of Atheism,. Pantheism, or Agnosticism. This course has been frequently adopted by 'S. R.,' although in several places in his works he has expressed his belief in Theism. What is contended for is this: In our reasonings respecting the truth of Christianity, we have no right to begin to argue on the principles of Theism, and then when it suits our convenience, to fall back on the assumption of the truth of one of these alien systems; for if either of them affords an adequate account of the origin of the Universe, the question whether a particular system is or is not a Divine revelation is for ever settled in the negative. The whole discussion which 'S. R.' has raised in his first article, therefore, belongs to an independent subject of investigation, and is improperly introduced into the present discussion.

But the Christian assumption is on other grounds abundantly defensible. Despite the metaphysical difficulties in which the idea of a God is said to be involved, the problem will present itself to the common sense of mankind as follows: A universe, full of adaptations, harmonies, and beauties in numbers surpassing the powers of the human mind fully to comprehend, unquestionably exists. Two alternatives respecting its origin alone are possible. Either it must have been the result of the action of a number of unintelligent forces, everlastingly struggling with their surroundings, or its adaptations, harmonies, and beauty must be due to the action of an intelligent Creator. When the question is thus broadly stated, there can be no doubt which side of the alternative will be embraced by the practical intellect of mankind. It will certainly infer the existence of a Being who, even if he does not correspond to the abstract conception of the Infinite, is yet incomprehensibly great and wise; and when it balances the evidence for the existence of such a Being which is above referred to, against the objection (1) that our ideas of the Infinite, the Absolute, and the First Cause are mutually contradictory; or (2) that personality is inconsistent with infinity; or (3) that it is nothing better than anthropomorphism to infer the presence of intelligence in the construction of the universe from its adaptations, harmonies, and beauty,—all but a small minority of peculiarly constituted minds will pronounce the balance of evidence in favour of Theism to be simply overwhelming. This being so, the assumption with which the Christian argument starts is amply justified.

II. The question of the probability of a Revelation.'S. R.' strongly objects, both in his work and in his first article, against any assumption on the part of the Christian

advocate that a Revelation is antecedently probable. The view of the subject taken by Mr. Mill in his posthumous Essays states our position in a manner amply sufficient for all the requirements of the Christian argument. It may be briefly stated as follows:-The moral degradation of mankind is a palpable fact, which no amount of scepticism can question. If, therefore, a God exists who cares for man, the expectation of some further interposition in his favour is not irrational, and may so far be viewed as antecedently probable. Let 'S. R.' prove that Mr. Mill's reasoning is invalid, and let him observe that it will be no answer to show that Mr. Mill has painted the condition of man in colours unduly dark. After every abatement has been made for this, the fact that mankind, taken as a whole, are in a condition of moral degradation remains beyond reasonable question; and therefore, if a God exists who cares for man, the expectation of some interposition in his favour possesses the degree of antecedent probability which the argument requires.

III. The position which miracles occupy in the Christian argument.-S. R.,' and a multitude of other writers on his side of the question, have taken it for granted that the sole claim of Christianity to be accepted as a Divine Revelation is its alleged miraculous attestation; and that the only ground on which certain doctrines, which reason never could have discovered for itself, can be accepted, is a number of miracles, wrought for the express purpose of attesting their truth. If, therefore, miracles be the sole attestation of what 'S. R.' calls 'such astounding propositions' as the Christian doctrines, we are justified in demanding a proof of their actual performance, such as will satisfy the technicalities of legal evidence.

The assumption of unbelievers that Christians rely solely on a miraculous attestation as the one great, if not the sole proof of the Divine origin of Christianity, however inaccurate it is, need not excite our surprise, for this line of reasoning has been adopted by no inconsiderable number of Christian advocates during the last century and the first half of the present. But the all important question, however, is not what are the views propounded by modern writers on this subject, but what were those entertained by the authors of the New Testament, and by those who first of all were convinced of the truth of Christianity. It is simply absurd for modern writers, however learned, to assign to miracles a place in the Christian argument that was not recognised by our Lord or His Apostles. As the limits of this article render the full discussion of this question impossible, we may refer the reader

to Mr. Row's Bampton Lectures, as named at the head of this article, where it has been treated at considerable length.1 All that can be done here is to state the conclusions which have been deduced after careful examination of the evidence:

'First, they affirm that our Lord's Divine Person is self-evidential; and that the various manifestations of the Divine which have been exhibited in Him, whether they are recorded in the New Testament, or subsequently manifested in history, constitute the highest evidence that He came forth from God, and therefore that they ought to be placed in the front of the Christian argument.

Secondly, that the evidential value of miracles, viewed as objective facts in the physical universe, is subordinate to this; and in estimating it, it is necessary to take into account the moral impress which they bear.

'Thirdly, that while all miracles, as being manifestations of the Divine on the sphere of the human, have an indirectly evidential value: a considerable number of those wrought by our Lord were not performed for the purposes of proof, but stand in the same relation to him as ordinary actions do to other men.

Fourthly, that while several of the Apostolic miracles were wrought for the express purpose of proving to those who witnessed them the truth of our Lord's Resurrection, and of His Messianic character consequent thereon, a very considerable number of them were wrought for merely providential purposes, and consequently were only indirectly evidential.

'Fifthly, that the great evidential miracle of Christianity is the Resurrection of our Lord, which, if it can be proved to have been an objective fact, will carry all the other miracles in the Gospels along with it; that is to say, they will require no stronger proof than that which is required to establish the ordinary facts of history.'

If, therefore, these five propositions are correct statements of the grounds on which the writers of the New Testament claimed that our Lord's mission should be accepted as Divine, it is clear that the moral evidences of Christianity bear the chief weight of its evidential position, and that miracles, viewed as mere objective facts in the physical universe, occupy a subordinate place. Their position in its evidential scheme is best set forth in a brief saying which the author of the fourth Gospel has attributed to our Lord. If ye believe not Me, believe the works, that ye may see and believe that the Father is in Me, and I in Him.' These words affirm that He who uttered them viewed His entire working, taken as a whole, as affording the strongest evidence that He came from God; and that His miracles, viewed apart from the moral impress which they bore as mere wonders and mighty deeds,

1 Christian Evidences viewed in relation to Modern Thought, 1877.

were addressed to those who failed to appreciate the morally Divine which dwelt within Him. As an illustration of this, we remark that numerous as are the miracles recorded in the Gospels, only two of them are alleged to have been performed with a directly evidential purpose,' the remainder generally being attributed to His Divine compassion as the reason which led Him to perform them.

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'S. R.', and many writers of his school, declare that our sole ground for believing in certain transcendental doctrines of Christianity is the evidence of miracles. To this there is one conclusive reply:—that not a single miracle referred to in the New Testament is alleged to have been performed for the purpose of proving the truth of either a doctrine or a moral precept. When referred to as evidence, they are appealed to as affording proof of one thing only the reality of a Divine mission. The author of the fourth Gospel has attributed to our Lord numerous strong assertions respecting His superhuman character; but when these were called in question, He is never once described as offering to prove their truth by the performance of a miracle. On the contrary, He appeals to the perfection of His knowledge, of His holiness, and of His veracity as the reason why His testimony should be accepted as true; and then He adds, in the language of the passage above referred to, 'If ye believe not Me, believe the works,' thus obviously assigning to His miracles, viewed apart from their moral associations, not the first, but the second place, as attestations of His Divine character.

If, then, such were the views which were entertained by the first teachers of Christianity, who had to make good their Master's claims to be accepted as the Messiah against a hostile world, it follows that they must have been far better judges of the position which miracles ought to occupy in the Christian argument than even the most learned men of the present day. Circumstances may have so changed as to render it necessary for us to vary the form of the argument; but nothing can justify our departing from its fundamental principles as laid down by our Lord and His Apostles. If then in the Apostolic age moral evidence held the first place, and the miracles were subsidiary, much more must this be the case, now that upwards of eighteen centuries have elapsed since their alleged performance; so that mere lapse of time has made the historical investigation a very complicated one,

1 The cure of the paralytic, in proof that He had power on earth to forgive sins; and the resurrection of Lazarus, 'that the people which stood by might believe that the Father had sent him.'

in consequence of no small portion of the materials for forming a judgment, which were available in the first century, having hopelessly perished, and from a variety of other causes.

But this line of reasoning is also one which is suggested by the principles of common sense, for it allows an appeal to facts which admit of easy and unquestionable verification. If one thing connected with this controversy is more certain than another, it is that the writers of the New Testament concur in depicting Jesus as a superhuman person. This is equally true of the moral aspects of His character, as it is of Him as a worker of miracles. Such a pretension can be brought to the test of facts, as the tree is known by its fruits. If Jesus Christ was a superhuman person, He ought to have exerted an influence on the history of the world which has been exerted by no one else beside Him; if His claim to be the light of the world be just, His illuminating power ought to be distinctly visible in the facts of the past and of the present. Whether these and other kindred claims have been vindicated is a question, not of theory, but of simple fact. If His influence on history has been absolutely unique, if it has differed from that of all other great men, single or united, if this can be proved by the facts of the last eighteen hundred and fifty years, then His superhuman claims are vindicated by the unmistakable evidence of facts. But if, while the writers of the New Testament have attributed to Him a superhuman character, His action on history cannot be distinguished from that of ordinary great men, then His claims are hopelessly discredited. This line of reasoning possesses the especial merit of bringing the controversy between Christians and unbelievers to the precise test which is demanded by scientific thought,—that, namely, of verification.

Add to this that these moral evidences of Christianity have a cogency at the present day far greater than they could have had to our Lord's contemporaries; for, instead of being weakened, they have only grown with the lapse of time. True, the few who were in habitual intercourse with Him were capable of witnessing the manifestations of His Divine character, and of forming their own judgments respecting it; but, if we cannot participate in this advantage, we can verify the truth of His pretensions by an appeal to the history of the past and the facts of the present in a manner impossible to them. Do they justify His superhuman claims? Is He the one character in history who stands forth in unique and solitary grandeur? Does He alone of the sons of men exert an influence which is supremely attractive to every condition