At first internal political developments during the intervention were more satisfactory. Despite opposition from Chamorro an agreement establishing the National Guard was drawn up and approved by the United States and Nicaragua. Díaz issued a new electoral code, and the United States appointed Army Major General Frank McCoy to direct the supervision of the 1928 elections, which went surprisingly smoothly. The Conservatives finally settled on a relatively obscure compromise candidate, Adolfo Benard, while the Liberals chose Moncada. Nationwide voter registration was conducted prior to the election, and voting took place under strict control and supervision. Moncada was elected with a 19,000 vote majority of the 133,000 Nicaraguans who participated. Sandino's supporters boycotted the entire process but were unable to disrupt what was probably the most honest election ever held in Nicaragua.

Whatever hopes existed that the Moncada administration could improve Nicaragua's economic and social situation foundered on the continued conflict with Sandino and the effects of the world depression. Some efforts were made to improve education facilities and expand railroad construction. The national debt had been consolidated and finances regularized during the last year of the Díaz administration. United States Army engineers surveyed a possible canal route through the country, providing considerable valuable geographical information in the process. But any benefits in these areas were offset or ultimately negated by the growing financial crisis of the early 1930s. Expenses for the National Guard grew steadily while the depression caused a fall in revenues. This led to cutbacks in all other budget areas. Furthermore Sandino's forces managed to inflict significant damage on American-owned properties in the Atlantic Coast area and in the inland mining regions. New investments virtually ceased and unemployment rose. Already noted for having one of the lowest standards of rural living and wage scales in the hemisphere, Nicaragua's economy declined even further. When the intervention ended in 1933 it left behind few, if any, economic and social benefits. In many areas conditions were actually worse than they had been a decade earlier-owing in part to the effects of the 1931 earthquake which virtually leveled Managua.

The 1932 elections proved more difficult to supervise than had those of 1928. Moncada had tried to restrict the political activities of his opponents during his term and had even tried to alter the constitution to permit him to remain in power until at least 1934. Opposition from the United States helped thwart this project, but resultant political animosity and splits within the Liberal Party for a time threatened the 1932 elections. Finally the Liberals nominated former Vice President Sacasa, while the Conservative ticket featured ex-presidents Díaz and Chamorro. Lack of funds hindered the Conservative campaign, making Sacasa's victory almost

Augusto César Sandino (1895-1934): as a guerrilla fighter (left); revered in portrait in Managua's Plaza de la Revolución

a foregone conclusion. Again United States supervision ensured a relatively honest voting procedure, but fewer Nicaraguans voted in 1932 than had in 1928.

The Somoza Dynasty, 1933-77

The Establishment of the Dynasty

The final task of the intervention was to turn over command of the National Guard to Nicaraguan officers. Enough junior officers had been trained by the marines to fill those positions, but selecting senior commanders proved more difficult. An agreement was reached between the two parties to divide most of these posts equally, but the top position of jefe director of the Guard remained in dispute. The final decision was that the choice would be made by the victor in the 1932 election, with the approval of the United States and Moncada. After some hesitation Anastasio Somoza García was selected by President-elect Sacasa.

Somoza was born in Nicaragua in 1896. He later attended school in Philadelphia where he gained a good command of Eng

lish and met his future wife, a member of the influential Debayle family. He played a brief role in the 1926 civil conflict and later helped translate for the Stimson mission. He carefully cultivated the friendship of the marines and the United States minister while serving in a variety of cabinet and subcabinet posts for Moncada. The Americans liked him, Moncada viewed him as a protégé, and Sacasa found him acceptable since Somoza's wife was the niece of the president-elect. All three groups evidently believed that the new jefe director could be controlled or manipulated. They badly underestimated both his ambition and his political skill.

Final withdrawal of the marines took place immediately following the January 1, 1933, inauguration of Sacasa as president. The new government inherited severe financial problems, but even more threatening was the continuing operation of Sandino. His long resistance to the American intervention had won him considerable stature throughout Latin America. As a result both the United States and the Moncada administration had been the object of strong criticism, while a torrent of writings had glorified Sandino. Domestic support, international prestige, and budgetary necessity all made some sort of arrangement with the guerrilla leader imperative.

Fortunately for the new president, Sandino quickly made it clear that he intended to honor his pledge to cease fighting once the marines were withdrawn. Preliminary negotiations had begun in December 1932, but final agreement did not come until February 2, 1933. The government offered a general amnesty, land, and jobs in northern Nicaragua for Sandino's followers, and permission for him to maintain a personal guard of 100 armed men. The National Guard was unhappy with the agreement-especially the last provision-and their dissatisfaction grew when they became convinced that Sandino turned over only a fraction of his arms to the government. Internal divisions and lack of funds, however, gave them little alternative other than to accept the pact.

The pact with Sandino ended the fighting but did not restore political harmony to Nicaragua. The Guard's antagonism towards Sandino and his followers was increased when the Nicaraguan Congress voted a substantial monthly sum to pay for Sandino's personal guard and shortly thereafter passed another bill reducing military salaries. The Conservatives were angered by Somoza's efforts to remove Conservative officers from the National Guard and replace them with individuals loyal to him personally. Sandino became increasingly hostile toward the Guard, especially after an August clash which left five of his followers dead. The president was fearful of Sandino's political ambitions and repeatedly pressured him not to form his own political party as he had intended. The various conflicts finally came to a head in early 1934.

Sandino's survival represented a major obstacle to Somoza's presidential ambitions and to the status of the Guard, which San

dino repeatedly denounced as unconstitutional. In January, at a meeting of high-ranking officers, the decision was made to eliminate the guerrilla leader. Sacasa was not informed of these plans, but the jefe director did try to obtain the approval of the United States minister, Arthur Bliss Lane, for Sandino's arrest. Lane refused to go along with these plans, fearing that such action would renew civil conflict in Nicaragua. Despite this rebuff the Guard remained determined to eliminate Sandino. Sacasa was not involved in the plot, but he was nervous about the growing tension and the guerrillas' refusal to give up any of their arms. He invited Sandino to a February 1934 conference with him in Managua. After several meetings, some of the issues were apparently resolved, but as Sandino and his chief aides were leaving a farewell dinner at the presidential palace on February 21 they were seized by a Guard contingent acting under Somoza's orders, taken to the airfield, executed, and secretly buried. At the same time another force attacked Sandino's followers along the Río Coco and largely destroyed them. A few, led by Pedro Altamirano, escaped and carried on a limited guerrilla campaign until Altamirano was killed in 1937; but Sandino's immediate threat to Somoza and the Guard was removed by the February 1934 actions.

Sacasa was furious at the National Guard for acting without his permission, but his reaction was tempered by his own weakness and fear of Somoza. No serious effort was made to punish Somoza or the rest of the high command. After an initial period of nervousness, the Guard's commander soon began to work towards placing himself in the presidency through the 1936 elections. His first task was to gain complete control over the Guard, a task he had largely completed by 1935 despite a brief uprising by disgruntled noncommissioned officers. On the political front Somoza began to cultivate ex-presidents Moncada and Chamorro, playing on their common antagonism towards Sacasa. Weak leadership, nepotism, graft, and fraud in the 1934 congressional elections had all combined to erode the president's popularity and leave him vulnerable to such tactics. By March 1935 Somoza had gained enough support in the Congress to give his followers the balance of power in that body.

The major obstacles to Somoza's drive for power were the Nicaraguan constitution and the United States. Since Sacasa was his wife's uncle, Somoza fell within the constitutional prohibition on immediate reelection of a president or any of his relatives. Moreover the constitution prohibited active duty military officers from seeking electoral office. Resignation from the National Guard would remove this obstacle, but it would also threaten Somoza's control over his power base. The United States policy of not recognizing governments that took power by violent or unconstitutional means offered another potential obstacle. Fear in this area was lessened somewhat in 1935 when Washington seemed to

abandon its traditional stance by extending recognition to the regime of General Maximiliano Martínez in El Salvador, but memories of Chamorro's fate in 1926 continued to trouble Somoza and led him to continuously seek United States approval for his actions. Fearful of the jefe director's ambitions and growing power, Sacasa also sought United States support. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, the United States Department of State pursued a policy of avoiding direct involvement in internal Nicaraguan politics and concentrated its efforts on urging both sides to avoid violence. These pleas ultimately proved unavailing. Somoza began the confrontation in the spring of 1936 by using the National Guard to remove local governmental officials loyal to the president and replace them with his own supporters. In May the Guard moved against units loyal to Sacasa in León and around the presidential palace in Managua. After a brief period of fighting the president surrendered; a few days later he resigned and went into exile. The vice president also resigned, reportedly in return for a US$20,000 bribe. Congress then selected a Somoza supporter as president.

President Anastasio Somoza García

The jefe director was now effectively in control of the country, but he waited until the 1936 elections to take formal possession of the presidency. An opposition coalition ticket had been nominated to oppose him, but National Guard control of the election machinery made it clear that they had no chance of winning. When the United States refused to intervene on their behalf, the opposition urged their supporters to boycott the election. Voting was postponed until December, and Somoza even went through the formality of resigning from the Guard (though he never gave up actual command) in order to remove the last obstacle to his election. Once the election was over he resumed his post as jefe director, making him, on January 1, 1937, simultaneously commander of the nation's only military and police force and president of Nicaragua. This ability to control both the military and the Liberal Party would prove a key to the longevity of Somoza family rule in Nicaragua.

The new president's first years in office were not particularly notable. The economy continued to suffer from the effects of the world depression. He concentrated his political skills on repressing the Conservatives and strengthening his control over the Liberal Party. The powers of the Guard were also expanded, giving them control over internal revenue, communications, immigration, transportation, and even sanitation. This not only limited potential areas of opposition influence, but also gave Somoza the ability to reward loyal officers with a wide variety of posts that offered opportunities for personal profit. Graft in return for loyalty was to become a dominant characteristic of the Somoza sys