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any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China."

Secretary Lansing interprets the agreement as 135 "openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relations to China created by geographical position.” And shortly prior to the conclusion of the agreement, Viscount Ishii spoke of the Japanese policy as follows:

There is this fundamental difference between the Monroe Doctrine of the United States as to Central and South America and the enunciation of Japan's attitude toward China. In the first there is on the part of the United States no engagement or promise, while in the other Japan voluntarily announces that Japan will herself engage not to violate the political or territorial integrity of her neighbor, and to observe the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, asking at the same time other nations to respect these principles.136

From the words of the notes and the expressions used in connection with them, it may be inferred that protection of China from interference by foreign states is the only special interest Japan has in China. The doctrine would then be not unlike the Monroe Doctrine in its simplest form. If this is its true intent, it is to be hoped that, as in recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, coöperation will be recognized as an essential feature of the doctrine and that in the determination of action to be taken under it, China will have an equal voice.

QUINCY WRIGHT.

136 This JOURNAL, 12: 154; World Court Magazine, 8: 595.

136 The Imperial Japanese Mission, 1917, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 15, Washington, 1918, pp. 103–104. World Court Magazine, 3: 520 (November, 1917). The Chinese attitude toward the agreement is indicated by the declaration of the Chinese Legation in the United States, November 12, 1917, immediately after publication of the exchange of notes: "The Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations." This JOURNAL, Supp., 12: 3; World Court Magazine, 3: 599 (December, 1917).

THE HELLENIC CRISIS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

PART IV 1

Having examined the question of the casus foederis of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, we shall now inquire whether the use of Greek territory by the Entente Powers for the purpose of carrying on military and naval operations against their enemies and the other forcible measures resorted to against Greece were justified either by reason of rights resulting from treaties, or on account of unneutral acts or omissions of the Government of Constantine.

Before discussing the points at issue, it will be necessary to summarize seriatim the facts connected with each.

It should be remembered that from the very beginning of the present war the Entente Powers have utilized the territorial waters of some islands in the Ægean Sea which were either under the military occupation of Greece or form part of her territory, and which the Allies subsequently occupied in order to further their military enterprises against Turkey. Thus, during the autumn of the year 1914, shortly after the entrance (November 5th) of the latter Power into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria, the fleets of the Entente Powers utilized the harbors and territory of some of the islands in the vicinity of the Straits of the Dardanelles as bases for their naval and, subsequently, military operations. The islands thus used for the prosecution of the war were Tenedos, Imbros, and Lemnos, and particularly the latter, on account of its convenient and safe harbor. · The two former islands were not then under the sovereignty of Greece, but were under Greek military occupation as a result of the first Balkan War, while the latter, namely, Lemnos, was incorporated

i Continued from previous issues as follows: January and April, 1917, and April, 1918.

into the Hellenic Kingdom by the diplomatic arrangements of the six great Powers at the London Conference of 1913. In fact, these European Powers, after having previously obtained the consent of Turkey as to the disposition of this and other islands of the Ægean Sea, had decided that Lemnos should pass from the Turkish sovereignty to that of Greece, while Tenedos and Imbros and another small island called Castellorizo, situated on the southern coast of Asia Minor, should continue under the dominion of the Ottoman Porte.la These dispositions were purely and simply the application of the principle of nationalities. Greece, on its side, relinquished its right of sovereignty over the islet of Sasson (Sasseno) — a former dependency of the Ionian Islands situated in the Gulf of Avlona — in favor of the so-called state of Albania, but practically in favor of Italy.

The question, therefore, may be asked, by what right the Entente Powers utilized these islands and treated them, so to speak, as res nullius?

In a semi-official communication issued at the time by the British Government, it was stated that the Allies had the right to occupy Tenedos and Imbros because these islands — although under the military occupation of Greece – continued to be part of the insular possessions of Turkey, and that further they had also the same right in regard to Lemnos, because, as they alleged, the Sultan had not ratified the decision of the London Conference of 1913.2 Neither of the two arguments can stand a legal test, inasmuch as, in the first place, the invasion or taking possession of territory under the military occupation of a friendly and neutral power is no less a breach of neutrality than applying the same measure to territory under the sovereignty of such a neutral state. The same reasons apply with more force to the second argument. An impartial observer could not absolve the Allied Powers from a breach of Greek neutrality were it not for the fact that the then Greek Cabinet, presided over by Mr. Venizelos, tacitly acquiesced in these actions, because it was contemplating to

12 See text of collective notes of February 14 and 15, 1914, to Greece and Turkey in Le Temps, February 15 and 16, 1914.

• London Times, March 30, 1915. See also semi-official statement of the French Government in Le Temps, January 23, 1916.

join the Entente Powers and had already offered the assistance of Greece in their war against Turkey. It is, however, incontrovertible that the disposition of the Ægean Islands, which were occupied by Greece during the first Balkan War, by the six great Powers of Europe was a concession made by them to the Sultan, who would have been compelled to cede them to Greece had the European Concert not interfered.4

The most serious charge made against the Entente Powers by their enemies for violating the neutrality of Greece, is the landing of the French and English troops in Salonika, to which reference has already been made.5 On October 2, 1915, M. Guillemin, the Minister of France, handed to Mr. Venizelos, then Greek Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following note:

By order of my Government I have the honor to announce to Your Excellency the arrival at Salonika of the first detachment of French troops, and to declare at the same time that France and Great Britain, the allies of Serbia, are sending their troops to help that country, as well as to maintain their communications with 'her, and that the two Powers rely upon Greece, who has already given them so many proofs of friendship, not to oppose the measures taken in the interests of Serbia, to whom she is equally allied.

In refutation of the charge of violation of Greek neutrality made at the time by the Teutonic Powers, the official spokesman of Great Britain and France tried to justify the landing of their troops in Salonika by declaring repeatedly that this step was taken at the invitation of Mr. Venizelos in order to carry out the provisions of the GrecoSerbian Treaty of Alliance, by which Serbia was bound to put in line 150,000 troops, who, in conjunction with the Greek army, were to repel any aggression from Bulgaria against one or both of the contracting parties; that further, as Serbia was unable wholly to fulfill this obligation, France and Great Britain undertook to supply the necessary troops for that purpose.

See speech of Mr. Venizelos in the Boulé on August 26, 1917, in supplement to Patris, Eleutheros Typos, Hestia, Ethnos, and Drassis, p. 93.

• See treaty of peace (Art. 5) in Supplement to this JOURNAL, January, 1914, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 51-52.

5 This JOURNAL, January, 1917, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 69. 6 Text in London Times, October 7, 1915.

Thus Sir Edward Grey, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons on October 14, 1915, said that the attack upon Serbia by Bulgaria raised the question of "treaty obligations between Greece and Serbia”; that it was “obvious to every one” that the interests of Greece and Serbia were one, and "in the long run they stand or fall together”; and that it was "through Greek territory alone that direct assistance could be given rapidly by the Allies to Serbia.” Referring to the landing of the Anglo-French troops at Salonika, he said, “Such help as was within their power to give at once the Allies desired to give Greece and Serbia in this way, and they accordingly sent such French and British troops as were available to Salonika.” He went on to say that Greece "made a formal protest; but that the assistance given in this way was welcomed was sufficiently proved by the circumstances of the landing, the reception of the troops, and the facilities for disembarking which had been given by the Greek Government.” “Indeed,” he added, "in view of the treaty between Greece and Serbia, how could there be any other attitude on the part of Greece towards the assistance offered through her to Serbia to meet the attack by Bulgaria."? • The same question came up again for discussion in the House on November 2, 1915, when Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, answering a criticism of the tardy and inefficient military help given by the Allies to Serbia, said that "up to the last moment there was the strongest reason to believe that Greece would acknowledge and act upon her treaty obligations to Serbia”; that when, on September 21, 1915, after the Bulgarian mobilization had begun, Mr. Venizelos asked France and Great Britain to send to Macedonia 150,000 troops, it was on the express understanding that Greece would also mobilize on September 24th, but that it was not until the 2d of October that "Mr. Venizelos found himself able to agree to the landing of British and French troops under the formal protest, or merely formal protest, which he had already made to the French Government.” Mr. Asquith declared that neither Great Britain nor her allies could "allow Serbia to become the prey of a sinister and nefarious combination," and that

? Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. LXXIV, pp. 1514-1515.

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