185 Review.-Divine Origin of Revelation. are proposed under each problem, to which the pupil, by referring to his globes, according to the rules given, is expected to find an answer, which he must insert in columns or blank spaces left for this purpose. We have no doubt that the plan laid down by the author will prove highly advantageous, by enabling the pupils, when advanced to maturity, to refresh their memories with the acquirements of their youthful years, and by operating as an incentive on their posterity, to equal, if not to surpass, in geographical knowledge, the attainments of their ancestors. REVIEW.-Reasons for admitting the ALTHOUGH Revelation has been as- 186 authenticity of scripture, from moral motives, without entering into any metaphysical disquisitions, or taking its stand on philosophical ground. We do not mean, however, to insinuate that these important sources of evidence are disregarded by our author. He admits their value, but assigns to them their respective limits, in the following passages: to violate any acknowledged principle of sound "It is not intended in the following pages philosophy, while at the same time it is as little intended to compose a mere philosophical essay. Philosophy and Theology are distinct things: nor do we suppose that the former has any just title to arrogate a claim, as valuable as its rules, and as sober and sound as its spirit may be, to dictate in a peremptory manner about the latter. We undoubtedly owe to reason and philosophy a very profound and sincere regard; but we must wisely assign to them their proper provinces and limits; and we must always remember, that theology is a peculiar subject. "The evidences of our religion are external and internal; the first description of evidence being composed of accredited testimony to certain facts; and the second resulting from the examination of the discoveries which the records themselves contain. Historical evidence, of which we are competent judges, stands, if it be firmly established, as an impregnable fortress, not to be in the slightest degree affected by the most ingenious, or virulent, or reiterated assaults. If the impugners of revelation acted with candour and fairness, they would desist from desseminating their calumnies, till by the complete subversion of historical evidence, they had shewn the justice of them. Let them dispassionately examine the labours of a Paley and a Chalmers; let them re-shew, if they are able to do it, by a method of reasoning and philosophizing as sober, as judicious, and as acute, as that which those great doc-fallacious, and that there is no credit whatever men have exhibited, that their statements are to be given to historical testimony. The whole subject will then at least assume a new complexion. It is a maxim among lawyers, that the title of an estate which has been questioned, submitted to legal cxamination, and pronounced valid, acquires additional strength by the scrutiny it has undergone. It is much the same with the Book of Divine Revelation. It has been assailed in every part that was thought vulnerable, but those attacks have been regularly pelled, and Christianity has risen with new triumphs from each contest. The enemies, however, of those trines which the sacred writings contain, although unable to advance any thing new, have been assiduous in giving circulation to long-refuted objections and half-forgotten calumnies, and in disseminating them in pamphlets among a description of persons, who know little or nothing of their antiquity or refutation. This circumstance, renders a circulation of the popular evidences in favour of Christianity peculiarly necessary, especially at the present time, to counteract the influence of that moral and intellectual poison, which the emissaries of infidelity are thus endeavouring to diffuse among the artisans, mechanics, and labouring classes of society. The work before us is rather persuasive than argumentative, urging the No. 24.-VOL. III. "Internal evidence is a very different thing. It rests on certain moral notions and feelings that belong to our nature, and on certain assumpWe advance certain positions; or, at least, we tions that are made in agreement with them. form and entertain certain notions; and we then apply them as so many tests by which we judge of the character of revelation, and of its claim to our esteem. Is this process proper, justifiable, and philosophical? We see nothing historical evidence is sufficient in itself, and in it to the contrary. It is allowed, that the incontrovertible; and some, on this ground, may deem any thing farther to be entirely superfluous. We are not prepared to adopt this notion in its full extent, until we have been convinced, that the very idea of internal evidence is a vain fabrication of the mind; that all our moral notions and feelings are so delusive as not to deserve the slightest credit; N 187 Review-Tributes to Truth. and that every assumption that proceeds upon them, must, in the very nature of things, be purely gratuitous.” 188 has at least one good trait, that of THE GUARDIAN Protecting Spirit! Thou hast ever been regarded as one easily yielding to corporeal pleasures, and more especially to that lowest if thou hadst not been formed for such pleaof all-the pleasures of the stomach. Certainly, sures, thou wouldest not have been fitted for our protector; but equally certain is it, that a formation, fitting thee for other pleasures, was infinitely more necessary. Long hast thou has it been acknowledged, that it is to thee we are chiefly indebted for all the pleasures of the mind, which every British subject must feel, and which is the very height of his enjoyment here. been cherished as our Protector; but seldom The preceding quotations furnish a fair specimen, not only of the author's style and manner of writing, but of those views which he has taken of the momentous subject which employs his pen. What these introductory observations promise, the subsequent pages amply fulfil. In these, the moral nature of God, the responsibility of man, and, from his lapsed condition, the necessity of such a development of the Divine will as the Bible supplies, are urged with much affectionate solicitude; and the consequences which flow from the use or abuse of those precepts and mercies 'Long hast thou been the Protector of our which Christianity presents, are anti-ported! and every British subject, relying on mental pleasure! Truth hast thou ever supcipated with a strong feeling of re- thy ever-supporting, and unconquerable power, gard. When this book becomes known must hail thee with delight, to a certain class of readers, it will Padstow, 1819. not want any other recommendation. REVIEW.-Tributes to Truth, by Nicholas Littleton. Wherein a few obscurities, made or left by Locke and others, are removed, and Philosophy and Common Sense go hand in hand. Vol. I. Part I. 4to. pp. 126.-1819. "Truth is never ashamed." As does the Author.' We have often read of Bacchus presiding over the flowing Can, cheering his votaries to excess, and exciting them to madness, by his all-powerful narcotics; but we never heard of him as the patron, or encourager of literature; or that it is to him we are chiefly indebted for all the pleasures of the mind.' It is generally supposed, that men of the most sober habits have the clearest understand will tend to annihilate its digestion. THAT Venal motives are more common-ings:-that spirit, therefore, must be ly the object of dedications, than pure made up of very contradictory princirespect or gratitude, cannot be ques- ples, which can at one time recommend tionep. Our being permitted to at- food to the mind, and at another be tach certain great names of respecta-strenuous in advocating habits, which bility among the literary world, to publications, or such as have great weight with the public as patrons of literature, must tend frequently to increase their sale, if not their value. But what additional support the author of the work before us can possibly suppose to derive, either of celebrity or gain, by dedicating 'to the Guardian Spirit of the British Isles,' we cannot easily conceive. Neither can we understand who or what this aerial being may be; and we must confess, as some palliation of our stupidity, that our friends who have seen this volume, are involved in the same mysterious doubt. Many have paid their devoirs to nobility, and even to majesty: but no one within our recollection, before Mr. L. The volume before us, is made up of has ever ventured to solicit prefatory a dedication, a preface, and an introprotection from any such imaginary duction, upon which we shall immedibeing. We shall not extend our re-ately enter, dwelling chiefly on such marks; for as this dedicatory epistle parts only as appear most likely to give That protector must be indeed of the unaccountable sort, which bids his disciples, first inhale the pleasures of the mind,' and then instil such poison as will, in most instances, counteract its influence. We must confess, we should approach such a spirit, let our adulation be ever so well got up, with rather a doubtful submission, lest we should be so unfortunate as to offer it at a time when his capricious disposition might savour more of destruction than condescension! In fine, we hesitate not to say, that we do not consider this imagined protector will be any safeguard, or do any credit, to the morality or celebrity of our author. 189 Review-Tributes to Truth. To give our readers an idea of the author's reasoning, we shall begin by a quotation from the preface, which it appears to us should be explanatory of the main design of the work, but which has been converted, in this instance, to a strange metaphysical disquisition! Whenever we express ourselves accordant to our knowledge, we are then said to speak the truth. Truth, as regarding the reality of things, the certainty of existence, is immutable; is never different; but as regarding mind, it is otherwise: for since some know better than others, therefore the truth of different persons differs: one man's truth is better to be trusted to than is another man's truth; although the truth of one man is no more truth than is the truth of the other man; as in the one man, truth is expressive of knowledge, so it is in the other man; and the difference between them is with regard to knowledge.' 190 Mr. L. is in some way connected with the medical profession, for he supports his positions and remarks by examples drawn from the Materia Medica. We cannot but remark, that our author has extended his preface to an unnecessary length by protracted pieces of poetry, which, however they may tend to convey his meaning, might, in our humble judgment, be very much curtailed. We always thought that system was a concatenation of links, or series of operations, by which certain effects might be produced, or merely the instrument by which certain wished-for consequences might be effected :---but our author declares that 'System is a word become at last synonymous with supposition; each system-maker dresses up a supposition in some gaudy, or perhaps beautiful apparel.' p. x. How often is it the case, that we condemn in others what we ourselves practise. Mr. L. declares, that, 'led by systems, men's minds become confused,' (p. x.) while he himself has methodically divided the volume before us into dedication, preface, and introduction, and his remarks and positions are not thrown together with all the carelessness imaginable. And why does system confound men's minds? Because Supposition being overlooked for immutable truth, and this truth, confounded with supposition;-which is known,-that which is true, immutably true, becomes confounded with what is thought to be thus true.' p. x. As truth is never ashamed,' so, under every possible circumstance, it admits of no variation. Our author says, When we express ourselves according to our knowledge, we are then said to speak the truth.' We cannot subscribe to this definition of truth without some hesitation, for, according to our celebrated lexicographer, Johnson, "Truth is conformity of notions to things.' "" Therefore there is a wide difference between contingency of notions to things, and con- As we have reason to suppose Mr. formity to them. Does Mr. L. mean Littleton is connected with the faculty, to say, that because a person speaks we would ask-Whether anatomy is to the best of his knowledge and belief supported on scientific, or chimerical of any circumstance, that the truth or principles? From the little we know falsity of such a circumstance, shall be of this science, we are inclined to think made to correspond with, or be altered it as one of the most perfect; and as by, this uncertain mode of communica- we would not doubt Mr. L.'s knowtion-that bare assertion shall be the ledge so much as to think him sceptitouch-stone of truth? Impossible! cal on this point, we shall naturally Truth, without exception, and in every disclaim the position, that its systems sense of the word, must be physically are altogether imaginary, or that they correct, and it is not to be affected by rest on any thing short of fact. Sysassertion or circumstance. If truth be tem relates only to the specific combigarbled or tarnished, the defect rests nation of materials. It matters not with him who does so, let the cause be what enters into this combination, what it may; yet the fact itself remains whether facts, theories, or supposition, unsullied, and is as much truth as if for we again repeat, that system merely stated correctly.-Veritas non recipit relates to a regular arrangement, withmagis ac minus,-truth is ipso facto im- out bearing any affinity to the nature mutable. of the materials. It is " any comWe should judge, by his elucida-plexure or combination of many things tions in a succeeding paragraph, that acting together; or, a scheme which 191 Review-Tributes to Truth. 192 reduces many things to regular de- | impulses and actions of the mind. As pendence or co-operation." (Johnson.) It will therefore be immediately perceived, that our author has allowed his definition of system too extensive a signification. But are thoughts to be corrected by maxims, when even maxims must spring from thoughts? No: every thought, as we proceed, is to be examined as to its truth or falsity; proceeding thus, whatever ground is gained will be firm; and when we cannot do all that we wish, let us be satisfied, in the doing all we can.' p. xiii. A maxim is an axiom, a general position, or certain direction. It is not, however, derogatory to the principle of common sense,' because it is the product of thought, that it should be a corrector of our thoughts. Man is a fallible being; is it not therefore just, that he should resort to maxims, (the result of thought,) to guide and direct him? Are they not the bulwark of the mens conscia recti? We might ask the question, whether the Bible is a proper book of consultation, such being replete with maxims, and no doubt they originated from thoughts? As we cannot question Mr. L.'s religious tenets so much as to doubt his belief in the Holy Scriptures, we shall suspend the argument, by supposing we do not understand the drift of his axiom. these do not differ materially from the opinions and reasonings of previous philosophers, we should not think ourselves justified in entering upon them. One passage, however, on probable evidence, appears to us of so much consequence in a legislatorial point of view, that perfectly as it coincides with our ideas, we cannot but give to our readers; and this we are the more willing to do, on account of our previous censures. Although the examination of the causes of effects does not lead to conclusions which are certain, nevertheless, our conclusions are often so certain, that we confide as boldly on them as on certainties; and all, having the free exercise of their reasoning powers, agree in their conclusions on numerous subjects, admitting only probable evidence. From this universality of agreement, in conclusions, arises the uniformity of human institutions; hence, to determine on the commission of crime by the laws of Old England, twelve men must be of one mind,-must come to the same conclusion. In some countries a larger number than twelve is required. By some governments, it is only required that the majority, by other governments, that two thirds, should be of one mind. In this island, the jury is demanded to give a decision of guilty or not guilty. Guilty or not guilty, form, as it were, the two terminating points of a line; and between these two points, are the various shades of probability. Our custom of requiring all to be of one mind, is most proper, as thus less doubt remains as to the guilt of the criminal; whereas, in countries These maxims, however, are the offspring where only part of the jury is required to of common sense; and it would have been well agree, it seems cruel that a culprit should pay if these system-makers had applied them the debt for a crime, the commission of which is so doubtful. Our custom, however, though strictly; for then system would soon have арpeared as synonymous with supposition.' p. xiii. leaning on the side of mercy, still seems capable of improvement. It has been remarked, We should be glad to know how that between guilty and not guilty, there are maxims, which are the offspring of the numerous shades of probability; and it common sense, should, by their ap- might so happen, (if hunger were not called in, plication, bring system on a level with in order to compel men to speak falsehood,) that the majority only would be of one mind. supposition. Every, man, short of an Now, since there are various shades of probaidiot, is endowed, we should judge, bility, as to the commission of crime, as well with some proportion of common sense; as different degrees of crime, it may he asked, and, as Mr. L. himself acknowledges, where would be the impropriety of different must be well stored with maxims. degrees of punishment, accordingly as the How then, in the name of all that is commission of crime is more or less probable; rational, can he who is under the guid-proportioned to the degrees of crime.' as well as different degrees of punishment, ance of axioms, maxims, or fixed moral principles, be taught to form systematic arrangements, which are nothing short of supposition? Having discussed this point in a preceding paragraph, we shall proceed with the analysis. We have now examined some passages belonging to the preface; the introduction commences by some remarks on reason, and, as proceeds, takes into consideration the various In probability, when most clear, the conclusion of a single individual is as certain as would be the conclusions of any number of persons; all will come to the same conclusion. What individual would not conclude that the sun will rise again, be again in the meridian, again set? Our conclusion is here founded on universal experience; and from concluding, that the conclusions of others are like our own conclusions.' p. 14 & *5. Man, as a fallible being, is constantly liable to err; much, therefore, as we reverence the opinions and ratio 193 Review-Tributes to Truth. cinations of Mr. Locke, we should not be the more respected by hazarding the opinion, that he, as well as others, did not partake of this kindred imperfection. On the contrary, the difficulty of the subject, the talents required to accomplish it, and the application necessary to complete his grand metaphysical system, will sufficiently palliate those defects, which are comparatively small, when put in competition with the immensity of the design. But to return :-Our author does not exactly coincide with Mr. Locke on the nature of complex ideas, and his reasons are chiefly directed against chap. viii. sections 7, 8, 9, & 10, of the Essay on the Human Understanding. The concluding sentence of the tenth section ruus thus, at which Mr. L. makes a pointed charge:- "For the power in fire to produce a new colour or consistency in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea, or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion, of its insensible parts." To which our author replies: "Motion of its insensible parts:" the word insensible, as here used, cannot refer to the want of sensibility in such parts, but refers to the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of insensible, that is, of imperceptible parts. Here is an inadvertent absurdity; to say insensible parts affect our senses are sensible to us. This may be corrected by substituting the word intangible for insensible. What is sensible to one sense, may not be so to another. P. 40. Our author has here a jeu de mots. Truth is in itself a sense, therefore tangibility and sensibility are in this case synonymous, and therefore we do not think Mr. Locke's reasoning made more intelligible, or more correct, by this gentleman's substitution. As the word sensibility refers to five distinct species of sensation, it must readily occur, on reading the passage, that Mr. Locke meant to be understood in two of them. What we have already added will be sufficient evidence of the nature of our author's objections to Mr. Locke; it remains that we should now give a specimen of the modesty with which his design is carried into effect, which will at once give an idea of the opinion he has of his own powers and abilities. 194 When in the wilderness of thought, I was much delighted with Mr. Locke's examination of the understanding but now, a few of his broad roads appear as scrambling sheeppaths." In giving a short analysis of this volume, it is not necessary, in order to fix the judgment as to its intrinsic value, for us to go minutely into its several passages. We think our readers must be sufficiently convinced already, by the parts already noticed. We shall therefore proceed rapidly through the volume, having given a specimen from each of the writer's arrangements. The process of conclusion is arrived at, by and through the authority of premises :-if the premises be accurate, the conclusion is necessarily supposed to be so too, and vice versa. We find, therefore, that we are enabled to give a very brief critique, by confining ourselves to our author's conclusion; which, to save time, as well as our pages, we shall immediately touch upon, as a corollary involving the multum in parvo of the whole. "Of this first part, (meaning this volume) the final conclusion is, MINDS THINK ALIKE form like conclusions: and the difference between us, is only with regard to the manner of expression,-is only a difference of words." p. 125. Cras credemus hodie nihil! The Expression, which is usually considered as the index of the mind, is by this hypothesis rendered null and void; and all the finer feelings of the soul are completely annihilated. glowing phrenzy of the poet's imagination, and the common sense and philosophy' so strenuously insisted upon by the author, must vanish into air, thin air." The intimate contiguity, which is usually allowed to subsist between thought and articulation, has no longer any being:-and what can be said of a man, whose intellects do not coincide with his utterance? Why, that he is devoid of reasonthat he is incapable of common sense,' much more of that laborious research imposed by philosophy.-Alack, Sir, he is mad. We consider this reasoning as dangerous, in a moral point of view. What! does a Christian agree sentimentally with an Atheist and a Deist 166 form like conclusions-differ only in expression"-" only a difference of words." Is it possible, that such a conclusion can be received by any rational being? Is it possible, that the |