The rule against accumulations is not restrained to cases which expressly provide for accumulation, but it applies likewise to cases where provisions are made which by implication lead to this result; as, for instance, where the whole residue of an estate is given in such a manner that the vesting is substantially postponed until a later period than that allowed by law; for this must of necessity involve the accumulation of the residue by adding income to principal while the period of suspension lasts. But a testator may do three things without violating any statute. First, he may suspend the absolute ownership of the corpus of his estate, and render it inalienable during the permissible period; secondly, he may during such suspension dispose of the income annually as it accrues, though not directing its accumulation except for a single purpose; thirdly, he may give vested legacies and provide for their payment at a future definite period. And upon these combined reasons a disposition was sustained in New York, some years ago, where a testator, after rendering his estate inalienable during the period allowed by law, gave pecuniary legacies, payable at future periods, with the manifest intention that they should be paid from income as it accrued, leaving the corpus of the estate to pass unimpaired to the residuary legatees.2 Where bequests are given with directions for accumulation which are void under the statute, the English rule, which is recognized also in New York, is that only the direction for accumulation is to be held void, and that the bequest will take effect as though there had been no such direction.3 § 148. Real and Personal compared; As to Estates Tail. Notwithstanding the many strong points of resemblance which we have seen between real and personal interests in expectancy, there are some rules worthy of special mention which do not seem to apply with equal force to the two prop 11 Jarm. Wills, 293; 2 Redf. Wills, 840 and notes; Bryan v. Collins, 16 Beav. 14. N. Y. 69. See Mandlebaum v. Mc- Williams v. Williams, 4 2 Phelps's Executor v. Pond, 23 Seld. 525; Martin v. Margham, 14 Sim. 230. erty systems. Thus, an estate tail in lands is created by those technical and almost inflexible words "heirs of the body." But the same expression, when used with reference to chattels, gives the absolute interest to the first donee, unless something can be found in the instrument to show that the donor's intention was clearly to restrict him to a life estate; in which case the heirs, if they were to take after the life estate has determined, will take as purchasers and not by way of limitation. And even the more manageable expression "issue" is subject to the same rule of construction under these circumstances if sanctioned by the whole scope of the will; namely, in favor of an absolute gift to the first donee. Estates tail, whether in real or personal property, are very rarely met with in American practice, so that one must rely chiefly upon the shifting opinions of the English chancery for the later development of this doctrine. There the disposition was formerly to apply the old rules of tenure to aid in construing wills of personal property. But more recently the current of authority turned in favor of regarding more liberally the giver's actual intention in such cases, and confining feudal reasons to the feudal property in which they originated.3 Chancellor Kent says positively that the same words which under the English law would create an estate tail as to freeholds give the absolute interest as to chattels. But this statement is too broad; certainly so far as concerns England. And with regard to the United States as well as England, we think the rule is better stated by one of our later equity jurists in these words: "The natural presumption in regard 12 Kent Com. 354; 2 Redf. Wills, 385; Jackson v. Bull, 10 Johns. 19; Ex parte Wynch, 5 De G. M. & G. 188, and cases cited. 2 See Ex parte Wynch, ib., where this whole subject is fully discussed and authorities cited. And see Knight v. Ellis, 2 Br. C. C. 570; Chandless v. Price, 3 Ves. 99. * Ib. See, further, Andrews's Will, 27 Beav. 608; Christie v. Gosling, Law Rep. 1 H. L. 279; Henderson v. Cross, 7 Jur. N. s. 177; Wms. Pers. Prop. 5th Eng. ed. 242. Mr. Williams's dislike of expectant estates in chattels seems to have carried him very far beyond the chancery courts in his statements on this point. 4 2 Kent Com. 354, and cases cited. For an instance of executory trust in jewels, see Shelley v. Shelley, L. R. 6 Eq. 540. to personal estate is, that the whole interest was intended to be given unless something else is clearly expressed. And in regard to real estate it is ordinarily intended that a life estate merely was intended to be conveyed, when no words of inheritance are used, unless an intention to give the fee is clearly expressed."1 In this country the heir is more readily regarded as purchaser, however, than in England.2 It has generally been understood that where real and personal estate are included in one and the same bequest, and the real estate must be held to have vested, the same rule of construction will be applied to the personal estate. Limitations of property real and personal, with remainder by way of estate tail, are to be found blended together sometimes in modern practice. In the United States, real and personal property are made to follow the same general rules of distribution under the local codes, so that we are free from many of those perplexities of construction which are inseparable from the system of our mother country. § 149. Real and Personal compared; As to Contingent Remainders. The feudal law with respect to contingent remainders was exceedingly abstruse. Where an estate in land was 1 Per Redfield, C. J., in White v. White, 21 Vt. 250. 2 Whitehead v. Lassiter, 4 Jones Eq. 79; Chew's Appeal, 37 Penn. St. 23; Ingram v. Smith, 1 Head, 411; 2 Redf. Wills, 388-391. 8 Farmer v. Francis, 2 Sim. & Stu. 505; Tapscott v. Newcombe, 6 Jur. 755. 4 Thus, in Christie v. Gosling, which was decided on appeal in the House of Lords in 1866, the question arose as to the construction of a will which devised lands for life with remainder to certain sons in tail, and also gave certain personal estate to be held by trustees upon such trusts and for such estates and interests as were declared concerning the real estate, or as near thereto as the rules of law or equity would admit, with a proviso that the personal estate should not vest absolutely in any tenant in tail unless such person should attain twenty-one. The lifetenant being dead, the bequest of the personalty was declared valid up to and including his eldest son, then under age; and it is understood that this decision meant to go further, to the extent of ruling that, on the death of the eldest son under twentyone, the bequest of personal property would go over to the next person named in the will as tenant for life or tenant in tail, as the case might be. Christie v. Gosling, L. R. 1 H. L. 279. See Harrington v. Harrington, L. R. 3 Ch. 564. And thus stands the English rule at this day. invariably fixed, to remain to a certain person after the particular estate was spent, it was called a vested remainder, the estate being already vested, though still in expectancy; but where the estate was to take effect either to an uncertain person or upon some uncertain event, the name of contingent remainder was applied, for it remained suspended, in mid-air, as it were, and might never vest at all. Now, limitations of personal property, as we have seen, are more analogous to executory devises than to remainders, whatever the term applied; if, indeed, the language of feudal tenure be applicable at all. The essential quality of an executory devise, that which gives it the great advantage over a contingent remainder, is that while the owner of the intervening estate might, and often did at the common law, defeat a contingent remainder altogether, by a certain mode of conveyance which would effect a sort of legal abortion, he can by no act of his own prevent expectant interests under an executory devise from coming into being or vesting at the appointed time.2 Hence is the general principle that every interest in personal property, which is provided to take effect in futuro is of an indestructible nature, and, notwithstanding the acts of a party having the present beneficial enjoyment, takes effect in its proper turn; so long, at least, as the rule against perpetuities is not violated.3 Where a remainder in lands had been devised to sons of the tenant for life, it was held in Massachusetts that on the usual principle of tenures the remainder vested on the death of the testator in the sons then living, but in case of afterborn children opened again and let them in. But Chief Justice Parsons adds: "Of a chattel there can be no remainder, which may vest and afterwards open to let in afterborn children; and the interest in it must be contingent, 1 See 2 Bl. Com. 168, 169. 2 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581; Wms. Real Prop. 4th Am. ed. 302; Nightingale v. Burrell, 15 Pick. 104; 1 Jarm. Wills, 828, 829; 2 Redf. Wills, 650. Stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, § 8, changes materially the law of contingent remainders in that country. 8 1 Jarm. Wills, 834; 2 Kent Com. 352, 353; Wms. Pers. Prop. 245. * Dingley v. Dingley, 5 Mass. 535. And see Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129. until the time provided for the distribution of it, in order that they may take." 1 terests. § 150. Real and Personal compared; As to Reversionary InWe do not find, as a matter of practice, that expectant estates are mentioned by way of strict reversion, in personal chattels. It would, of course, be inconsistent with testamentary dispositions to limit property in this manner. But the loan of chattels, with or without the stipulated payment of a certain sum for their use for a certain specified time, is a matter of every-day business. Pianos and other household furniture are often let with a house. We can hardly apply the term "expectant estates" to such chattel interests, although in many respects the owner's interest is somewhat analogous to the landlord's estate, by way of reversion, in lands which he has leased for a particular life or for years. It is clear, however, that personal property may be subjected to much the same modifications of ownership as real estate, even though not by way of technical devise or bequest; and we may readily conceive of a case where some one making a family settlement as a husband — might wish to so limit chattels to wife or child that there would be still an interest in himself, operating by way of reversion. The term "reversionary interest" is, however, one of frequent application in the law of trusts to things both real and personal; and it appears to be applied without much discrimination to expectant interests in general; not in the more restricted sense of that residue which remains to one who has carved out of his own a lesser estate. We hear sometimes of "future or reversionary interests" in chattels, whether vested or contingent. Most commonly are these expressions applied to family settlements. Inasmuch as a reversion, 1 Dingley v. Dingley, 5 Mass. 535. As to the old English practice of drawing settlements so as to preserve contingent remainders, see Perry Trusts, §§ 522, 523. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, renders these formalities no longer necessary. Ib. 2 As to estates in reversion in lands, see 2 Bl. Com. 176. 8 See Burrill Dict. "Reversionary Interest; " Bouvier's Dict. ib.; Wms. Pers. Prop. 350; Ibbottson v. Rhodes, 2 Vern. 554; Browne v. Savage, 7 W. R. 571. 4 See Schouler Dom. Rel. 131; Peachey Marr. Settl. 165, 261, 733; Osborn v. Morgan, 8 E. L. & Eq. 192; 9 Hare, 432. |