propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the socalled "Open Door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

ROBERT LANSING.

Documents of this kind must needs be interpreted, and it is a familiar maxim of the common law, and, indeed, of all law, that contemporaneous exposition is the best. Secretary Lansing, therefore, on behalf of the Government of the American people, gave to the public a statement defining the sense in which the terms of his note, rather of their notes, was to be understood, and in this statement the reasons for the note and their exchange are set forth. Inasmuch as Secretary Lansing's note is in the nature of an offer, and Viscount Ishii's note in the nature of an acceptance, it necessarily follows that the offer was accepted in the sense in which it was understood by Secretary Lansing; and, in order that there might be no doubt as to this sense, the interpretation, no doubt made to Viscount Ishii in person, was made in public to the people of the United States by Secretary Lansing, so that the notes and the statement constitute a single document, without which neither is to be understood or applied. For this reason, the text of Secretary Lansing's statement follows in full: 1

Viscount Ishii and the other Japanese commissioners who are now on their way back to their country have performed a service to the United States as well as to Japan which is of the highest value.

There had unquestionably been growing up between the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, promised to develop a serious situation.

1 Official Bulletin, November 6, 1917.

Rumors and reports of improper intentions were increasing and were more and more believed. Legitimate commercial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive were presumed to have political significance, with the result that opposition to those enterprises was aroused in the other country.

The attitude of constraint and doubt thus created was fostered and encouraged by the campaign of falsehood, which for a long time had been adroitly and secretly carried on by Germans, whose government, as a part of its foreign policy, desired especially to so alienate this country and Japan that it would be at the chosen time no difficult task to cause a rupture of their good relations. Unfortunately there were people in both countries, many of whom were entirely honest in their beliefs, who accepted every false rumor as true, and aided the German propaganda by declaring that their own government should prepare for the conflict, which they asserted was inevitable, that the interests of the two nations in the Far East were hostile, and that every activity of the other country in the Pacific had a sinister purpose.

Fortunately this distrust was not so general in either the United States or Japan as to affect the friendly relations of the two governments, but there is no doubt that the feeling of suspicion was increasing and the untrue reports were receiving more and more credence in spite of the earnest efforts which were made on both sides of the Pacific to counteract a movement which would jeopardize the ancient friendship of the two nations.

The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relation to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. In a few days the propaganda of years has been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skillfully set for them.

Throughout the conferences which have taken place Viscount Ishii has shown a sincerity and candor which dispelled every doubt as to his purpose and brought the two governments into an attitude of confidence toward each other which made it possible to discuss every question with frankness and cordiality. Approaching the subjects in such a spirit and with the mutual desire to remove every possible cause of controversy the negotiations were marked by a sincerity and good will which from the first insured their success.

The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two Governments in relation to China. This understanding is formally set forth in the notes exchanged and now made public. The statements in the notes require no explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation of the "open door" policy, but introduce a principle of noninterference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation also of Pan Americanism as interpreted by this government.

The removal of doubts and suspicions and the mutual declaration of the new doctrine as to the Far East would be enough to make the visit of the Japanese commission to the United States historic and memorable, but it accomplished a further purpose, which is of special interest to the world at this time, in expressing Japan's earnest desire to cooperate with this country in waging war against the German Government. The discussions, which covered the military, naval, and economic activities to be employed with due regard to relative resources and ability, showed the same spirit of sincerity and candor which characterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange of notes.

At the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of those conversations, but it may be said that this government has been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their government desired to do their part in the suppression of Prussian militarism and were eager to coöperate in every practical way to that end. It might be added, however, that complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of naval coöperation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her allies have been reached between the representative of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who is attached to the special mission of Japan, and the representative of the United States Navy.

It is only just to say that the success, which has attended the intercourse of the Japanese commission with American officials and with private persons as well, is due in large measure to the personality of Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in negotiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness won the confidence and good will of all. It is doubtful if a representative of a different temper could in so short a time have done as much as Viscount Ishii to place on a better and firmer basis the relations between the United States and Japan. Through him the American people have gained a new and higher conception of the reality of Japan's friendship for the United States which will be mutually beneficial in the future.

Viscount Ishii will be remembered in this country as a statesman of high attainments, as a diplomat with a true vision of international affairs, and as a genuine and outspoken friend of America.

In the address delivered by Viscount Ishii at the banquet given to him in New York on September 29, 1917, he referred to the seeds of distrust sown by an insidious hand, and in Secretary Lansing's public statement of November 2, 1917, accompanying the notes and explaining their origin and the sense in which they are to be understood, he referred in apt terms to the notes as removing the growth of discord. which unfortunately had taken root. What each statesman had in mind we do not need to speculate, inasmuch as the sinister hand disclosed itself in the following note, dated Berlin, January 19, 1917, and signed by the then Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico on his own initiative should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.1

May we not hope that the words of Hosea, found applicable in the past, may always apply to those who would create discord and distrust between nations: "They have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind."

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

TREATMENT OF ENEMY ALIENS

Apart from its special horrors and excesses, due mainly to the Teutonic theory and practice of warfare, the Great European War seems to mark a reversion to certain former severities which modern civilization was supposed to have outlived. While most of these reactionary tendencies or practices are wholly unjustified, others may perhaps be successfully defended on the ground of a fundamental change in the conditions of modern warfare.

Among the defensible reversions to former severities which were supposed to have been abandoned is that of the detention in concentration camps of enemy aliens of military age.

It is true that there has never been a clearly defined rule of international law governing the treatment of enemy aliens. Even in the Middle Ages alien merchants regarded as enemies were usually permitted to dispose of their property or depart with it. Sometimes a period of forty days was allowed for this purpose. As is well known, Magna Charta provided for the security both of the persons and property of 1 Congressional Record, Vol. 55, No. 4, p. 194.

foreign enemy merchants. In 1666 Louis XIV issued a proclamation permitting Englishmen three months in which to leave with their property.

After a careful examination of modern practice, the writer of this editorial thus stated what he supposed was the present-day practice relating to the treatment of enemy aliens, on page 362 of his Essentials of International Law, published in 1912:

A considerable practice of over a century and a half has established the customary rule that nationals of the enemy State found in belligerent territory at the outbreak of war are permitted to remain during good behavior, unless their expulsion is required by military considerations. Permission to remain carries with it, of course, the right to protection of life and property and an obligation of temporary allegiance. If ordered to leave, alien enemies should be given a reasonable time for the withdrawal or disposal of their property. Nor may they any longer be detained or held as prisoners.

It was added in two footnotes:

The only instances of expulsion during recent wars with which we are familiar have been that of the Germans from Paris in 1870 - a precautionary measure which has been much criticized; the expulsion of various categories of British subjects during the Boer War; and the forcible ejectment and cruel treatment of Japanese refugees in Manchuria and Siberia by the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War. In its Imperial Order of February 28, 1904, the Russian Government had authorized Japanese subjects to continue, under the protection of the Russian Law, to reside and to follow peaceful callings in the Russian Empire except in territories forming part of the Imperial Lieutenancy of the Far East. In its "Instructions" of February 10, 1904, the Japanese Government made no exceptions whatever, though it was made clear that such permission to continue residence in Japan should be considered as an act of grace and conditional upon good behavior.

The last instance of forcible detention occurred in 1803, when Napoleon I ordered the arrest of all Englishmen between eighteen and sixty years of age residing in France, as an unjustifiable reprisal for the British capture of French vessels without a prior declaration of war.

In another footnote the writer had, however, raised the question whether, in a future war on the European Continent, the practice of detention of alien enemies might not be revived. He observed:

The question has been raised whether, in view of the generality of the obligation of military service on the Continent of Europe, it would be permissible to detain alien enemies who might otherwise join the opposing belligerent army. It would be difficult to justify an obligation to permit the departure of such persons, though it appears to be tolerated on grounds of policy.