square miles, with a probable loss (by plebiscites) of nearly 20,000 more - in all, a territory about the extent of Pennsylvania, and more than a fifth of the old Germany. Even this is not enough to satisfy the French government. That government has failed to get recognition for its claim to the Rhine districts of Germany; but attempts, which may yet succeed, have been fomented by French agents to induce this part of Germany to secede and form a separate state.

of Germany

Besides all this, Germany has lost her vast colonial empire. The old This is well. But, instead of being placed directly under the Colonies guardianship of the League of Nations until they can walk alone, the former German colonies are turned over, part to England, part to Japan, according to the terms of a secret treaty of 1914 between those countries. True, England and Japan are "mandatories" of the League of Nations; but that arrangement is left so vague and loose that it looks like little more than a scheme for the division of spoils and Japan surely has shown herself (in Korea) as unfit to rule subject-peoples as ever Germany was.

In this connection Americans are especially chagrined that Japan succeeds also to all Germany's indefinite "rights" in the Shantung Peninsula, against the futile protest of China. True, Japan has promised vaguely that her political occupation shall be "temporary"; but that word has been used too often as a prelude to permanent grabs of territory. To allow the one remaining despotic and military power in the world so to seize the door to China is not merely to betray a faithful ally, but also to renounce a plain and wise American policy in the Orient.

Very objectionable, too, are the economic provisions of the German treaty. Germany is to pay fixed reparations amounting to about 30 billions of dollars during the next fifteen years. This is severe, but on the whole it is just. However, Germany is to pay further indefinite amounts, to be determined in future by a commission of her conquerors. This provision, along with

The

Shantung matter

66 'Liberal " criticism of the treaty

accompanying rules regarding German taxation, leaves Germany's head in a noose which English or French jealousy may tighten at will.

The treaty has been denounced vehemently by many earnest thinkers in all lands as breaking faith with a beaten and submissive foe, and, still more, as fruitful of future wars. Nine of the experts attached to the American Commission were so disappointed that they resigned their positions in protest; and General Smuts, the hero of South Africa, when signing for that country, declared in a formal statement that he signed only because of the absolute necessity of immediate peace for Europe and because he hoped that the most objectionable provisions might be modified in future by the League of Nations. Organized labor in England and France made earnest protests also against the violations in the treaty of the principle of selfdetermination.

This opposition has little or nothing to do with any sympathy for Germany: it is based upon a conviction that the terms are bad for the world at large, or that they are dishonorable to the Allies. But a stern peace was to be expected, and in the conflict of so many claims, some unsatisfactory provisions were sure to appear. Probably the majority of the people in the Allied lands still feel that Germany is getting off too easily.

The German delegates made many protests, and did secure some very slight modifications in the terms. Then they refused to sign. But a new Cabinet came into power, and, June 28, a new set of German delegates signed the treaty. The five years' war was ended. A few days later, the German assembly ratified the peace by a two-to-one vote. The English Parliament approved it even more unanimously. At this writing (July 25) the United States Senate has not come to a vote upon the matter because of the intertwining of the League of Nations with the peace but commercial intercourse with Germany has been restored.

Austria

Late in July, after the return of President Wilson to America, The the treaty with Austria was completed at Paris. Austria her- treaty with self is left a petty state of 7,000,000 people, grouped around Vienna, shut off from the sea, with little excuse for a separate political existence. The Austrians very naturally wish incorporation with Germany. Germany also desires it; but at French insistence, the Peace Congress has forbidden this application of the principle of "self-determination." The other precise territorial terms of the treaty are not yet made public. The most delicate concern the frontier between the new South Slav state and Italy. In general the treaty has the same traits as does the treaty with Germany.

at Paris

The treaties with Bulgaria and with Turkey are still to be Remaining worked out. The latter will care for important problems such problems as the disposition of Constantinople, of Armenia, of Palestine, and of the rich valley of the Euphrates. At the conclusion of peace with Germany the great statesmen left the Peace Congress, to attend to pressing needs in their own parliaments; but the remaining delegates at Paris will probably be busied for many weeks in settling these remaining matters.

The cost of

the war

The cost still to be paid

CHAPTER XII

HEALING FORCES

The war was a world war: Eight out of every nine men on the globe belonged to the warring nations. It cost nine million lives and 200 billion dollars. A vast portion of all the wealth stored up laboriously through centuries is consumed, and over wide areas all the machinery for producing wealth is gone.

The United States had relatively small sacrifices to make. We entered late, and our borders were remote from the struggle. Still, eighty thousand American boys lie in French soil, and thrice as many were horribly maimed. As to money, aside from the immense sums raised by war taxes, our war debt is nearly twenty-five billions, besides some nine billions more that our government borrowed from our people to loan to England, France, Belgium, and Italy. On these loans the Allied governments will pay the interest, and possibly sometime they will be able to repay the principal; but on the remaining twenty-five billions the interest alone will each year exceed the total yearly expenditure of our government before the war. Without paying a cent of the principal, we will have to tax ourselves each year twice as much as ever before for our national government.

But we must also pay the principal. If we pay it in one generation (as probably we will), that will mean one billion more of taxes a year. As we pay the principal, the interest will lessen; but, taking into account the increased cost of living for the government, it is safe to say that for the next twenty-five years we must raise three billion dollars a year, or three fourths as much as in the war years themselves. We have boasted that in this country the war has been paid for by the wealthy classes, not by the poor. But so far (1919) we have

hardly begun to pay that cost: if our boast is to be made good, we must raise more than two thirds of our taxes during the next years by income and luxury taxes.

In Europe the burden is terrifying. Words cannot express Conditions in Europe the ruin there; and the huge totals of indebtedness in France, England, and Germany have little meaning to us. Factories are gone; shipping is sunk; raw materials for manufactures are not available; it seems almost impossible to start the wheels of industry again. Poverty and profound discouragement permeate the masses of the people. England has suffered less than the continent; but England's debt is enormous. Without paying a penny of it, merely to keep up the interest and her old annual expenditure, she must raise more than five billions of dollars a year in taxes. With her smaller population, that means that each family must pay some four times as much as an American family.

Still there is another side. The world is freed, we trust, Some lastfrom the perpetual cost of vast navies and crushing military ing gains establishments; and it has learned fruitful lessons. In the preceding chapters we surveyed some of the forces that made for war efficiency. Many of these, and others apart from these, make also for healing and reconstruction in peace.

The whole American people learned that when the rich family saved its fragments for a later meal, instead of casting them to the garbage can, some starving child in Europe had bread. We learned to do our daily work not so much for private gain as for the general good. We learned that every man who did not do work useful to society was a parasite, dangerous to society, whether he were a tramp or a millionaire. We learned that by coöperation, in place of wasteful competition, we could enormously increase the productiveness of our labor and machinery, and that by wise direction we could find useful work for every worker. Lessons like these, after growing into our life for two years of war, must leave a mighty effect upon our life in peace.