weapon, the torpedo. But given this, shall the merchant ship go free if the captor has no unblockaded port to which to send her? Clearly this would give the premier maritime Power an undue advantage. Let the capture be interned in a neutral port, therefore, and you have a fair compromise.

man.

In comment, let me say at the outset that a sharp enough distinction has not been drawn between the neutral and the enemy merchantWhat can ever warrant the destruction of a neutral trader! Under certain circumstances, of unneutral service, violation of blockade, carrying a disproportionate amount of contraband, she can be confiscated, but only after a judicial trial and condemnation, which means that she has been taken infra praesidia and has had her day in court. Otherwise you substitute the prejudiced impulse of the searching officer for the responsible finding of the judge.

We all recall our indignation at the Russian judgment in the Knight Commander case, where a young officer determined that railway metal and provisions were intended for Japanese military use in Corea, not for Japanese innocent use at home. Unable to send the ship to Vladivostock, he sank her.

It is true that both the United States Naval Code of 1900 and the Declaration of London (neither in force) allow the destruction of a neutral prize under highly exceptional conditions, subject to judicial review and with damages hanging over the captor who errs. And of course the safety of those on board must be insured. But until the present war such destruction was almost unknown. We must clear our minds of German methods and ask whether in normal wars it is reasonable and fair to the neutral to put an end to his existence during the war by internment on suspicion and with no judicial review. For it is inevitable that while his destruction (under normal rules) was highly exceptional, this internment, if legalized, would be abominably frequent. Some excuse could be found for this humane disposal of almost every neutral vessel, while the Declaration of Paris. would be a dead letter. There is no fair compromise about this.

On the other hand, destruction of enemy merchant ships, harsh as it is, by present law is permitted. The career of the Alabama shows the length to which this can be carried and the effectiveness of the method. To substitute internment for destruction in such case is really a softening and humanizing of war. And since it would make the sacrifice of life unlikely, the price of uselessness for the term of the war is not un

reasonable. Nevertheless there are difficulties in the way of Sir Graham's program.

The captured ship must be taken in by a prize crew, because she could not be trusted to go without compulsion. Could this prize crew be spared (from a U-boat for instance), and what would become of it in neutral jurisdiction? Is the interned merchant crew to be idle for the term of the war at its government's charges, or may it return to home and work? The plan says nothing as to this. Would the neutral assume such a burden, of policing and feeding and transportation, for the port of internment will be a remote one to avoid recapture? And is not the neutral exposed to trouble without end in playing his new and difficult rôle?

The United States during this war has been in turn neutral and belligerent, with a change of interest and a double point of view. Its experience, therefore, may have value in the discussion of Sir Graham's very real and serious problem. What did it try to insist upon when its neutral ships were sunk by submarines and others? Simply that no matter what the searching ship was, whether cruiser or armed trader or U-boat, it must observe the rules of cruiser warfare. This meant visitation duly carried out, search legally executed, the safety of the personnel honestly provided for. If the ship searching was incapable of all this, so much the worse for it. We would not permit the rules of the game to be changed to suit the new U-boat weapon. And this attitude seems to the writer everlastingly right.

Now Sir Graham's program, whether consciously or not, is based upon belligerent rather than neutral interest and makes changes to suit the submarine, instead of compelling the submarine to keep to its special field if it can not conform to the existing law. Is not this mistaken policy? It is conceivable that the seaplane can be so developed as to stop ships under threat of bombing. Must the rules of prize law be still further altered to favor the airplane or the Zeppelin? Are we not on safer ground if we say that the old rules shall govern and their violation be punished?

With other of Sir Graham's suggested changes I am more in sympathy.

Thus, a circumscribed detention at a belligerent port for purposes of search is not unreasonable, always provided that the enforced presence of the ship in a belligerent port gives no other rights over her than would be admitted on the high seas; that it is merely a matter of convenience.

Preëmption, which has often been tried in the past and was provided for in some of our own early treaties, is a favor to the neutral and not objectionable. It will not, however, cure the tendency to call everything in sight contraband.

And to a seaman's eye, one would think, the marking of trading ships should be unnecessary, but it can do no harm unless it is improperly used.

Is not the real difficulty in the present situation, and in the future as we contemplate it, that the rules we have are not observed? That is why we are at war today, because Germany deliberately chooses to violate our rights at sea. Japan did not do so in the Russian war; we scrupulously observed the rules in our Spanish war; when a wanton calculating offender comes along and breaks all laws, the thing to do is not to change the law, but to punish the one who violates it. THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.

PROPOSED NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR From time to time statements are made and documents find their way into print which throw light upon, and tend to clear up the situation existing before the outbreak of the war of 1914.

In this category fall the statements made in the month of March by M. Stephen Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, by M. René Viviani, formerly Prime Minister and French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the outbreak of the war, and of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the then Imperial German Chancellor.

In an address delivered by M. Pichon at the Sorbonne in Paris, on March 1, he made the following statement, and supported it by the text of a very important document. Thus he said, according to the London Times, of March 2, 1918:

The men who were not satisfied with having caused this most appalling war endeavored, on the very day when they made that war inevitable, to dishonor us by dragging us into cowardly complicity in the ambush in which they were leading Europe. I will show that by revealing the document which the German Chancellery, once it had been drafted, kept concealed in its most secret archives. You will soon see why. We have only become acquainted with this document recently. Its authenticity is beyond dispute. It bears the signature of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and is dated July 31, 1914. It is known, notably by the German White Book, that on that day the Imperial Chancellor, in requesting Baron von Schoen to acquaint us with the declaration of a state of danger of war as re

gards Russia, asked his Ambassador to request us to remain neutral, and gave us a delay in which to reply of 18 hours. What is not known and what I now reveal

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is that the telegram containing these instructions finished with these words: "If the French Government declares that it will remain neutral your Excellency will kindly state that we must, as a guarantee of that neutrality, demand the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we shall occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia. The reply to this last question must have reached here before 4 o'clock on Saturday."

That is how Germany wished to treat at the moment when she declared war. That shows her sincerity when she maintains that we forced her to take arms for her defense. That is the price she meant to make us pay for our turpitude if we had had the infamy to hand over Allied Russia to her and of repudiating our signature as Prussia repudiated hers in tearing up the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. She began by exacting, in order to come to an agreement with us to consummate her crime, that we should give up our two dearest and most glorious fortresses, one of which by the heroism of its defenders has increased its immortal renown. Who can say where Germany would have stopped had we been vile enough to take the crude bait of her ignominious perfidy?

The passage of the German White Book to which M. Pichon refers is the following telegram:

Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and navy, directed also against us in spite of our still pending mediation and although we have not resorted to any mobilization measures. We thereupon declared the threatening state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether they intend to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of enquiry. Utmost speed necessary.1

In commenting upon this address and its disclosures, M. Viviani said, according to the London Times of March 4, 1918:

These revelations enable me now better to appreciate Baron von Schoen's attitude in my room on July 31, 1914. You will remember that it was on that occasion that he came to tell me that Germany felt herself obliged to declare a state of danger of war, and he then asked me what would be the attitude of France in the event of a conflict between Russia and Germany. The question was precise, and doubtless the German Ambassador expected one or other of the following replies, which he would have turned to profit: - Either he expected me to say,

1 German White Book, No. 24, telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31, 1914 (Urgent). Supplement to this JOURNAL, Vol. 8 (1914), p. 409 (Annex 25); Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, publication of the Carnegie Endowment, ed. by J. B. Scott, Part II, pp. 811–812.

"In such a case this is war," when he would have left me, imputing aggressive language to France; or else he expected me, stunned by the news he communicated, to display a weakness favorable to the dishonorable proposals which could not only not be considered for a moment by a representative of France, but which such a representative could not expose himself to receive. I replied to him, "France will consider her interests." Baron von Schoen, apart from telling me that he had to return on the following day for a reply to his questions, said nothing more. He did, indeed, come back, but he asked no question, and appeared, indeed, to take no further interest in that which he had put to me on the previous day.

The incident to which M. Viviani refers is thus related in the French Yellow Book under date of July 31, 1914:

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.1

According to the German White Book, under date of August 1, 1.05 P.M., the German Ambassador sent the following telegram to the Imperial Chancellor:

Upon my repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.2

In reply to M. Pichon's statement and declaration, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg is reported by the Associated Press, in a dispatch dated March 16, 1917, to have said in an interview published by the Munich Nueste Nachrichten:

The Russian general mobilization furnished an indisputable proof that those factors which wielded power in Russia over the head of the Tsar desired war in all circumstances. My instructions to our Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, on July 31, 1914, have now been brought to light. But what have these instructions to do with the Russian mobilization and France's attitude? Russian regiments were already on the march before these instructions were written, and the French Government had no knowledge whatever of these instructions when replying to our

1 French Yellow Book, No. 117, M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Paris, July 31, 1914. Supplement to this JOURNAL, Vol. 9 (1915), p. 258; Diplomatic Documents, ibid., Part I, p. 673.

2 German White Book, No. 26, telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, to the Imperial Chancellor, August 1, 1.05 P.M. Supplement, Vol. 8, p. 410 (Annex 27); Diplomatic Documents, ibid., Part II, p. 813.