the alternative possibility of a superstate based on social force. Both points of the dilemma are practical absurdities, and whatever effort is devoted in either direction must be entered in the column of uncertain collateral profits.

It is a capital defect of peace proposals that the irrational factors of the group psyche are never taken into account. Too often the problem is regarded as one in which all the elements are purely rational and that all these rational elements are fully understood. The problem then becomes one of the pure mechanics of human nature to be solved by a similar mechanical adjustment of political powers. The elaborate discussions and proposals based on nationality are in point. The distribution of political power has not been governed solely by race consideration, as the map of the world eloquently shows. States are not artificial creations, but products of nature, of human nature. This human nature is oftener egoistic than altruistic, and it is well to recall occasionally, without abating our efforts to advance ethical values, the Carlylean formula (quoted by Bagehot) that the ultimate question is, "Can I kill thee, or canst thou kill me?" Since states are products of irrational forces, it is idle to think of a redistribution of territories or of peoples without evaluating the irrational factors which will control the possibility of such a thing. Will the power-forces consent? Furthermore, can the proposal be carried out, assuming its factual possibility, on any consistent principle?

A convention of delegates will also not be free from irrational influences. We once had a Constitutional Convention which succeeded in working out a great political document. That fact is not to be forgotten, and it is hopeful. But a congress of Americans and Spaniards, of Englishmen and Germans, of Chinese and Japanese, of Italians and Turks, will be a different gathering from that of a Washington, a Hamilton, a Franklin, and a Madison.

Another obstructive factor will lie in the fact of representation by the various states by delegates. It is of the essence of representation that it is never larger than the source of its power, and in practice it is restrictive. The centrifugal forces of such a gathering will be so many that it would require the most reckless optimism to expect in any given time but the most slender results. But if a convention

is called together, it must by every means be held intact de jure as an organization. It may be expected that at times the differences of opinion among groups of states will become so acute that a state or a group of states will withdraw. In that case conciliation must be employed to bring the seceding members back into the organization.

While irrational factors must be reckoned with in any undertaking which seeks to rationalize a field of activity which has been governed predominantly by the irrational, there is a counterforce which may be employed, itself irrational, to overcome these blind powers of obstruction-time. There is nothing rational in the concept of time, and yet it is a greater force than war itself, which is said to be the father of all things. Time is the greatest of slayers and the greatest of creators. Nothing in the world can withstand its power.

It is for this reason that we emphasize not a plan for peace, not a concrete proposal, but an empty thing which may contain everything - an organization. It is also for this reason that we emphasize the high necessity of keeping this organization intact, regardless even of war; since if that much can be achieved by the efforts of man, the forces of nature will sanctify the achievement.

The difficulty will not be with the so-called justiciable disputes. Civilized states are thoroughly accustomed to the arbitral function in settlement of matters of law and equity. There have been already a sufficient number of Hague arbitrations to indicate that in this particular field an international tribunal will likely find success. The assumed difficulty of abdication of sovereignty is no more real here than in the shield scene of Homer or the symbolical manus consertio described by Gaius. There is nothing inconsistent with sovereignty in a moral submission of a money controversy. How far some states will go in these matters is attested by the number of arbitration treaties made since 1903, and conspicuously by the treaties of Denmark with the Netherlands (1904), with Italy (1905), and with Portugal (1907), where the reservations of the Anglo-French treaty (1903) were eliminated and an agreement made to arbitrate every difficulty which could not be adjusted by diplomacy. The fact that the larger states declined to arbitrate everything has a deep-seated meaning which can not be overcome by moral indignation or by enthusiasm for peace.

The lethal dangers of war lie not in justiciable disputes (although these, too, have often enough contributed their share of destruction), but in the nonjusticiable disputes. The field of nonjusticiable controversies does not appear, so far as the present writer is aware, to have been clearly and sharply marked off; but there is no difficulty in recognizing the type if the example lies beyond the penumbra. Among the most important of them, and it might be said the leading kind of nonjusticiable disputes, are those which arise from collisions of expanding social forces each determined to express its individuality. These are the very forces of nature itself. Nothing can destroy them; nothing can diminish them. They are themselves the makers and the destroyers of peoples and races, of empires and of republics.

Until mankind is converted into pillar-saints or social forces are broken up into individual fragments under a system of world socialism, both unlikely enough, these powers, which mine below the surface of things and inspire the limitless diversity of all activities, will continue their despotic sway over human events. If the power resided in any individual or aggregation of individuals to stay this remorseless process which builds only to tear down, it would be the sin against the Holy Ghost to exercise it; since from that moment the pall of death with no resurrection will spread over the earth.

What then are we to do? Shall we glorify war which so well embodies the spirit of this movement? By no means! We must plan, and patiently make experiments, to control, if possible, the irrational element in these forces, with the object of making them useful by standards which are pragmatically successful.

No state by a treaty can agree to commit suicide. No state can agree so to limit its activities that it will bleed to death. In private law such an agreement is void; likewise by the Ulpianian law of nature such an agreement between states is a nullity. If the form is entered into, the content will not be observed if there is sufficient force power left in the state which has made so disadvantageous a bargain, to do otherwise; and if it has not sufficient power to resist, it no longer is a party to an agreement. As the Romans would say, the act is governed by vis atrox, and such a state is likely soon to prepare itself for the mortuary ceremonies.

Any limitation, whether by treaty or howsoever, which limits the free expansion of a state in a universal competition of interests takes on the aspect in some degree, however slight, of a suicide arrangement, unless there are compensating advantages. Many such limitations will be borne at least temporarily; others will be combated by the ultimate resort. All such situations, exclusive of those which are presented in matters already standardized by law and equity, are nonjusticiable. Slowly and patiently, as in the development of the substantial content of rules of private law, standards must be attempted which will gradually raise these subjects to the plane of law.

The essential conflict which lies at the basis of all human activity will continue in unabated vigor, just as it now also continues in the whole field of private law. No rule of law can be permanently fixed; it is subject at all times to the play of competitive forces for its existence. So also will it be when nonjusticiable subjects of controversy are converted by standardization into justiciable subjects. That, however, is a fact yet unrealized; and the effort must be to attain a method of adjustment where none is now provided. The inherent great difficulty of the problem and the inevitable long period of gestation are enough to give pause to the hope of an early or successful solution.

Matters which touch the pride or honor of a state or a people are likewise nonjusticiable; that is to say, there are no rules in existence or any standards which touch the case. Aggression is the only solution now available. Such nonjusticiable conflicts are, however, in a class entirely distinct from those already discussed. It may be doubted whether any satisfactory standard here can be created, or whether it will ever be expedient to attempt it.

Private law Thus æsthetic

Some of the

International relations are not distinctive in this. also makes a similar separation of interests and claims. interests are only exceptionally recognized by the law. grossest mental cruelties go entirely without legal reprobation either by civil or criminal remedies. It is not believed, however, that in international relations these conflicts will be so conspicuous as to cast doubt on the possibility of standardizing the relations of states. These

matters may be left to the deportment of nations with, of course, the risk that now and then conflict may arise.

The ideal of standardization is to allow each state the greatest scope of formal freedom of activity based on the greatest possible extent of material equality of opportunity. It is likely that all the civilized states in the world would subscribe to this program; and it is equally probable that no two states could agree on the first concrete interpretation.

There are physical obstructions to material equality of opportunity. These are of two kinds: first, lack of access to harbors and waterways; and second, differences in soil and climate. The first drawback could conceivably be modified by internationalizing all navigable waters. Even a landlocked country like Serbia could, if one were a benevolent despot of the world, be provided with an easement to the Adriatic. Inequalities of soil and climate can not be equalized, and each state must work out its fate on the terrain where history has placed it.

By far the greatest difficulty in providing an equality of material opportunity would come in the adjustment of surplus national forces of population. Many states have colonial possessions. Whether acquired by force or purchase is not highly material. Such states have in such possessions advantages not equally realized. Much the same philosophical question of justification is applicable here as in the field of private law. A peaceable expropriation of colonies may be as unjust as the owning of large estates by a few individuals in the midst of a great proletariat. It is evident that a solution of this essential problem - essential because it is a part of the expression of the individuality of every state, and because it will not be ignored - can not be worked out in advance and that it must rest within the slow enucleation of time. A number of recent writers on peace proposals have shown their understanding of the necessity for providing an outlet for the unhampered expression of state force by attempting to outline in one form and another a universal free trade. Even Emeric Crucé saw in this datum of human nature one of the great causes of war to be removed by freedom of commerce.

It is, therefore, not a question of what states can be compelled to