cerning the amount and method of taxation essential to be put into effect, whether by way of order to the State Legislature or direct action, to secure the full execution of the judgment, as well as concerning the means otherwise existing in the State of West Virginia, if any, which by the exercise of the equitable powers in the discharge of the duty to enforce payment may be available for that purpose. And it is so ordered.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914-April 6, 1917. Based on Official Documents. By James Brown Scott, Doctor of Jurisprudence of the University of Heidelberg, etc. New York: Oxford University Press. 1917. pp. cxiv, 390.

In this admirable survey Dr. Scott has given us the most comprehensive and most thoroughly documented exposition of the relations of the United States to the Great War which has been published. Specifically it treats of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, but it contains in addition a full account of the genesis of the war, the efforts of the United States to maintain neutrality, and the position taken by this country on all the great questions of international law arising from a state of belligerency and the consequent restraints upon commerce and international intercourse on the oceanic highways.

Very appropriately, after the full text of the President's recommendation to Congress that a state of war be declared to exist between the United States and the Imperial German Government and the joint resolution of Congress upon this subject, the introduction to this volume is devoted to a general exposition of German conceptions of the state, international policy, and international law. Citations from sovereigns, statesmen, jurists and philosophers amply illustrate the distinctive and exceptional doctrines which have animated Prussian policy, and may be summed up in the words of Frederick the Great: "Know once and for all that in the matter of Kingcraft we take when we can, and that we are never wrong unless we have to give back what we have taken."

Before entering specifically into the subject matter indicated by the title of this volume, a chapter is devoted to the genesis of the war of 1914. Foremost in this brief but lucid historical sketch is placed the ambition of Prussia, the veritable and primary cause of the present war. The scheme of Bismarck first to exclude Austria from the circle of German States and then to use it as a satellite is of first importance in an

explanation of the causes of the existing situation. "Austria-Hungary, excluded from Germany and without chance of developing to the north or to the west," says Dr. Scott, "was to be given a field of exploitation to the south through the Balkan peninsula to the Ægean, until such time as 'the logic of events,' as Bismarck would say, should force the Imperial German Government to supplant Austria," a project which now appears practically realized. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife on June 28, 1914, furnished the occasion for the armed intervention on the part of Germany necessary to complete the Prussian control of the destinies of the Balkan States and the practical absorption of Austria. "The time was about ripe for the wedge to be driven through the Balkans and to have its keen edge cut through to the Persian Gulf, . . . with a line of communication from the Kiel Canal to the Persian Gulf, through Berlin, Vienna, and Bagdad." The documentary evidence showing Germany's responsibility for the war is here indicated rather than definitely elaborated, which would require greater space than the author's plan could assign to it; but the sources of information are admirably tabulated, showing with precision the attitude of each of the Powers.

Turning now to the relations between the United States and Germany during the war, in a second chapter Dr. Scott gives an ample account of the neutrality of the United States and the effort of our government to maintain it. Not only was the usual proclamation of neutrality promptly issued; but, as is pointed out in his desire to avoid even the impression of unneutral opinion, the President made a special appeal to his fellow countrymen to be neutral in thought as well as in deed.

The difficulties encountered in maintaining this attitude were many and were greatly augmented by the conduct of the.Imperial German Government. These difficulties are discussed in this work with much detail in chapters on Censorship of Communications; Unlawful Seizure of Persons upon the High Seas; Restraints on Commerce; Sale of Munitions of War; Submarine Warfare; Reprisals and Retaliation; Belligerent Use of Neutral Flag; Mines, War Zones, and Blockade; Status of Merchant Vessels; and many other matters relating to neutral and belligerent rights.

All of these discussions possess a double value, being at the same time of a historical nature, written with the authority of one who, as

adviser in these matters, has been in close touch with every step of their development, and involving problems of jurisprudence upon which, as an accomplished international lawyer, the author is able to comment in a most instructive manner.

From the point of view of the international jurist there is, no doubt, much that is debatable regarding the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents; for upon many points the law of nations is not only indefinite but imperfect. Dr. Scott has, however, not found it difficult to justify the course of the Government of the United States both in its complaints of violation of neutral rights by the belligerents and in the defense of the conduct of the American Government in the course it has pursued. Very effectively, so far as complaints emanating from Germany and from German sympathizers in this country are concerned, he has appealed to the standard of neutral right and duty as set forth in the German Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, which presents a rather lax conception of neutrality as compared with the standards and practice of the United States. Undoubtedly, the inferiority of Germany in sea-power rendered the relations of that country and the Entente Allies with the United States very unequal; but this fact was in no respect a fault of the American Government. An attempt to destroy that inequality in the interest of Germany would have been a violation of neutrality so gross as to be utterly indefensible and would have offered a casus belli to the governments against which it would have been directed.

There were, undoubtedly, restraints upon commerce on the part of the British Government against which, in the interest of American commerce and the American conception of neutral rights at sea, the Government of the United States was fully justified in protesting, and against which it did protest; but these were never of a nature that demanded a declaration of war. They were of a nature that rendered possible material compensation, and that this upon proper adjudication would be offered, was never denied on the one side or doubted on the other. But the German violations of neutral rights were of a different character. They struck at noncombatant life a deadly blow by the use of the submarine. They assumed an exclusive control of vast areas of the high seas. They sank neutral ships, with their noncombatant crews and passengers, without observing any of the legal requirements of warning and search, and they did this in an unexampled spirit of insolence and ferocity in waters closely adjacent to the shores of the

United States. All this is fully and impressively recorded in this volume, and it is the resort to this menace and violence more than any other cause, though others were not wanting, which, in the opinion of Dr. Scott, not only justified but necessitated the declaration by the United States of a state of war in which Germany was the aggressor.

As a foremost advocate of an international court and of the judicial settlement of international disputes, it might be expected that, somewhere in this volume, Dr. Scott would raise the question, which he so ably answers in the eighteenth chapter of this work, "Why not Arbitration?" The section on the German attitude toward arbitration recounts the position on this subject taken by Germany in the two Hague Conferences and the efforts of the American Secretaries of State to negotiate with Germany a treaty of arbitration. In the midst of all importunities, the Imperial German Government has stood aloof from arbitration; which, if adopted, might have prevented the Great War altogether, for the alleged reason for resorting to war was a judicial question. Certainly, the United States could not allow murder on the high seas to go on indefinitely, in the expectation that there would some day be a judicial settlement in which the only penalty would be a money indemnity. The futile efforts of the United States to secure an arbitration of the case of the William P. Frye sufficiently demonstrates the impracticability of an attempt to settle by arbitration the differences which had arisen between the American and the Imperial German Governments. The problem before the United States was the prompt compulsion of Germany to abandon a career of crime.

In a final chapter the author of this volume touches the problem of "The Freedom of the Seas," which he considers largely from a historical point of view, especially with reference to the meaning of the expression "the high seas," ending with the fundamental principles laid down by Grotius. Here, without doubt, taking into account the actual status of sea law, much progress is yet to be made when the nations are ready to reopen this vast subject. So long as war is regarded as permissible, there will be certain rights of belligerents on the sea; but so long as innocence is considered inviolable, neutral rights will be even more evident. The problem of adjusting these conflicting claims depends upon postulates of equity and a growth of opinion regarding peace and war which will in the future give a new aspect to the laws of the sea; for the interests of peaceful commerce will unquestionably outweigh the interests of international conflict.