On this state of fact the plaintiff in error argues that the "Regulations" annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land" constitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico; that these "Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of property as we are considering in this case; and that, therefore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale made by General Villa and the property may be recovered by the Mexican owner or his assignees when found in this country.

It would, perhaps, be sufficient answer to this contention to say that the Hague Conventions are international in character, designed and adapted to regulate international warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in purpose, apply to a civil war. Were it otherwise, however, it might be effectively argued that the declaration relied upon that "private property can not be confiscated" contained in Article 46 of the Regulations does not have the scope claimed for it, since Article 49 provides that "money contributions" . . . "for the needs of the Army" may be levied upon occupied territory, and Article 52 provides that "Requisitions in kind and services may be demanded for the needs of the army of occupation," and that contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash, and when not so paid for a receipt shall be given and payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible. And also for the reason that the "Convention" to which the "Regulations" are annexed, recognizing the incomplete character of the results arrived at, expressly provides that until a more complete code is agreed upon, cases not provided for in the "Regulations" shall be governed by the principles of the law of nations.

But, since claims similar to the one before us are being made in many cases in this and in other courts, we prefer to place our decision upon the application of three clearly settled principles of law to the facts of this case as we have stated them.

The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative - "the political" - Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 517, 520; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 499. It has been specifically decided that

"Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a territory is not a judicial but is a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this Court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances." Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212.

It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the principles of international law that when a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department of our government as the de jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 253. See S. C., 65 Fed. Rep. 577.

To these principles we must add that: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts. of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 253; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347.

Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted as the legitimate government of Mexico, in the progress of a revolution, and when conducting active independent operations, seizing and selling in Mexico, as a military contribution, the property in controversy, at the time owned and in the possession of a citizen of Mexico, the assignor of the plaintiff in error. Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican Government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we have seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this court such action is not subject to reëxamination and modification by the courts of this country.

The principle that the conduct of one independent government can not be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be to the cases

cited, in which claims for damages were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reëxamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."

It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court did, the validity of the levy of the contribution made by the Mexican commanding general, under rules of international law applicable to the situation, since the subject is not open to reëxamination by this or any other American court.

The remedy of the former owner, or of the purchaser from him, of the property in controversy, if either has any remedy, must be found in the courts of Mexico or through the diplomatic agencies of the political department of our government. The judgments of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey must be

Affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Law of the Sea. By G. W. T. Omond. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. pp. 80. $1.00.

This small volume is a historical sketch of the progress by rule and practice in some of the usages and laws of war upon the seas from 1756 and the times of the first Armed Neutrality until the earlier years of the present war. The language of the book is nontechnical, and in the main the work can be considered as being historically correct. It is not, however, colorless in its findings, as the writer evidently belongs to the school of Bowles and considers the adoption by England of the Declaration of Paris a blunder and a surrender of the right exercised with great effect by the British Navy in the Napoleonic Wars as well as during the period preceding that era.

The author, in his interesting narrative, shows himself, as an Englishman, to be in opposition to an extension of the rights and privileges of neutrals, especially as to exemptions granted by the Declaration of Paris to enemy goods under neutral flags.

The great extension of the doctrine of contrabrand and in the enumeration of articles of that nature made in recent years lessens, of course, the value of such exemption when under a neutral flag, and when to this is added the drastic restrictions of trade with an enemy, the consequent value of the Declaration of Paris to neutrals is materially lessened, as well as to the trade of the weaker naval belligerent.

The Declaration of Paris was the result of the Crimean War, the outbreak of which found the principal western allies, Great Britain and France, with different principles and practice as to laws of capture at sea. Great Britain practiced the traditional rule found in the Consolato del Mare, which made enemy ships or cargoes subject to capture, while neutral ships and cargoes were free. France, on the other hand, followed a different doctrine by which neutral cargoes on board of enemy ships, in addition to enemy cargoes on board of neutral ships, were subject to capture.

The allied Powers, however, in their war against Russia, agreed to carry on the war by making enemy cargo free in neutral ships, as well as neutral goods on the ships of the enemy. This agreement naturally resulted at the end of the war in the Declaration of Paris.

The great sea power of the Powers allied against Russia, in view of the great possibilities shown in our own Civil War and in the present great war, was almost literally squandered in the Baltic. As the author of the book under review says,

So much consideration was shown to the neutrals that on all hands they engaged in trade for the benefit of Russia. . . . Prussian and Greek merchants did a roaring trade by exporting raw materials from Russia in exchange for supplies which they needed; and the Government (of England) was accused with good reason of prolonging the war by the immunity granted to the neutral merchant

men.

Military preponderance on land naturally chafes at sea restriction and sea power, and hence there is raised a false cry of "freedom of the seas" without an offer of a diminution of military power on land in return.

This check (sea power) to military domination has upon the whole tended toward a freer world and a saner democracy. It would be a sad day for us all if unchecked military power on land could have a similar license on the high seas. C. H. STOCKTON.

The Philippines. By Charles Burke Elliott. 2 vols. Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill Company. 1917. pp. 541, 541. $9 net.

After the smoke from the guns of the American fleet at Manila had vanished, revealing the deadly blow dealt to the Spanish flotilla, the last page of the closing chapter of the history of the Spanish rule in the Philippine Islands was written, and with the dawn of the new day a new era began in the history of the United States and of the Islands of the Far East. And so the world assumed it. Columbia, to quote the words of the author, "was then full grown, and Dewey's battle in Manila Bay was regarded as a sort of a national coming-out party. Henceforth she was to be considered in society." In coming out, however, Columbia did not adopt the usual attitude of the blushing and timid debutante, but rather that of the fully developed matron, ready to bear a self-imposed burden and to take up the responsibility of a national policy from which a majority of the thoughtful men of