unlike a remainder, arises by operation of law, there is no particular reason why the term "reversionary interest" should not have a more exact meaning in connection with things personal, if a corresponding convenient term were applied to interests by way of remainder. § 151. Real and Personal compared; As to Conditional Devise or Bequest. The distinction between limitations of real and personal property may be further illustrated by the case of a conditional devise or bequest. Landed estates granted on condition precedent could not, at common law, vest in the grantee until the condition had been performed; while those granted on condition subsequent vested at once, but were liable to be defeated afterwards through non-performance.1 Hence, where one makes a will containing a devise of lands upon condition to some person in expectancy, it is material to inquire whether the condition be precedent or subsequent. But in regard to personal property our law follows the rule of the civilians, which made no distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent. And hence, where a legacy depends upon a condition precedent which becomes impossible, the bequest will vest and become absolute; though it is otherwise where performance of the condition forms the consideration of the gift.3 But where a gift is made upon an immoral condition, it fails altogether; this, too, being the doctrine of the civil law.* § 152. Equity aids Parties in Expectancy; Security from Life Beneficiary, etc. - Courts of equity furnish their assistance to parties interested in expectancy, where the chattels are already subject to an intermediate interest. The English rule was formerly more stringent than at present; security being required from the beneficiary for life, in favor of the person entitled by way of remainder. But Lord Thurlow 1 See 2 Bl. Com. 152-154; Co. Lit. 201. 22 Wms. Ex'rs, 1131, and n.; Gorst v. Lowndes, 11 Sim. 434; 2 Redf. Wills, 661 et seq.; Moakley v. Riggs, 19 Johns. 71, 72. 32 Jarm. Wills (ed. 1861), 13; Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Gratt. 804; 2 Greenl. Cruise, 16; 2 Redf. Wills, 665, 675. 4 Ib.; Swinb. pt. 4, § 6, pl. 16. See, further, c. on Legacies, post. says, in Foley v. Burnell, that these cases have been overruled, and chancery now demands of the intermediate party only an inventory, which affords more equal justice.1 If there should appear, however, good cause to apprehend that the property would be wasted, secreted, or removed by the plaintiff, security may still be required.2 The American cases generally support the same views. But as executors and trust officers generally are in the habit of giving bonds for the performance of duties, it can hardly be considered unreasonable to require some kind of security, at least, in the remainder-man's favor, from the life beneficiary in possession, especially if the property itself is easily capable of destruction or removal; though where the property is in the hands of trustees having the legal estate, such special precautions might be unnecessary. Where property is given by the executor to the tenant for life and by him consumed, the executor either of the testator or of the tenant for life may be held responsible. The rule in Pennsylvania under legislative enactment is to require security in all cases, under the direction of the Orphans' Court, where chattels are bequeathed to one for life and then limited over.5 The civil law made the usufructuary, in general, give not only an inventory, but the necessary security, which, according to circumstances, would be with or without sureties; and if the property might be easily injured, this constituted an important element in determining as to the need of sureties.6 § 153. Death of Life Beneficiary; Presumptions. - In a case where the life beneficiary of a fund had been transported in 1832 and had not afterwards been heard of, the remaindermen applied twenty years later for payment, on the pre 1 Foley v. Burnell, 1 Br. C. C. 274. 2 Ib.; 2 Kent Com. 354; 1 Jarm. Wills, 835. 8 De Peyster v. Clendining, 8 Paige, 295; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Met. 194; Langworthy v. Chadwick, 13 Conn. 42; Henderson v. Vaulx, 10 Yerg. 530; 2 Redf. Wills, 655, n.; 2 Kent Com. 354, and n.; Rowe v. White, 1 C. E. Green, 411; Perry 4 Jones v. Simmons, 7 Ire. Eq. 172. 5 See 2 Kent Com. 354, n. See also Hawthorne v. Beckwith, 89 Va. 786; Bedford's Appeal, 40 Penn. St. 18. 61 Dom. Civ. Law, 994. sumption of death. Said the Master of the Rolls: "I will not now dispose of the capital, but I cannot refuse to order payment of the future dividends to the children, on their undertaking to abide by any order of the court to make good the dividends received by them out of their shares of the capital, if it should hereafter appear that their father is still alive."1 CHAPTER VIII. JOINT AND COMMON OWNERS. § 154. Number and Connection of Owners of Personal Property. The number and connection of owners is an important element to be considered in dealing with the law of personal property. Writers on the subject of real estate tell us that lands may be held either in severalty, or by joint tenancy, or by co-parcenary, or in common; and under these heads they embrace about all the law that pertains to the subject; though the title of husband and wife to land is something peculiar and might constitute still another topic. Taking a corresponding standpoint from which to view the subject of personal property, we shall see that similar principles of classification are to be adopted. The very same terms are sometimes applied indiscriminately to lands and chattels, as where one speaks of a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common under a patent. But we are still to remember, as before, that while real estate is theoretically the subject of tenure, personal property is owned; and it would be more correct to designate persons as joint owners or owners in common, than as tenants of a chattel. 1 Per Romilly, M. R., In re Mileham's Trust, 15 Beav. 507; 21 E. L. & Eq. 550. Upon the general subject of personal property in expectancy, the student is referred to works upon Trusts. A good modern work upon this subject, especially for American readers, is that of the late Jairus W. Perry. Lewin on Trusts has a good English reputation. The topics of this chapter are incidentally considered in the extensive works of Jarman and Redfield upon Wills. 2 See 2 Bl. Com. 179-195; 1 Washb. Real Prop. c. 13. § 155. Owners in Severalty; Joint and Common Owners. Where one holds or owns property, as the case may be, in his sole right, without any other person being joined or connected with him so long as his interest continues, we say that he is a tenant in severalty of the land, or a sole or several owner of the chattel. This species of ownership being the simplest and most familiar, needs no special exposition. Next, as to an estate by co-parcenary, that tenancy has sole reference to the inheritance of lands; and in this country, where the rule of equal descent and distribution prevails, as to both real and personal property, it has no application whatever.1 To We have only then to consider, at length, in the present connection, two leading classes of owners to personal property: first, joint owners; second, owners in common. these the present chapter will be exclusively devoted. As concerns the rights of husband and wife in one another's property, special treatises should be consulted by the reader; 2 and of partners, stockholders, and the like we shall speak hereafter. § 156. Joint Ownership of Personal Property; Its Nature and Creation. First, as to joint owners of personal property. Where two or more are joined together with reference to the same property, having unities of title, time, interest, and possession, they are joint tenants thereof if the property be real, and joint owners if it be personal. Unity of title is necessary, that is to say, the title should arise under one and the same instrument, or be created by the same act on the part of the donor or seller; unity of time, that is, each interest should vest at the same moment; unity of interest, that is, these interests in the property should be for the same duration and the same quantity; and unity of possession, that is, each tenant or owner must have an undivided posses sion of each entire part as of the whole, and not possess, one a distinct and separate portion, and the other another distinct and separate portion. The creation of such ownership de 12 Bl. Com. 187, 399; 4 Kent Com. 363. 2 See Schoul. Domestic Relations. 81 Bl. Com. 180-182, 399, and n.; pends upon the acts of parties, for it does not result from operation of the law. As there can be no "estate" in personal property, many of those technical distinctions which are made in the books between joint estates for life, in tail, or in fee, have no application to our present subject.1 But any interest which may be lawfully created in chattels, whether immediate or expectant, is itself susceptible of joint as well as sole ownership; and, as we take occasion to show the reader elsewhere, personal property may be limited in modern times to very much the same effect as lands, notwithstanding the natural and technical differences between them.2 Household furniture, merchandise, animals, and other movables of a corporeal character, may therefore be so vested in two or more persons as to constitute them joint owners thereof. There may likewise be joint owners of a promissory note; of a patent-right; 5 of a legacy; of stock; of an insurance policy; of a bank deposit; and, in short, of any chattel, whether of a corporeal or incorporeal nature, whether in the nature of a chose in possession or of a chose in action; so long indeed as that chattel can be the subject of ownership at all, unless special reason to the contrary exists. Nor does the principle apply only to chattels personal; for chattels real, such as a lease for years, may be owned by two or more jointly.10 It is the fundamental principle of a joint tenancy, that while the parties. constitute but one person, so to speak, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, with regard to |