the application of it made by Count von Bismarck in the FrancoPrussian war.

As to principle, the distinguished Dutch authority says:

The right of seizure (ius angaria, droit d'angarie, Admiralty right of prestation) is that right which, according to many,' a belligerent State has, in case of extreme necessity, for self-preservation, to seize for its own use, the property, that is to say, the ships of neutrals.

Only an unusually pressing necessity of war can justify the exercise of the droit d'angarie.

It is always expected that when seizure of this sort is resorted to, it shall be effected with those courteous formalities that are due to the subjects of friendly Powers.

Full compensation for the value of the property and complete indemnification for the persons injuriously affected by the act, are required. . . .

To the contention that the neutral in consenting to the exercise of this right commits a violation of neutrality, General den Beer answers, and it would seem conclusively, that,

Whenever a belligerent, compelled by necessity, seizes upon that which he finds ready to hand, takes possession of it and disposes of it as he sees fit and assumes full liability for all damages, then the offense against neutrality disappears, because it is no longer the neutral, but the belligerent who performs the service.

As to the application of the right of requisition, General den Beer

says:

On December 21, 1870, five English coal-barges which were in ballast at Duclair, by the Seine, were seized by the Germans, in order to close the river to some French gunboats. The commanders of the vessels received a written promise for compensation of full value. . . .

It seems that the manner of seizing the vessels had been regarded as effected in a coarse manner and as an offense against the English flag. On December 29 the English Government called upon Count v. Bismarck to give an explanation of the matter. On January 4, following, Bismarck expressed his regret about the incident, and promised an immediate investigation and adequate indemnification.

On January 8, Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Ambassador to London, received an additional telegram about the affair from Count Bismarck. It read as follows: "The report of the German Commander, in reference to the English ships which were scuttled in the Seine, has not been received; but the main facts are known. Inform Lord Granville that we sincerely regret that our troops, to ward off an immediate danger, were compelled by necessity to seize British vessels and

1 [Author's footnote.] It is defended, among others, by Azuni, Droit maritime de l'Europe, I, ch. 3, art. 5; and by De Cussy, Phases et causes célèbres, I.

that we shall accept claims for damages. We shall pay for the value of the vessels without waiting to find out by whom the compensation shall be granted. If the motives for the act are not fully justified, then the guilty shall be punished."

On January 25, Count Bismarck wrote from Versailles to the said Ambassador as follows:

"In continuation of my preliminary communication of the 4th, and of my telegram of the 8th of this month, I have the honor of sending you a copy of the report of the First Army Corps, regarding the sinking of English ships in the Seine, near Duclair, the drafting of which report has been delayed as a result of the many moves made by the Corps referred to.

"Your Excellency will get from it the same satisfaction which I felt in learning that the measure in question, however unusual the case, did not transgress the international usages of war. From the report it appears that a pressing danger was at hand and that, to ward it off, all other means were wanting; it was, therefore, a case of necessity which, even in time of peace, admits of the use or destruction of the property of foreigners, provided compensation is made. I take the liberty of calling attention to the fact that such a right, in time of war, has become the subject of a special law, the jus angariae, which, by so high an authority as Phillimore, is thus defined: that a belligerent Power demands and makes use of foreign ships, even if not found in one's own waters or in the ports and roadsteads of one's jurisdiction and even uses the crews for transporting troops, ammunition or other war material.

"I hope that the negotiation with the owners, whereto you have been authorized already, will lead to a settlement about the compensation for damages; if not, then it shall be referred to arbitrators. In the negotiation, the discrepancy as between the declarations of the First Army Corps and those of the English Consul at Dieppe, concerning the number of ships sunk, will be explained.

"I request Your Excellency, respectfully, to communicate this dispatch, together with annex, to the Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty, and to be good enough, at the same time, to present my apology for the delay, and the expression of my thanks to the government of Her Majesty, for the just appreciation of the military necessity, with which Lord Granville has viewed and treated this matter."

It may indeed be admitted that the requisition of neutral vessels lying within the territorial waters of a belligerent is an extreme right and not to be lightly resorted to. At the same time, if the right exists,

and in view of the imposing array of authority cited by Dr. Erich Albrecht in his brochure entitled, Requisition of Private Neutral Property, Especially of Ships, published in 1912,' its existence can not be successfully denied, it is of course for the belligerent to determine when it shall exercise the right. This the United States has done,

1 Dr. Juris. Erich Albrecht, Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigentum, insbesondere von Schiffen, Beiheft I zum VI. Bande der Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht, Breslau, 1912.

and has complied with General den Beer's requirements, which are also the requirements of international law.

But there is greater authority for the requisition of neutral vessels found in the port of a belligerent than that of den Beer Poortugael, however great that may be, for the greatest publicist of the eighteenth century declared it to be conformable to the practice of nations, and therefore the law of nations, and the greatest of Dutch publicists, and indeed of all international lawyers, has also recognized the right. Thus, Vattel says, in his Law of Nations, published in 1758:

Likewise, if a nation has urgent need of vessels, wagons, horses, or even of the personal labor of foreigners, it may make use of them, by force if consent can not be had, provided the owners are not under a like necessity themselves. But as its right to these things is merely that which necessity gives it, it must pay for the use it makes of them if it is able to do so. European practice is in accord with this principle. Foreign vessels which happen to be in port are pressed into service in a time of need, but payment is made accordingly.1

And Grotius, who does not cease to be Dutch merely because his authority has become universal, makes the following comment:

Hence it may be gathered how it may be lawful for one who is waging an honorable war to seize a place which is situated on peaceful soil: namely, if there be a danger, not imaginary, but certain, of the enemy laying hold of that place and thence doing irreparable damage; secondly, if nothing be taken which is not necessary for this precaution, for example, if the mere custody of the place [be taken], leaving to the true owner the jurisdiction and revenues; finally, if it be done with the intention of restoring the custody [to the true owner] as soon as that necessity shall have ceased. "Enna was retained by an act either altogether evil or justifiable only on the ground of necessity," says Livy, because "evil" here [means] whatever departs even in the slightest degree from necessity. When the Greeks who were with Xenophon were absolutely in need of ships, they took the ships that were passing, on the advice of Xenophon himself, but in such a way as to preserve the lading untouched for its owners and to give to the sailors food and their pay. The first right, therefore, which remains out of the old community of goods after ownerships had been established, is, as we have already said, that of necessity.2

The action of the United States in requisitioning the Dutch ships within its jurisdiction is not justified by the President in his proclamation of March 20, and the statement accompanying it, on the plea of necessity. The existence of the right is stated, and because the

1 Book II, Chap. IX, § 121; trans. by Charles G. Fenwick, Classics of International Law, Vattel, Vol. III, p. 150.

2 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. II, Ch. II, Par. 10; paragraph trans. by Herbert F. Wright.

right exists in the practice of nations and therefore in the law of nations, the United States requisitioned the ships in accordance with international law, and in so doing specifically expressed its intention to comply with the letter of the law by indemnifying the owners of the vessels for the deprivation of them, and to make good their loss if they should be destroyed through the action of the enemy. Necessity is not invoked to create the law; it is only stated in order to justify the exercise of the right in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the law.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE GERMAN IMPERIAL AND STATE CITIZENSHIP LAW 1

The caption of this law, the interpretation of which has given rise to much discussion in this country, is as follows:

We, William, by the Grace of God German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc., enact, in the name of the Empire, with the consent of the Federal Council and Imperial Diet, the following.

The law was signed by the Emperor on board the yacht Hohenzollern, on July 22, 1913, and attested by Minister Delbrück, whence it is sometimes referred to as "the Delbrück Law." It declares that it is to go into effect on January 1, 1914, "simultaneously with a law revising the Imperial military law of February 11, 1888, relative to the revision of liability to military service"; an apparently significant place, time, and purpose of signature, in view of the international situation six months after the law went into operation.

The body of the law is composed of 41 sections, and is divided into four parts:

Part I. General Provisions

Part II. Citizenship in a Federal State

Part III. Direct Imperial Citizenship

Part IV. Final Provisions

The chief interest in this law, so far as the United States is concerned, centers in the question, Can a German citizen become by naturalization a citizen of the United States and at the same time also remain a German citizen?

1 The full text, translated into English, is to be found in the Supplement to this JOURNAL, July, 1914, pp. 217, 227.

At first thought this would seem impossible, because the very idea of citizenship involves, according to the customary way of thinking, a sole and loyal allegiance to some one particular country; which, in exchange for this single allegiance, offers its protection to its citizen. The relation implies a reciprocal obligation, on the one side to serve and on the other to protect. This obligation would be nullified entirely by a double allegiance, in case the aims and interests of the two countries to which allegiance is owed should conflict.

In the law under consideration an entirely different position is taken. It is held and provided that the same person, being of German origin, may become by naturalization a citizen of a foreign country and at the same time retain German citizenship. This dual citizenship is definitely authorized in paragraph 2 of section 25 of this law, as follows:

A German who has neither his residence nor permanent abode in Germany loses his citizenship on acquiring foreign citizenship, provided the foreign citizenship is acquired as a result of his own application therefor.

Citizenship is not lost by one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has secured on application the written consent of the competent authorities of his home State to retain his citizenship. Before this consent is given the German consul must be heard.

In the second paragraph, just quoted, German citizenship is not terminated by naturalization in another country, if previous consent to retain it has been obtained from the competent authorities through a German consul. Here is a clear statement of the principle of dual citizenship and provision for securing it. If it means anything, it means that when the German authorities are willing to permit German citizenship to be retained by a German after naturalization, that is, to regard the naturalization as not causing the loss of German citizenship, they may legally and properly do so.

This, it must be confessed, is a new interpretation of citizenship; but it is none the less authoritative from the German point of view, which is that so long as a government is willing to permit citizenship to continue in the country of origin, it may properly do so, even though an additional citizenship has been acquired in another country. Although it is contrary to the generally accepted idea of a single allegiance, dual citizenship is here recognized as a perfectly normal status.

The reasoning upon which this conception is based is not stated in this law, but it may perhaps proceed along the following lines. Returning to the old conception that there can be no expatriation without