intended by him to be a satisfaction of it, and by the rents and reve-
nues received since his death; and that such portion in aliquot parts
should be held by them free from the other debts of the estate; but
that the remaining portion should be sold to pay said debts;
(4) That, being minors at the time they became heirs, they were, under
the law of Louisiana, heirs with benefit of inventory, and not person-
ally liable for the debts beyond the amount of the property which was
not received in satisfaction of their own claim upon the community;
(5) That on equitable grounds they should have some allowance or con-
sideration, beyond the use of the property, for improvements which
they had placed upon it, and for restoration of its condition after
floods and other devastations;
(6) That in view of the conflicting evidence and the difficulty of arriving
at an accurate adjustment of equities this court would direct that the
respective interests of the heirs be increased as indicated in the
opinion;
(7) That there is nothing in the sections of the Civil Code of Louisiana,
referred to in the opinion, which conflicts with these equitable conclu-
sions. Mellen v. Buckner, 388.
3. When in a suit in equity this court finds, on examining the proofs,
nothing which makes a proper case for equity, it is its duty to recog-
nize the fact, and give it effect, though not raised by the pleadings,
nor suggested by counsel. Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 658.
See JURISDICTION, B, 4, 5;
LOCAL LAW, 1.
ESTOPPEL.
1. The grantee in a deed of conveyance is not estopped to deny the title
of his grantor. Bybee v. Oregon & California Railroad Co., 663.
2. The plaintiff in error, under the act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 251, c.
262, constructed a ditch over lands granted to the defendant in error
for a railroad under the act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 239, c. 242. The
defendant in error, under a misapprehension of its legal rights, re-
ceived a deed from the plaintiff in error, conveying a license to enter
upon said ditch and construct its road over the same, for the consider-
ation of $250 paid by defendant in error to plaintiff in error, and upon
condition against impairing or destroying said ditch. The plaintiff in
error sued the defendant in error for so constructing its road as to
permanently obstruct and destroy his ditch. Held, that the defendant
in error by accepting the deed, was not estopped from denying the
title of the plaintiff in error, or from asserting the invalidity of the
covenant into which it had inadvertently entered. Ib.
1. A judgment recovered against an administrator in one State is no evi-
dence of debt in a suit by the same plaintiff in another State against
VOL. CXXXIX-46
third persons having assets of the deceased.
156.
2. The allowance, by commissioners appointed by a probate court in the
State of Michigan, pursuant to statute, of a claim against the estate
of a deceased person, upon a hearing to which the only party is the
administrator in his personal capacity as claimant, and in his repre-
sentative capacity as defendant, is no evidence of debt in a suit in
equity by him in the Circuit Court of the United States in New York
to recover from other persons assets of the deceased. Ib.
3. The failure to note an objection to a deposition, based upon the form
of the commission or the manner of executing it, when the deposition
is taken, or to present the objection by a motion to suppress, or by
some other notice before the trial begins, will be held to be a waiver
of it. Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mf'g Co., 199.
See JURISDICTION, C, 1;
NEGLIGENCE, 5;
WITNESS.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
An administrator appointed in one State cannot as such maintain any suit
in another State. Johnson v. Powers, 156.
See EVIDENCE, 1, 2;
WITNESS.
1. The act of the legislature of Massachusetts, approved May 6, 1886,
(Laws of 1886, c. 192,) "for the protection of the fisheries in Buz-
zard's Bay," is valid, so far as it relates to the taking of menhaden.
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 240.
2. It applies to a vessel which has a license to fish for menhaden under the
laws of the United States. Ib.
3. As between nations, the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction
of a nation over tide-waters is a marine league from the coast; and
bays wholly within its territory which do not exceed two marine
leagues in width at the mouth are within this limit; and included in
such territorial jurisdiction is the right of control over fisheries. Ib.
4. The courts of Massachusetts can lawfully take jurisdiction of violations
of such statutes, as against the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States. Ib.
5. It has always been the doctrine of this court, that whenever a conflict
arises between a State and the United States, as to the regulation of
commerce or navigation, the authority of the latter is supreme and
controlling. Ib.
6. Within what are generally recognized as the territorial limits of States
by the law of nations, a State can define its boundaries on the sea and
the boundaries of its counties; and by this test Massachusetts can
include Buzzard's Bay within the limits of its counties. Ib.
7. There are no existing treaties or acts of Congress which relate to the
menhaden fisheries within such a bay as Buzzard's Bay. Ib.
8. The question is not considered whether or not Congress would have the
right to control the menhaden fisheries in question. Ib.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
When the trial court of a State has jurisdiction and power, under state laws,
to determine the law applicable to the case of an indictment and trial
for murder, and the prisoner, when convicted, has an appeal to an
appellate court of the State, of which he avails himself, the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District, if applied to for a writ of
habeas corpus, pending the appeal, upon the ground that the proceed-
ings are in violation of provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, may properly decline to interfere. In re Duncan, 449.
1. In the State of Arkansas, foreign insurance companies are governed
by the statute of March 26, 1887, requiring such companies to file
with the auditor of State stipulations for the service of process upon
them, and not by the statute of April 4, 1887, which requires foreign
corporations to file such stipulations with the Secretary of State. St.
Louis, Iron Mountain &c. Railway v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 223.
2. The right of an insurer, upon paying for a total loss of the goods
insured, to recover over against a third person responsible for the loss, is
derived by way of subrogation from the assured, and can be enforced
in his right only. Ib.
3. A railroad corporation, which has contracted with a compress company
to receive and transport all cotton brought by its owners to the ware-
house of that company, and neglects to do so, by reason of which,
and of the consequent accumulation of cotton at the warehouse, so
large a mass of cotton is piled and kept by the compress company
in the adjoining street, as from the danger of taking fire to become
a public nuisance, and is there destroyed by fire from an unknown
cause, is not responsible for the loss to owners of part of such cotton
for which it has given no bills of lading, if it has in fact assumed no
custody or control of any of the cotton, or of the place where it was
kept, before it was put upon the cars; although it has, as a matter of
convenience, given to the owners of other parts of such cotton bills of
lading in exchange for the warehouse receipts of the compress com-
pany; and although it is prohibited by statute, under a penalty, from
issuing bills of lading, except for goods actually received into its
possession. Ib.
4. The plaintiff in error was an association formed "to furnish substantial
aid to their families or assigns in the event of a member's death."
The husband of the defendant in error became a member, and received
a certificate stating that in consideration, among other things, "of the
payment of all dues and of all mortuary assessments" his wife should
be entitled to receive $10,000 from the death fund of the association.
The constitution and by-laws of the association provided that a mor-
tuary assessment should be made on the first days of February, May,
August and November, but did not fix any rate; that it should be the
duty of a member failing to receive notice of an assessment on or
before those days, to notify the home office thereof; and that a failure
to pay the assessment within thirty days from said first days should
work a forfeiture of membership. When the husband died he had
failed for more than thirty days to pay an assessment which had been
made, and had not informed the association that he had failed to
receive notice of it. To an action brought by the beneficiary to
recover the amount insured the association set up these failures in
defence. Held, (1) That the association was not required to make
assessments except when made necessary in order to meet existing
claims; (2) That the insured was entitled to notice of each assess-
ment; (3) That the failure of the assured to inform the association of
a failure to receive notice of an assessment did not work a forfeiture
of membership and of previous payments; (4) That, as there was con-
flicting evidence upon the issue of fact whether notice of the assess-
ment was mailed by the association to the assured, it was properly
left to the determination of the jury. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn.
v. Hamlin, 297.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUpreme Court.
1. A statute of a State, which authorizes the judge presiding at the trial to
order a judgment of nonsuit to be entered, when in his opinion the
evidence introduced by the plaintiff is insufficient in matter of law to
sustain a verdict, may be followed, under Rev. Stat. § 914, in the
Circuit Court of the United States held within that State; and a judg-
ment of nonsuit rendered accordingly, upon a ruling in matter of law
duly excepted to, may be reviewed by this court on writ of error.
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 24.
2. When the highest court of a State dismisses a case upon the ground that
the matters involved were purely pecuniary, and that the amount in
controversy was less than sufficient to give the court jurisdiction under
the constitution of the State, no federal question arises. Callan v.
Bransford, 197.
3. There being no exceptions to the rulings of the court in the progress of
the trial, and the findings of fact by the court being general, the record
raises no question open to revision. British Queen Mining Co. v. Baker
Silver Mining Co., 222.
4. Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, affirmed on the point that a suit prosecuted
in the state courts to the highest court of such State against a marshal
of the United States for trespass, who defends himself on the ground
that the acts complained of were performed by him under a writ of
attachment from the proper federal court, presents a case for a writ
of error to this court, when the final decision of that court is against
the validity of the authority thus set up by the marshal. Etheridge v.
Sperry, 266.
5. In determining the ground upon which a judgment in a state court was
rendered, this court may refer to the opinion of that court. W. A.
Wood Machine Co. v. Skinner, 293.
6. When it does not appear upon what ground the highest court of a State
placed its judgment, and the judgment may be supported without de-
ciding a federal question, this court is without jurisdiction of it in
7. On a libel in rem, against two canal boats, brought by two insurance
companies, alleging that they had insured a cargo of wheat on board
of one of the boats, which was lost through the carelessness of those in
charge of the two boats, and that they had paid $9211.75 to the insured,
who owned the wheat, as its value, and received an abandonment of the
cargo, and were subrogated to the rights of the insured, the District
Court dismissed the libel, and, on appeal, the Circuit Court reversed the
decree and awarded to the libellants a decree for $8252.47, condemning
both of the boats therefor. In the District Court one of the boats was
sold for $2100 and the proceeds were paid into court, and a stipulation
for value as to the other boat, in $1000, was given by consent. The
claimant, who owned both of the boats at the time of the loss, appealed
to this court; Held, that this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal,
because all that was involved was the $2100 and $1000, and the aggre-
gate of those sums did not exceed $5000; and there was no decree in
personam against the claimant. The Sydney, 331.
8. A decree was entered in the Circuit Court in favor of two complainants
against a defendant for the infringement of letters patent, from which
the defendant appealed. After the decree, and before the appeal was
taken, one of the complainants below died. It did not appear that the
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