and in the name of the people of the United States, sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations.'

This sentiment is thus reciprocated by Colombia:

"The Government of the Republic of Colombia, in its own name and in the name of the Colombian people, accepts this declaration in the full assurance that every obstacle to the restoration of complete harmony between the two countries will thus disappear.'

Another achievement of the Wilson Administration which will have a lasting effect in conserving the good results which by other means may be gained between the United States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere is the negotiation of the Bryan peace treaties with eleven of our sister republics. The republics which have signed these treaties with the United States since the inauguration of Mr. Wilson are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala, and Salvador. The result of these treaties is practically to insure that there will be no war between the United States and countries in this hemisphere.

The treaties provide that in the event of international differences which under ordinary circumstances might necessitate a recourse to war, a year shall be allowed for an investigation of the issues by an international commission.

The vital provision of each of these treaties, to quote from that with the Netherlands, which is regarded as representative of the entire group, is contained in Article I, which sets forth this agreement:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement

of which previous arbitration treaties or agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent International Commission, to be constituted in the manner prescribed in the next succeeding article; and they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.'

Article III provides that the international commission shall complete its investigation and report within a year after the date on which it shall declare its investigation to have begun, unless the high contracting parties shall extend or limit this time by mutual agreement.

The American Journal of International Law is of the opinion that while war with many of the nations with which the United States has become signatory to the Bryan treaties is unthinkable, the very existence of such treaties with these nations ‘is an invitation to other nations, with whom war is not unthinkable, to investigate before they fight, or rather to investigate instead of fighting.'

Secretary of State Bryan bases his confidence in the efficacy of the treaties in preserving peace upon the belief that the calm, dispassionate judgment of mankind is on the side of peace, and that the one year provided in which this judgment may assert itself will suffice in nearly every international dispute to avert war. 'We know well,' said he recently, 'the proneness of nations to act under excitement, and a period of investigation permits the restoration of deliberate reason.'

In some measure at least the trade between two countries reflects the sentiment between them. The same thing may be said with more confidence of the trade relations between two continents.

Let us see how this works out with regard to the United States and South America. According to a recent compilation of Director John Barrett of the Pan-American Union, the twenty Latin-American countries of Central and South America conducted in 1913 a foreign commerce valued at $2,870,188,575. Of this total, the imports were valued at $1,304,261,763. The imports from the United States, despite the geographical propinquity of this country as compared with the position of Germany and Great Britain, the other great manufacturing countries from which the Latin Americans were making purchases, amounted to more than $5,000,000 less than those from Great Britain and exceeded those of Germany by about $100,000,000. These divergences were less impressive, however, than those of the previous year, and are accepted as indicating a development of American trade with South America.

It may be said without a violation of this government's neutrality in the European war, and without infringing on the diplomatic proprieties to such an extent as did A. Rustum Bey, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, by a similar utterance, that the war has furnished the United States its opportunity. The output from the European factories will necessarily be diminished for many years to come. The de

mand of the Latin-American markets, it follows, must depend more and more on the United States. It is a matter of gratification to realize that the American government, and American commercial interests as well, are fully alive to this opportunity, and are preparing with careful haste to reap the benefits which it is believed will be conferred mutually upon the two continents.

Most important probably of the steps which have been taken with the view of developing our trade with these

countries is the launching of President Wilson's plan for a government-owned merchant marine. The newspaper press assumed upon the announcement of this plan by the President that it was designed chiefly to furnish means of transporting American cereals and manufactures to the belligerent nations of Europe. Persons who have watched the minute developments with respect to this plan which have followed in the months since it was launched are convinced, however, that the larger purpose that the President has in mind to serve, after it has been ascertained that our European commerce will be cared for, is the promotion of our trade with South and Central America.

A short time after the administration Merchant-Marine bill had been introduced in the House, the President in a conversation at the White House expressed the belief that our commerce with Europe would be able to look after itself; and he spoke significantly of the possibility offered by the governmentowned marine for developing 'new avenues of trade.'

It is fortunate that at this time there should become available a special appropriation of $50,000 to be used by the Department of Commerce in promoting trade with South and Central America by extending commercial agencies such as had been initiated by the Taft Administration.

This opportunity offered by the war is not without its responsibilities for the United States, as has been pointed out by both Secretary of Commerce Redfield and Mr. Barrett, the Director of the Pan-American Union. These men have declared that first of all, in order that the United States may extend its trade with South America in these troublous times, there arises the necessity that American bankers extend a financial helping hand to these countries. The war has not impaired

their ultimate purchasing strength, Mr. Redfield points out, but their present buying strength and credit resources have been affected adversely, and he urges that the policy for which there is most immediate necessity is one of helping South America to regain her credit and thus laying the foundation of a permanent trade.

The action of the National City Bank of New York, however, in establishing important branches at Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo, gives evidence that the banks of the country are alive to this need.

Not least among the efforts of government officials to develop friendly intercourse between the United States and Latin-American countries is the recent undertaking to establish a flat twocent rate for letter postage throughout the Western Hemisphere, and to conclude money-order conventions which will stimulate trade with Latin America. The Postmaster General has indicated a willingness on the part of the government to sacrifice the revenue that would be lost through a reduction of the postal charges from the United States to those countries, out of consideration for the impetus that would be given toward the building up of direct and frequent mail interchanges.

The United States does not now do any money-order business with Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and a number of the less important Latin-American republics. Negotiations have been undertaken for concluding conventions with the postal authorities of these countries by which direct money-order interchanges can be made to the advantage of all concerned. These efforts of the Post Office Department, while not in themselves likely to bring any immediate important result, are a part of the movement being made for bringing the countries of this hemi

sphere into closer touch and sympathy, and they cannot in the long run fail to aid this general purpose.

Certainly it is too early now to attempt to form an estimate of the results of the efforts of the Wilson Administration toward establishing a 'new era of good feeling' between the two Americas. These efforts have laid the foundation for large results in the future, and their accomplishments cannot now be foreseen. It can be said, however, and with proper regard for the principles of conservative judgment, that the unity of high purpose running through all these recorded happenings, unless obstructed by events which are not now anticipated, will do much to overcome the racial and sentimental antipathies which have held back the development of the relations that should exist between the greatest democracy and those other governments which are founded on the same principles as our

own.

The policy which Mr. Wilson has laid down is destined to be regarded as remarkable in the history of international politics. It is based on a new precept - that it is possible for great neighboring powers to continue prosperous and great without attempting to overlord one another. He has advanced the idea that the United States, in order to carry to the fullest consummation its destiny of political and commercial prosperity, need not become the suzerain nation of the Western Hemisphere. His is a precept that has been entirely absent from the diplomatic history of the United States as well as from that of Europe. Doubtless it will take a considerable time for it to permeate the minds of those controlling the destinies and friendships of the Latin-American republics.

Ara time when the issue of the war is still doubtful, it is impossible to speak with any confidence of its probable effects upon Europe and the world; for the kind of settlement that is possible will depend upon where victory falls. The Germans, so far as one can understand from the utterances of their representative men, are fighting for a German hegemony of Europe, in order that they may pursue the task whose hopelessness all history demonstrates of destroying by force the 'culture' of the non-Germanic nations and imposing upon them their own. Such an attempt would mean perpetual war, and would end by reducing Europe to the level of the Balkan States. On the other hand the Allies profess to be fighting, not for territory or for hegemony, but to 'crush German militarism.' No object could be more desirable, but the important question is, how to do it. There is talk, irresponsible of course, of 'crushing Germany' in order to crush German militarism, and even of imposing upon her by force a new form of government, expelling the Hohenzollerns and democratizing Prussia. But it is clear that no nation will patiently take its form of government from foreigners and enemies; and that such a solution, too, would only perpetuate war. If militarism is to be crushed it must be crushed in all countries, the victorious as well as the vanquished. Will it be, and can it be? Let us try to estimate the forces and the possibilities.

ism? Conscript armies, in the first place, and huge navies. But that is only the outward sign. The inner spirit is the will to dominate by force, evoking everywhere the fear of domination.

These two things go together. Every country, of course, claims to be always on the defensive. But every country, or every group of allies, believes the others to be aggressive, or there would be no need of defense. The truth indeed is that, in all countries, there are militarists and anti-militarists; the militarists believing in force, desiring to extend the power and territory, or perhaps the 'culture,' of their country by force, and believing that every other state has the same purpose and attitude; the anti-militarists believing that no country has any interests that are worth pursuing by war; that all real interests are common to all peoples; and that all disputes between states can be and should be settled by judicial process. In the conflict between these principles the militarists have always won. They win partly because they are so strongly entrenched in the governments of the continental states; partly because, having made war, which they can always do before the people know they are making it, they can count upon an immediate outburst of passion, sedulously nourished by the press, to carry them through to the issue.

The question, then, that we have to ask is, whether this war, like all previous ones, is to end in a mere truce

may hope for a permanent change in the spirit and organization of Europe. This question cannot be answered with any confidence. But some of the tendencies in either direction may be appraised.

On the side of militarism are all the bad passions evoked by war. Before the outbreak, all the great permanent forces of civilization were working, as they always must do, toward an everincreasing coöperation and understanding between the nations. Militarists, of course, were doing what they could to counteract this; publicists and historians and professors, especially in Germany, were preaching the necessary and eternal antagonism of races, states, and cultures. But the ordinary business of life was working against all that. The democratic parties especially, in all countries, were pacifist; and this was specially true of the Socialists. In France and in England literary and cultural influences were becoming more and more humane and less and less chauvinistic. And the community of interest of trade and finance, as well as of labor, was more and more being recognized.

The war has changed all that for the moment. When nations go to war they feel it necessary to hate the enemy; and they have no difficulty in finding excuses. The expressed sentiment in England toward Germany, and in Germany toward England, is now one of sheer unadulterated hate, not only of the governments, of the Kaiser on the one hand, and Sir Edward Grey on the other, but of all the individuals of the nations concerned, merely because they are German or English. All sense of fact has disappeared. It is unpatriotic to doubt German atrocities in England, or French or Belgian or English atrocities in Germany. I have myself seen letters and postcards full of the foulest abuse, written to a man

who had sent a letter to the press pleading for some kind of evidence before such things were believed.

All this popular fury is, of course, made the most of by the press. And it is difficult, even in the liberal organs in England, to get inserted any expression of reason or humanity toward the enemy. The Germans, indeed, by their methods of warfare give little chance to those who endeavor to remember and remind others that Germans are men like other men. And the hatred felt in England for the Germans is fully reciprocated in Germany against the English. The war, in fact, which was represented in Germany, before the English went into it, as a war of defense against Russia, appears now to have taken in German public opinion the form of a war of revenge against England.

As for the feeling of the Belgians and French, whose countries are invaded, whose cities and villages have been destroyed, whose non-combatants have been slaughtered, they may be better imagined than described. No better evidence can be given of the trend of sentiment than the fact that M. Maeterlinck, the preacher of universal tenderness and justice, has written to the press a letter breathing nothing but revenge.

All this, of course, is grist to the militarist mill; for militarism depends upon the perpetuation of fear and hatred and revenge. But how deep these feelings go, how widespread they are, how long they will last, it is difficult to estimate. Collective feelings are changeable in proportion to their shallowness. If proof is wanted, one has only to remember the rapidity with which the hatred of the English by the Boers has given way to very general loyalty; or to reflect that the same Germans whom we English now exclude from the comity of nations were our friends fifteen years ago, and the same French whom