legislature of Maryland had prohi |