their representatives in Parliament may determine who shall be entitled to occupy the throne. Thus King George of England lays no claim to other than a parliamentary title. And, furthermore, it is recognized as a matter of constitutional practice that the representatives of the people may withdraw from the Crown any of the independent or so-called prerogative rights which it still has, and that, even as to the rights still retained, they must in every case, in practice, be exercised at the direction of the King's Ministers, who are held politically responsible to Parliament for the directions which they may give.

In effect, then, so far as the substance is concerned, the Government of Great Britain is as subject to the popular will as are the Governments of the Republics of France and the United States. There are, indeed, not a few who assert that through the operation of her system of cabinet control the British Government is more responsive to the will of the people than is the Government of the United States.

In Italy also the parliamentary system has developed which brings the control of the acts of the King under the control of his Ministers, who are responsible to the elected representatives of the people.

In sharp contrast with what exists in Great Britain or in Belgium and Italy, we find it accepted in Prussia as right and proper that the King should exercise a personal influence that in many matters is decisive. I am here, of course, speaking of the King of Prussia. As ex officio German Emperor, he is not vested with independent powers nor supposed to exert a personal control in imperial affairs. This monarchical authority in the Empire is constitutionally possessed by the Bundesrath, which represents the governments of the individual States. But, inasmuch as the voice of the Prussian delegation is, in practice, controlling in the Bundesrath, and this delegation is subject to the control of the King of Prussia, it necessarily follows that the Emperor, exercising his powers as Prussian King, is able to exert a powerful influence in the Imperial Government. In other words, the dissatisfaction in Germany, which at times has been intense, with certain utterances and activities of the present Kaiser has not been because he has exerted a personal influence, but because he has exercised it outside of the channels constitutionally provided.

This relationship in which the King stands to his popularly elected legislative chambers interprets many features of German public life which seem strange to English and American observers. It explains, in the first place, the fact that it is considered a moral and wholly justifiable practice for the King and his personal advisers — “the Government" as they are called to control, so far as they are able, not only the elections of members to the representative body, but by rewards and other forms of political pressure to influence the votes of the representatives after their election. It explains, furthermore, the policy of the "Government" in playing off one party or faction against another, and thus, through the bloc system, obtaining a majority vote in favor of action which the Government desires. It explains also the fact that not even the first steps have been taken in Germany in the development of responsible parliamentary government whether of the English or of the French type. It is indeed recognized by all German publicists that such a system is absolutely incompatible with the German conception of monarchical power.

The monarchical conception in Germany explains, still further, the right which is freely exercised by the "Government" of dissolving the elected chamber whenever other methods of obtaining its support for a government measure have failed; and, it may be said, so powerful is the official influence that may be exerted in the ensuing election that in all cases the result has been that the newly chosen chamber has been of the desired political complexion. Von Bülow, in his Imperial Germany, complains that the Germans lack political ability, by which, as he explains, they show a disposition to form a multitude of minor parties based not on broad public principles but upon narrow, particularistic, and personal interests. It would seem, however, that this failure of two or more strong political parties to develop has been due in no small measure to the attitude which the "Government" assumes towards all political parties. The one strong political party- the Social Democrats - which has been formed in German imperial politics, is strong in numbers rather than in influence, and, moreover, occupies a very particular position, for, as Von Bülow frankly says, it has, from the viewpoint of the "Government," no right to exist. He flatly stigmatizes its members as enemies of the German State - enemies

for the overthrow of whom any means, including force when possible, may rightfully be employed. As to the reasons why the Social Democrats are held in such peculiar detestation by the "Government," shortly stated, it may be said that it is not so much their legislative program which is disapproved of as it is that their fundamental political doctrines are in conflict with the monarchical conception of the Empire and of Prussia. This is made abundantly clear by reading between the lines of Von Bülow's book.

Finally, it may be said that the monarchical conception in Germany explains the open and avowed measures which are taken by the ruling authorities to control the formation and expression of a popular opinion with regard to matters of public policy. Not only is there kept a strict control over unofficial expressions in the press, as the numerous prosecutions for lèse majesté testify, but, and more especially, governmentally inspired articles are constantly published in the leading newspapers in order that the people shall be led to take a favorable view regarding public policies which are approved by the "Government.”

In summary, then, we may ask: Just what is the part played, according to Prussian ideas, by the elected representatives of the people in the Diet? Their function is a fourfold one: (1) They constitute an avenue of information through which the "Government" -the King and his advisers may learn regarding the economic and social conditions of the people and of their desires; (2) they constitute an organ of advice, that is, the representatives, individually, or through their collective wisdom, give what amounts to advice to those in authority; (3) they criticize the acts of the Government, bring its acts, or many of them at least, to the bar of public opinion; (4) they have a veto power over the matters enumerated in the constitution. This veto they can exercise by refusing, by a majority vote, to approve legislative propositions laid before them by the King. But, even in this negative sense, it is to be observed that they can not prevent the execution of any laws already enacted by refusing to approve the necessary appropriations. If these appropriations are not made by the chambers, the King is generally conceded to have the constitutional

* These statements are discreetly omitted by the former Chancellor from the second edition of his work issued since the beginning of the war.

right to raise and expend what funds are necessary in order to carry out the laws already upon the statute books. This Prussian theory of the budget is based upon the doctrine that inasmuch as only the will of the King is competent to create law, the Diet can not, by its action, defeat the operation of law.

The function which the chambers perform in the creation of law is thus limited to the vetoing of propositions of new law of which they disapprove. And even as to the new law which is approved by them, the constitutional theory is, as has been said, that the part played by the chambers in its establishment is limited to a participation in the determination of the substance or material content of the law. That which gives legal life and force to this substance is the will of the King as manifested by his promulgation of the project in his name as law. And it does not need to be said that the King is at all times free to refuse to promulgate propositions which have received the assent of the chambers.3

Starting, then, with this explanation of the character of the Prussian monarchy, we may proceed to inquire the rational, that is, the utilitarian or ethical basis upon which it is rested by its supporters. And here, in order to keep our thought clear, it will be necessary to distinguish between the grounds upon which the King founds his personal claim to the throne and the arguments which uphold the institution of monarchy itself as a form of government.

As regards this latter phase of the question it is to be observed, first of all, that the Prussian people have never been given any real opportunity to decide for themselves whether they wish to be monarchically ruled. They certainly had no say as to the original establishment of this form of government and they have never been given a chance to declare whether they wish to maintain it. It is, however, fairly certain that in Prussia there are few persons who would wish to abolish monarchical rule if they could. It is true that the Social Democratic party, with its very large membership, is strongly insistent

The paragraphs dealing with the functions of the legislative chambers in Prussia are taken from an article by the author entitled "The Prussian Theory of Monarchy," which appeared in the American Political Science Review for November, 1917.

that the exercise of all royal powers should be brought under parliamentary control, but they do not advocate the abolishment of the monarchy itself. All parties are agreed that Prussia needs a strong executive: the only dispute is as to the political responsibility under which the executive shall act.

Prussian publicists are not content, however, to argue the merits of monarchy for Prussia upon purely rational and pragmatic grounds. Instead, we find it constantly asserted that the German people are inherently monarchically-minded; that Providence as manifested in Prussian history has given a sacrosanctity to monarchy which raises it, as an institution, to a plane where it is no longer necessary continuously to apply the touchstone of practical utility and consonance with desires of the people. At times, indeed, we find it argued that monarchy has in itself inherent qualities which point it out as the best form of rule for all peoples and under all circumstances. But still more frequently we find it maintained that, for the German peoples, at any rate, its value is so absolute that even to question it is a political impiety. In other words, throughout German political writings we find a tendency to ascribe to monarchy in general, and to Prussian Monarchy in particular, an ontological or metaphysical perfection that shuts out utilitarian argument. In this sense monarchy is mystically conceived and takes its place alongside the transcendental conception of the State with which I dealt in my former paper.

It is, however, not necessary to stress this point of the Prussian justification of monarchy in the abstract, for the existence of monarchy is necessarily implied not only in the repeated denials that the governed have the right to determine the form of government which they will have, but also in the claim of the Hohenzollerns that they have a personal and indefeasible right to the throne.

Kant, in his Philosophy of Law (p. 170), declares that from the very nature of government the executive function of the supreme ruler should be regarded as irresistible. He denies that resistance to royal oppression is ever justified. "If," he says, "the ruler or regent as the organ of the supreme power proceeds in violation of the laws . . . the subject can interpose complaints and objections to this injustice, but not active resistance" (p. 175). And a little later on he says: