of Mr. Gary. The expenses of the current year required eight hundred and thirty millions two hundred and sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine reals, and the deficit of the income is represented as two hundred and thirty-three millions one hundred and forty thousand nine hundred and thirty-two reals. This, besides an immense mass of unliquidated debt, which the minister acknowledges the utter inability of the country to pay, although bound in honor to redeem it. He states that the vassals of the king are totally unable to submit to any new taxes, and the country is without credit, so as to render anticipation by loans wholly impracticable. Mr. Gary appears to be a virtuous man, who exhibits frankly the naked truth; and yet such a minister aknowledges, that the decorum due to one single family, that of the monarch, does not admit, in this critical condition of his country, any reduction of the enormous sum of upwards of fifty-six millions of reals, set apart to defray the expenses of that family! He states that a foreign war would be the greatest of all calamities, and one which, being unable to provide for it, they ought to employ every possible means to avert. He proposed some inconsiderable contribution from the clergy, and the whole body was instantly in an uproar. Indeed, I have no doubt that, surrounded as Mr. Gary is, by corruption, by intrigue, and folly, and imbecility, he will be compelled to retire, if he has not already been dismissed, from a post for which he has too much integrity. It has been now about four years since the restoration of Ferdinand; and if, during that period, the whole energies of the monarchy have been directed unsuccessfully against the weakest and most vulnerable of all the American possessions, Venezuela, how is it possible for Spain to encounter the difficulties of a new war with this country? Morillo has been sent out with one of the finest armies that has ever left the shores of Europe-consisting of ten thousand men, chosen from all the veterans who have fought in the Peninsula. It has subsequently been reinforced with about three thousand more. And yet, during the last summer, it was reduced, by the sword and the climate, to about four thousand effective men. And Venezuela, containing a population of only about one million, of which near two-thirds are persons of color, remains unsubdued. The little island of Margaritta, whose population is less than twenty thousand inhabitants-a population fighting for liberty with more than Roman valor-has compelled that army to retire upon the main. Spain, by the late accounts, appeared to be deliberating upon the necessity of resorting to that measure of con

scription for which Bonaparte has been so much abused. The effect of a war with this country would be to ensure success, beyond all doubt, to the cause of American independence. Those parts even, over which Spain has some prospect of maintaining her dominions, would probably be put in jeopardy. Such a war would be attended with the immediate and certain loss of Florida. Commanding the Gulf of Mexico, as we should be enabled to do by our navy, blockading the port of Havana, the port of La Vera Cruz, and the coast of Terra Firma, and throwing munitions of war into Mexico, Cuba would be menaced-Mexico emancipated-and Morillo's army deprived of supplies, now drawn principally from this country through the Havana, compelled to surrender. The war, I verily believe, would be terminated in less than two years, supposing no other power to interpose.

Will the allies interfere? If, by the exertion of an unquestionable attribute of a sovereign power, we should give no just cause of war to Spain herself, how can it be pretended that we should furnish even a specious pretext to the allies for making war upon us? On what ground could they attempt to justify a rupture with us, for the exercise of a right which we hold in common with them, and with every other independent state? But we have a surer guarantee against their hostility, in their interests. That all the allies, who have any foreign commerce, have an interest in the independence of Spanish America, is perfectly evident. On what ground, I ask, is it likely, then, that they would support Spain, in opposition to their own decided interest? To crush the spirit of revolt, and prevent the progress of free principles? Nations, like individuals, do not sensibly feel, and seldom act upon dangers which are remote either in time or place. Of Spanish America, but little is known by the great body of the population of Europe. Even in this country, the most astonishing ignorance prevails respecting it. Those European statesmen who are acquainted with the country, will reflect, that, tossed by a great revolution, it will most probably constitute four or five several nations, and that the ultimate modification of all their various governments is by no means absolutely certain. But I entertain no doubt that the principle of cohesion among the allies is gone. It was annihilated in the memorable battle of Waterloo. When the question was, whether one should engross all, a common danger united all. How long was it, even with a clear perception of that danger, before an effective coalition could be formed? How often did one power

stand by, unmoved and indifferent to the fate of its neighbor, although the destruction of that neighbor removed the only barrier to an attack upon itself? No; the consummation of the cause of the allies was, and all history and all experience will prove it, the destruction of the alliance. The principle is totally changed. It is no longer a common struggle against the colossal power of Bonaparte, but it has become a common scramble for the spoils of his empire. There may, indeed, be one or two points on which a common interest still exists, such as the convenience of subsisting their armies on the vitals of poor suffering France. But as for action-for new enterprises, there is no principle of unity, there can be no accordance of interests, or of views, among them.

What is the condition in which Europe is left after all its efforts? It is divided into two great powers, one having the undisputed command of the land-the other of the water. Paris is transferred to St. Petersburgh, and the navies of Europe are at the bottom of the sea, or concentrated in the ports of England. Russia-that huge land animal-awing by the dread of her vast power all continental Europe, is seeking to encompass the Porte; and constituting herself the kraken of the ocean, is anxious to lave her enormous sides in the more genial waters of the Mediterranean. It is said, I know, that she has indicated a disposition to take part with Spain. No such thing. She has sold some old worm-eaten, decayed fir-built ships to Spain, but the crews which navigate them are to return from the port of delivery, and the bonus she is to get, I believe to be the island of Minorca, in conformity with the cardinal point of her policy. France is greatly interested in whatever would extend her commerce, and regenerate her marine, and consequently, more than any other power of Europe, England alone excepted, is concerned in the independence of Spanish America. I do not despair of France, so long as France has a legislative body, collected from all its parts, the great repository of its wishes and its will. Already has that body manifested a spirit of considerable independence. And those who, conversant with French history, know what magnanimous stands have been made by the parliaments, bodies of limited extent, against the royal prerogative, will be able to appreciate justly the moral force of such a legislative body. Whilst it exists, the true interests of France will be cherished and pursued on points of foreign policy, in opposition to the pride and interests of the Bourbon family, if the actual dynasty, impelled by this pride, should seek to subserve these interests.

England finds, that, after all her exertions, she is everywhere despised on the continent; her maritime power viewed with jealousy; her commerce subjected to the most onerous restrictions; selfishness imputed to all her policy. All the accounts from France represent that every party, Bonapartists, Jacobins, Royalists, Moderes, Ultras, all burn with indignation towards England, and pant for an opportunity to avenge themselves on the power to whom they ascribe all their disasters.

[Here Mr. C. read a part of a letter which he had just received from an intelligent friend at Paris, and which composed only a small portion of the mass of evidence to the same effect, which had come under his notice.]

It is impossible, that with powers, between whom so much cordial dislike, so much incongruity exists, there can be any union or concert. Whilst the free principles of the French revolution remained; those principles which were so alarming to the stability of thrones, there never was any successful or cordial union ; coalition after coalition, wanting the spirit of union, was swept away by the overwhelming power of France. It was not until those principles were abandoned, and Bonaparte had erected on their ruins his stupendous fabric of universal empire-nor indeed until after the frosts of Heaven favored the cause of Europe, that an effective coalition was formed. No, the complaisance inspired in the allies from unexpected, if not undeserved success, may keep them nominally together; but for all purposes of united and combined action, the alliance is gone; and I do not believe in the chimera of their crusading against the independence of a country, whose liberation would essentially promote all their respective interests.

But the question of the interposition of the allies, in the event of our recognising the new Republic, resolves itself into a question whether England, in such event, would make war upon us if it can be shown that England would not, it results either that the other allies would not, or that, if they should, in which case England would most probably support the cause of America, it would be a war without the maritime ability to maintain it. I contend that England is alike restrained by her honor and by her interests from waging war against us, and cousequently against Spanish America, also, for an acknowledgment of the independence of the new state. England en

couraged and fomented the revolt of the colonies as early as June, 1797. Sir Thomas Picton, governor of Trinidad, in virtue of orders from the British minister of foreign affairs, issued a proclamation, in which he expressly assures the inhabitants of Terra Firma, that the British government will aid in establishing their independence.

"With regard to the hope you entertain of raising the spirits of those persons with whom you are in correspondence, towards encouraging the inhabitants to resist the oppressive authority of their government, I have little more to say than that they may be certain that whenever they are in that disposition, they may receive at your hands all the succors to be expected from his Britannic Majesty, be it with torces or with arms and ammunition to any extent; with the assurance that the views of his Britannic Majesty go no further than to secure to them their independence," &c

In the prosecution of the same object, Great Britain defrayed the expenses of the famous expedition of Miranda. England, in 1811, when she was in the most intimate relations with Spain, then struggling against the French power, assumed the attitude of a mediator between the colonies and the peninsula. The terms on which she conceived her mediation could alone be effectual were rejected by the Cortes, at the lowest state of the Spanish power. Among these terms, England required for the colonies a perfect freedom of commerce, allowing only some degree of preference to Spain; that the appointments of viceroys and governors should be made indiscriminately from Spanish Americans and Spaniards; and that the interior government, and every branch of public administration, should be intrusted to the cabildo, or municipalities, &c. If Spain, when Spain was almost reduced to the Island of St. Leon, then rejected those conditions, will she now consent to them, amounting, as they do, substantially, to the independence of Spanish America. If England, devoted as she was at that time to the cause of the Peninsula, even then thought those terms due to the colonies, will she now, when no particular motive exists for cherishing the Spanish power, and after the ingratitude with which Spain has treated her, think that the colonies ought to submit to less favorable conditions? And would not England stand disgraced in the eyes of the whole world, if, after having abetted and excited a revolution, she should now attempt to reduce the colonies to unconditional submission, or should make war upon us for acknowledging that independence which she herself sought to establish?

No guarantee for the conduct of nations or individuals ought to be