From the preceding statements, however, it is clear that this was in reality only a pretext. For after the war had once broken out it was hardly possible for England to withdraw; on the contrary, the opportunity to rid herself once for all of Germany's rivalry on the sea appeared so enticing that the English ministers wished to take advantage of it. This was the real crisis, and it was decided before the question of Belgium's neutrality was brought up. But it was, of course, very opportune for the English ministers that Germany's line of action toward Belgium furnished them a pretext for posing as champions of the right and guardians of treaties.

Why did Germany give England this advantage?

If it were true that England entered into this war on account of Belgium's neutrality, Germany would have cheated herself out of a sure victory by this unwise step. For, if England had not interfered, Italy would have remained with the Triple Alliance; how, in that case, could France and Russia have conquered, or even maintained themselves? Can any one credit the German Emperor, the Chancellor, the General Staff, all very sagacious personages, with such a blunder? Their conduct cannot be logically explained unless they were sure, not only that England would join the ranks of our enemies under any circumstances, but that the united Allies would themselves afterward make their way through Belgium.

One very important advantage for Germany, at the outbreak of the war, lay in the fact that it could hardly be expected that Russia and France would be able to open hostilities simultaneously: the Russians, with their cumbersome mobilization, the enormous extent of their empire, and the thinly distributed network of their railways, would not be able to take the field

until several weeks later than their allies. It was to be anticipated, therefore, that the French would first advance up to the Franco-German frontier (two hundred kilometers in length, and thickly invested by forts and fortresses), and would wait there, without assuming the offensive, until the Russians, arriving from the east, had obliged the Germans to divide their forces. Then, however, as the Germans have amply fortified their French frontiers with fortresses at Strassburg, Metz, and other places, the attack would have followed through Belgium, on the much more exposed lower Rhine. Of course, the German General Staff knew that, since they possessed the great mortars which subdued Liège, Namur, Antwerp, and the French northern fortresses, the French fortresses along the Vosges must fall also; but with these places protected by the whole French army, this would take so long that the Russians would have time to arrive. The only possibility of averting from Germany this hazardous double conflict was to break into France, across her much longer and less protected northern frontier, through Belgium, and thereby gain such an advantage that a part of the army could be dispensed with and sent against the Russians. Although finally Germany did declare war on Russia because the latter was mobilizing in threatening force on the Austro-German frontier, this danger was in reality much greater than Germany imagined.

Only a few days after our army was mobilized in the west, the Russians appeared in great force on our eastern frontier.

The first day of mobilization in Germany was August 2. By August 16 the mobilization was so far completed that the Kaiser left Berlin to join the army. On August 20 the Germans occupied Brussels, and on August 21 and 22

the first great battle took place on the Franco-German frontier between Metz and Strassburg. But already, on August 23, the Russians appeared in vastly superior numbers on the eastern border of Prussia and drove the Germans back, so that the German general headquarters was forced to withdraw troops from the French field of operations and send them against the Russians.

It is clear that the Russians must have begun their mobilization a long time before we were aware of it. If we had waited longer before taking the offensive, we should not have needed to violate the neutrality of Belgium, nor should we have been able to do it, for by that time the French and English would have been on the way through Belgium; they would have invaded the Rhine country, occupied Aix-la-Chapelle and Treves, and then, with the strong Belgian strongholds of Liège and Namur as bases, would have been able to push their offensive operations farther into the Rhine provinces.

Would the Belgians have defended their fortifications as bravely against the French and the English as they did against us? Why then had they built their forts only on the German border and not on the French? One can be perfectly sure that they not only would not have defended these fortresses against the Allies, but would have turned them over to them as a base; because, if the war had progressed to such a stage, no one in Belgium would have doubted the ultimate victory of the Allies, and every Belgian would have trembled for Belgium's existence, if the least opposition were made to the Allies.

In 1870, it was Germany that saved Belgium's integrity. Napoleon III would have been ready to agree to the German Federation if we had allowed him a free hand in Belgium. Why then has Belgium, in spite of this, gone over

to the enemies' camp? Not because we were the ones who had just violated her neutrality. The others would have done the same, and it is very probable that French soldiers crossed the Belgian border even before the Germans did. The Belgians joined the Allies simply because they considered that side to be the strongest. (There was, too, the natural sympathy of the Belgian people for the French, growing out of the common language and religion.) It is always the surest course for a small country to pursue, to be on the side of the strongest. For years the French press has daily proclaimed that the French army alone, with its superior artillery and highly developed aviation, was a match for the Germans. The peaceful foreign policy of Germany they construed as fear, and ridiculed the Kaiser as 'Guillaume le Timide.' The political developments could be foreseen: that there would some day be a great coalition against Germany. The coalition came, and we stood two against seven. Belgium certainly seemed to have the greatest assurance of being among the victors by joining the other side.

For this reason, Belgium, in 1906, as has now become known, closed with France and England an eventual convention concerning military aid. Belgium did not close such a convention with Germany. This might be explained if Belgium-in spite of the memory of the French plans in 1870 - had been absolutely sure that this neighbor (on the south) at no time and under no circumstances would violate her neutrality. If this had been the reason, Sir Edward Grey would have told the German Ambassador, and would have been obliged to tell him, that France would not violate the neutrality of Belgium and that England was ready to guarantee that France would keep this obligation. Sir Edward did not give such a pledge

to the German Ambassador. Was it possible for a German statesman under these circumstances to believe in the lasting neutrality of Belgium? Diplomats very easily find a pretext to set aside a promise. Is a country lying between two unfriendly neighbors, and taking military precautions against one of them and not against the other, in reality neutral?

What attitude should Germany take toward such a state? From Sir Edward Grey's refusal to answer the neutrality question, Germany saw clearly that just as soon as the Russians were near enough, the French, perhaps aided by the English and Belgians, would attack Germany on that flank. Germany, therefore, had to consider which was the lesser of the two evils. If she proceeded against Belgium, there was the prospect of gaining large advantages before the Russians entered the conflict, a hope that has only in small measure been realized. On the other hand there was the disadvantage in this move, that abroad, particularly in neutral countries, Germany would appear in the light of the peace-breaker. If, on the contrary, Germany had waited until the enemy had violated Belgium's neutrality, she would have had the moral advantage of appearing in the light of the defender of the right, but at the same time would have lost almost all hope of victory against the stupendous odds. Under these conditions Germany chose the odium of appearing to the world as the treatybreaker, sure that she was so only in appearance, because the treaty had already been broken in fact from the other side.

Many take the standpoint, especially in neutral countries, that England hesitated until the last moment before going into the war, and that the violation of Belgium's neutrality was the last drop which caused the goblet to

overflow. This theory has since been exploded by a report from the Belgian minister in St. Petersburg, de l'Escaille, to his government, dated July 30, which has been found in Brussels. This document states that the assurance of English support gave the war party in Russia the majority. This was five days before Germany had violated Belgian neutrality and while the German Ambassador was still discussing the question of Belgian neutrality with Sir Edward Grey. How is this evidence of M. de l'Escaille's report to be squared with the pretension of Sir Edward Grey in the English Blue Book that to the last he never undertook any obligation to Russia, to assist her against Germany? The answer is very simple. It is quite true that a formal treaty did not exist between England and Russia, any more than between England and France; notwithstanding, the leading men in St. Petersburg as well as in Paris were assured that England in case of war would be on their side. Grey's fault is not that he gave them a promise of help, but that he failed to declare that England would not be on their side. That, and that alone, would have conserved the peace.

The real sequence of events is therefore the following: Sir Edward Grey, with consummate skill, let Germany see that England would participate in the war in any case, thus putting Germany into the position of having to violate Belgian neutrality in self-defense; and then announced to all the world, with much moral pathos, that the defense of this neutrality was the ground for England's declaration of war.

One is now very well able to point out with the aid of several small mistakes in the English Blue Book that this artful policy of making Germany

appear as the aggressor was very carefully followed through. Grey reported, on July 30, that the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, tendered him a communication from the French Foreign Minister which stated that Germany was much further advanced with her preparations than France. If one considers the statements of this report more closely, it becomes apparent that this French note could not possibly date from July 30, but from August 1,1 at the very earliest, if not from even later. This contradiction was subsequently discovered in London, so that in the new edition of the Blue Book not only this date, but the term 'yesterday, Friday,' by which the false date betrays itself, has been simply left out in both the English and the French texts; in consequence this very important document now has no date at all. The documents have in this way been falsified in order to justify the assertion that Germany, four days before she began to mobilize, was already making aggressive preparations.

In another place, a falsification betrays itself. The attempt is to prove that Germany already on July 23, the day on which Austria tendered the note to Servia, began mobilization. In both the French and the English text, this July 23 is designated as Saturday. July 23, however, was a Thursday. This mistake also was discovered later and corrected in subsequent editions.

One may reply that even the German Chancellor himself stated that Germany had violated Belgian neutrality, because 'necessity knows no law,' and was conscious of being in the wrong. This can be explained. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg lays much value on being recognized as absolutely loyal and truthful, which, in diplomacy, is not a very prevalent virtue. Because the for

1 The date for which (5:30 P.M.) the order for mobilization in Germany was given. VOL. 115-NO. 2

mal violation of neutrality actually did come from the German side, it was characteristic of him to admit it openly. However, he immediately added, in his speech in the Reichstag, that he knew as a certainty that the neutrality had already been violated from the other side, and thereby had ceased to be in effect. In the same sense he told the British Ambassador, who announced the British declaration of war on the ground of this violation of neutrality, that England was going to war for a piece of paper. This did not mean, by any means, that in the eyes of the German Imperial Chancellor all treaties were only pieces of paper, but that this particular treaty had ceased to be anything more than a piece of paper, because it was no longer respected, not by us, but by either country.

VI

In the United States, many have taken sides against Germany, because they believed that they saw in the victory of the western powers a victory of liberalism, and in a German victory a triumph of militarism. Quite aside from the fact that Germany, in many respects, has far more political liberty than either France or England, the victory of the Allies would be a victory, not of the western powers, but of England and Russia. It is in reality these two powers who threaten the liberties of the nations to-day: England, who strives to rule the seas of the world and to subjugate the commerce of all nations to the law of her naval power; and Russia, whose army, even in time of peace, is larger than the armies of Germany, Austria, and Italy added together. Without those tremendous efforts made by Germany, called by our enemies the 'Prussian Militarism,' the mainland of Europe would long since have been under the dominion of

the Cossacks and there would have remained nothing but the struggle between England and Russia for the dominion over Asia, which would mean to the victor world-domination.

Would that be a desirable aim for the development of the world's history? All modern culture in all its wealth rests on polynationalism. If Germany and Austria are victorious in this war, the freedom of the nations will be preserved, because, no matter how strong Germany emerges from this struggle, she will still be far too weak to maintain a world- dominion. Germany lacks the mass, the bulk, the weight, and must rely for power on greater tension, activity, and efforts. Texas alone is much larger in area than Germany.

But if England and Russia win, France in comparison with these two hardly counts as a great power, — one will dominate the seas, the other the continents. Of course, England's power will continue only if the British Empire continues to exist. Does not the United States already feel the injustice of the English interpretation of maritime law? To what extremes would England utilize her power, if she no longer, as a check, had Germany to consider?

Therefore we, in Germany, have the firm conviction that it is not for our own independence alone that we are fighting in this war, but for the preservation of the culture and freedom of all peoples.

Ah! qu'elle est belle de haut en bas, cette France de 1914! Tout y est à recueillir dans nôtre mémoire, pieusement, et à suspendre pour jamais dans notre maison de famille, comme des tableaux devant lesquels les génerations viendront prier et se recueillir. Quelle fraîcheur universelle! Il semble que toutes les âmes soient redevenues neuves et simples. Nous n'avions connu que des chrysalides. La France vient d'ouvrir ses ailes.

MAURICE BARRÈS. de l'Académie Française.

I

BEYOND all question Barrès is right. For the past two months I have traveled through the length and breadth of France, talking with all sorts and conditions of men, from the government

officials at Bordeaux to the last pitiful refugees of the devastated provinces, and as I look back on those crowded days, the impression left on my mind is one of ever-recurring wonder and increasing admiration. For to those who have eyes to see and ears to hear, France presents to-day a splendidly moving spectacle of spiritual renaissance; the nation, purified and ennobled by sacrifice and suffering, is finding itself in a new world of rare moral beauty. War, the destroyer, has become also the restorer. In France it has swept away all frivolous and aimless things, all the petty strifes of class and creed, that seemed so vital a little while ago; all the sordid differences