where it is not possible to make an immediate and complete delivery of the thing sold or given; as in the instance of goods in a warehouse, where the delivery of the key has been held sufficient. But it would appear that, in this latter class of cases, symbolical delivery is accepted instead of actual delivery, on the supposition that actual delivery can presently follow; for sooner or later the actual delivery of a personal thing corporeal, or movable proper, would be possible; whereas, of a money right or thing incorporeal, only some voucher or muniment of title can be actually delivered in transfer.2 § 88. Rule as to Transfer of a Ship. - A peculiar rule is applied in the case of a ship, which, as we have seen, is a personal corporeal chattel. Partly because of the great bulk and value of such chattels, partly because it would be impossible to deliver property of this nature (whose element is the water) like things transported on land, and in a great measure from reasons of expediency and public policy appertaining to the intercourse of commercial nations with one another, a registry system has been fostered by legislation which assimilates the title and transfer of vessels very closely to that of real estate. The Registry Statutes of the United States, like those of England, have always required a certain registration in order to entitle the ship to the full privileges of an American vessel. The English statutes have gone so far as to require registration to make the transfer valid. And quite recently an act of Congress was passed which required the registration of all such transfers by sale, mortgage, or pledge. And the universal custom under the law merchant is to require the transfer of a ship by a written document. Can, then, a ship be transferred, independently of a bill of sale or other written document, like any other chattel, by mere delivery? It seems to be reasonably certain 12 Kent Com. 446-448, and cases cited; ib. 500-504, and cases cited; 1 Atk. 171; per Lord Kenyon, 1 East, 194; Packard v. Dunsmore, 11 Cush. 282. 2 See Stevens v. Stewart, 3 Cal. 140. 8 See 1 Pars. Shipping, c. 2; and post, chapter on Ships and Vessels. that it can; and that, leaving legislation out of consideration, which might at any time control the question, the sale and ownership of a ship are regulated by the same principles as apply to corporeal chattels in general.1 § 89. As to Seizure and Attachment; Chattels Corporeal and Incorporeal. Thirdly. Another distinction is noticeable between corporeal and incorporeal chattels personal, in the matter of seizure and attachment. The usual mode of seizure in the case of corporeal personal property would be taking it into actual and manual possession; as in the case where implements are seized for violation of the internal revenue laws. But an incorporeal chattel manifestly cannot be seized in the same way. Indeed, except for the garnishee or trustee process of which we have spoken,2 or some similar remedy, a mere debt could not be attached or seized at all. Here, too, the principle seems properly applied, wherever a statute confers the right to seize or attach incorporeal chattels, of making a sort of symbolical seizure or attachment, such as the thing in its nature and according to its class admits of, sufficient to hold the property for judicial proceedings.3 § 90. As to Larceny; Chattels Corporeal and Incorporeal. Fourthly. Choses in action, or incorporeal chattels personal, were not, at the common law, the subject of larceny, because they were deemed to be of no intrinsic value, "nor importing any property in possession of the person from whom they were taken." But bonds, bills, and valuable securities generally, being important muniments of title to some incorporeal right, are now rendered by statute the subject of larceny and punished accordingly. There are negotiable instruments in these days whose possession by a bona fide holder for value would give title to the chose; so 1 Ib.; The Amelie, 6 Wall. 18; Scudder v. Calais Steamboat Co., 1 Cliff. 370; s. c. 2 Bl. 372. And see Pars. Partn. 2d ed. 550, and cases cited. 2 Supra, § 81. 8 This is one of the principles upon which the recent case of Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, under the "Confiscation Acts" of 1861 and 1862, was decided. 4 Calye's Case, 8 Co. 33; 4 Bl. Com. 234, and notes by Chitty and others. that the criminal safeguards ought to be very strong.1 The reason of the old exemption ceasing, the exemption itself ought to be made to cease. We have seen that even in the taking of things corporeal, such as animals, the alleged criminal offence may sometimes be justified by reason of the worthlessness of the thing taken.2 § 91. As to Husband's Marital Rights; Chattels Corporeal and Incorporeal. Fifthly. The title of the husband to his wife's personal property, upon marriage, is greatly affected, at the common law, by the distinction made between things corporeal and things incorporeal. All of the wife's corporeal chattels personal - that is, her choses in possession -vest in her husband absolutely; while his right to her choses in action, or incorporeal chattels personal, is qualified only; marriage operating in this latter case somewhat as a gift, upon the condition that the husband shall do some act, while the matrimonial state lasts, to appropriate such choses to himself, or, as it is called, "reduce them to possession." The technical terms applied in this connection would lead one to suppose that "reduction into possession" meant nothing more nor less than to turn the incorporeal property into corporeal property or make the chose in action a chose in possession. Many of the cases, indeed, support such a belief, so far as money debts or the old choses in action are concerned; and yet, if this were in truth the ancient theory, it is found too narrow to fit the modern precedents. As to chattels real, the title acquired by the husband upon marriage is of a somewhat anomalous nature.6 § 92. As to Survival of Remedies. 1 See post, vol. ii. pt. iv. 2 See supra, § 50. 8 See Schouler Dom. Rel. 5th ed. §§ 82-85; 2 Bl. Com. 389, 396; 2 Kent Com. 130 et seq., 351. + 2 Kent Com. 137, 138; Schouler Dom. Rel. 5th ed. §§ 82-85. 6 Ib. See, for instance, as to novating a debt by taking a new security to himself, Arnold v. Ruggles, 1 R. I. 165; Dodgson v. Bell, 3 E. L. & Eq. 542. See also, as to a husband's as Sixthly. While the signment of the chose by way of reduction, Ib. Schouler Dom. Rel. §§ 87, 88; 2 Kent Com. 134. The married women's acts, now constituting a prominent feature of English and American legislation, curtail the husband's common-law privileges very considerably; their policy being to allow the wife to keep as her separate property whatever she has at the time of marriage or subsequently acquires; so corporeal chattels personal of a deceased person remain in specie after his death, and (with the exception, perhaps, of such things as heirlooms, emblements, and fixtures, of which we are to speak hereafter) go into the hands of his executors or administrators, to swell the assets of the estate, his incorporeal chattels do not in all cases even survive him. Thus, it was an old maxim of the law that damages for injuries to one's person or property died with the person to whom or by whom the injury was done; and hence a claim for damages, though it might be valuable to the wronged party while he lived, could never avail his personal representatives after his death. Statutes, enacted from time to time since the reign of Edward III. of England, have gradually modified this rule; so that now, in various cases, remedies are permitted to survive; yet, in other instances, particularly where the wrong is done to the person instead of the property, and local legislation affords no special remedy, executors and administrators have no power whatever to commence a new suit, nor to carry on one already begun to final judgment and execution.1 But for debts founded upon contract, the personal representative may generally sue; and these, whether resting upon judgment, specialty, or parol agreement, together with such species of incorporeal property representing debts, as bills, notes, certificates of stock, coupon bonds, and the like, go in with corporeal chattels as part of the assets of the deceased person's estate. Accruing rents, annuities, salaries, and the like, all of which are incorporeal, may be lost by the death of the owner, on the ground of not being strictly due and payable at the time of his death; but these are now frequently saved by statutes which permit of an apportionment up to the date of the owner's death.2 that this whole doctrine of "reduction into possession" seems likely to pass into oblivion, as concerns the United States, at no very distant day. See Schouler Hus. & Wife, §§ 162, &c., for a full discussion of the doctrine concerning the wife's "separate "mar estate," together with the 11 Wms. Ex'rs, 6th ed. 739-752; Schouler Ex'rs, §§ 279, 280. 2 Wms. Ex'rs, 776, 784, 785; Schoul. Ex'rs, § 277. § 93. As to Effect of Time upon Title; Statutes of Limitation. Seventhly. We are to notice, as a final distinction between corporeal and incorporeal chattels personal, that while one's title in those of the former kind is strengthened by lapse of time, in many of those of the latter kind it becomes rather endangered. For if one has possession of a corporeal thing, such as an animal, money, or a box of jewels, the longer he keeps it, the stronger becomes his presumptive title. But a mere money right, which must be eventually enforced by collection or suit, is subject to our statutes of limitation; and unless the creditor sues within the period which the law permits, he loses his right and title altogether. And the same may be said of the right to sue upon a bill or promissory note, or any other instrument which promises the repayment of a loan at some future time certain and not far distant. This distinction is often found, however, of much less practical consequence when applied to some species of incorporeal chattels personal, such as shares in joint-stock companies and the loans of government or private corporations, where not only the written evidence of title is a visible and tangible thing, easily produced when occasion 1 See Wms. Pers. Prop. 5th Eng. ed. 370. Upon the general subject of limitations, see elementary works of H. G. Wood, H. F. Buswell, and others. Our modern statutes of limitations put bounds to all private litigation, whether by real or personal action; and the parent act on this subject is the English statute of James I., passed in 1623, whose provisions have been extensively copied into the American codes. The statute of limitations affects quite differently corporeal chattels and those incorporeal or founded in a right to enforce some claim for money: for, in the former instance, lapse of time aids the possessor by shutting out contestants; while, in the latter, a possessor's title, though strengthened in this sense, is certainly weakened in an other, or by the delay to pursue his debtor and realize the demand. Concerning the general purpose of statutes of limitations, judicial opinion has varied; but, at the present day, the legislative policy is highly favored, and they are allowed to operate, not because affording a presumption of payment liable to rebuttal, but as statutes of repose: consequently the legislative intent in this instance is not to be evaded by construction. Equity adopts the statute rule likewise, and, in cases within its own jurisdiction, applies by analogy the same bar which would have prevailed in a common-law action, wherever there are legal and equitable remedies pertaining to the same subject-matter; though, in cases of exclusively equitable cognizance, |