Bees, too, are feræ naturæ; but when hived they become reclaimed, so as to belong to the person who first hived them. If they afterwards fly away, his right of ownership continues so long as he can keep the swarm in sight, and he can, under such circumstances, pursue and recapture them, even though they should settle upon a tree in another person's lands.1 But one cannot gain an original title to bees as a trespasser upon some third person's premises.2 § 51. Offspring of Domestic Animals; how owned. Of tame and domestic animals it is to be observed that the brood belongs to the owner of the dam or mother; the maxim of both civil and common law being, as to brute creatures, partus sequitur ventrem. Hence, the owner (or in certain cases the hirer) of the cow is the owner of the calf; the owner of the mare is the owner of the colt; and so on; each proprietor of the female being taken rather than that of the male. And this, not only for the reason which Puffendorf elaborates at some length, that the female parent occasions her proprietor much the greater damage, requiring during the time of pregnancy especial expense in the keeping, while disabled from rendering her usual service; but upon another consideration, quite sufficient in many instances, namely, that the male parent cannot be clearly identified. It is therefore quite a common thing in the case of certain domestic creatures, where the pedigree of the offspring is deemed a matter of importance, for the owner of the sire to demand and receive from the owner of the dam some special compensation in advance by way of equivalent for paternal services. The progeny of cows and of other domestic animals will go presumably to 1 Goff v. Kilts, 15 Wend. 550. See Gillett v. Mason, 7 Johns. 16; 2 Kent Com. 350; 2 Bl. Com. 393. This was also the rule of the civil law. See 2 Kent Com. 350. Bees in possession of the owner are the subject of larceny. 2 B. & C. 944; State v. Murphy, 8 Blackf. 498. But see Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binn. 546. See also 1 U. S. Dig. "Animals Fera Naturæ." 2 Rexroth v. Coon, 15 R. I. 35. 8 2 Bl. Com. 390; 2 Kent Com. 361; Puff. Droit Nat. lib. 4, c. 7, § 4; Stewart v. Ball, 33 Mo. 154; 130 U. S. 69. Blackstone, however, cites 7 Co. 17, where, under peculiar circumstances, young cygnets were equally divided between the owners of the hen and cock, as an exception to this rule; founded, as he asserts, upon natural reasons, though perhaps it was upon mere custom. See Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184. the new purchaser notwithstanding no full transfer of possession of premises or animals has been made.1 § 52. Property in a Person or Corpse. - Property in a living human being is no longer permitted by English or American law. As to a corpse, no one can in the strict sense of the common law be said to own it; yet there is a quasi property in a dead body, more especially for the purposes of interment and protection from insult, which the courts will protect out of regard to the relatives; and the persons having charge of such remains hold them as a trust subject to the regulation of a court of equity, and must act with decency. The last wishes of the deceased person, moreover, as to the interment or disposal of his own corpse, receive often great consideration from his executors and family.4 § 53. Vegetables, Minerals, etc.; Severance or Annexation. Next to animals may be mentioned vegetables, which also, under certain circumstances, come under the designation of chattels personal of a corporeal nature. Vegetables are essentially distinguished from animals in lacking the quality of sensation; though in scientific classification this may not always prove an exact test, so closely are some orders of animals and vegetables allied. We speak of vegetables as chattels when they are disjoined or severed from the ground; and so, too, the fruit of a tree is a chattel when severed from the body of the tree; and the tree or plant itself is a chattel when severed from the ground.5 The same may be observed of minerals and metals, like coal, iron, gold or silver, whose substance is part of the realty while in the mine; but after being dug out they are corporeal chattels personal.6 A similar rule applies to soil dug out to 1 Wolcott v. Hamilton, 61 U. S. 79. 2 Cf. 2 Bl. Com. 402. Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227, and cases cited. When a coffin, with the consent of all persons having any interest in it, has been deposited in the earth, for the purpose of interment, with a corpse enclosed within it, it is no longer a subject of property, nor can replevin Guthrie v. for it be maintained. 4 Yet a direction even by will as to the disposition of one's body cannot be enforced. 20 Ch. D. 659. 62 Bl. Com. 389; 1 Wms. Ex'rs, 6th ed. 668; Yale v. Seeley, 15 Vt. 221. 62 Burge Col. and For. Laws, 10; be used elsewhere,1 and to ice formed on a sheet of water, when it is cut away.2 Coal oil or petroleum is a mineral, too, in its natural state, and being a mineral is part of the realty where it lies confined, like coal, iron, gold or silver, although of a liquid character; and the same may be said of natural gas, and of percolating or subterranean waters. But where the imprisoned gas, water, or oil escapes, it becomes personal property.* As Actual severance rightfully made, and with the intention of converting the thing into a chattel, makes what before was realty personal property. But a constructive severance of fruit, vegetables, or trees, or other products, sometimes takes place before there is an actual separation from the land. where the owner of the fee in lands by a valid deed sells the trees to a third person, or sells the land reserving the trees; the intention being that these trees shall be speedily removed from the land. In such cases it has been held that the trees became chattels personal, and were not, under the Statute of Frauds, to be regarded as interests in land, but might be transferred by parol. And we shall see hereafter that growing crops are for many purposes treated as chattels. Mutual intention, however, to such constructive severance is needful; likewise, that the act be rightful and not wrongful, and with the purpose of passing chattel property; and no constructive severance can operate to prejudice subsequent purchasers for value of the realty without notice.7 Bainbridge on Mines and Minerals, 1st Am. ed. 3; Lykens, &c. Co. v. Dock, 62 Penn. St. 232. Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349; 15 B. Mon. 479. 4 Ib.; 28 W. Va. 210. See further, 1 Lacustrine Fertilizer Co. v. Lake § 130, post. Guano Co., 82 N. Y. 476. § 4. 2 Higgins v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318. Ponds, streams, &c., are usually owned with the soil; but ice may be sold, if formed, whether in or out of the water, as personalty. Ib. As to the right to cut ice, see 149 Mass. 322. 8 Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 257, and citations; Frank v. Haldeman, 53 Penn. St. 229; 131 Penn. St. 143; 152 Penn. St. 235; 1 Ld. Raym. 182; Warren v. Leland, 2 Barb. 613; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313, and cases cited. See n. to 4 Kent Com. 451, where this question is fully discussed, with references. 7 Lewis v. Rosler, 16 W. Va. 333. Soil removed from the land of one person and placed on the land of another, without intent of reclaiming On the other hand, annexation to the soil, or even, as it would appear, a deep embedding in the ground, will change that which before was personal into part of the realty.1 And hence, in a recent case, where an aerolite weighing over sixty pounds, buried itself in the ground where it fell to the depth of three feet, it was held that it thereupon became the property of the person who owned the soil.2 § 54. Money a Corporeal Chattel Personal. Money is likewise a corporeal chattel personal. This is the common medium of exchange in a civilized nation. At our law the word "money" usually comprehends coins of gold and silver, which have become the recognized standard of value throughout the civilized world. The Constitution of the United States vests in Congress the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof; in pursuance of which laws have been framed from time to time regulating the coinage. Again, the Constitution declares that "no State shall coin money, or make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts." Thus the power to legislate in such matters is checked and controlled in this country by the fundamental law of the land. Civilized nations in general claim the prerogative of regulating each its own coinage, by taking the bullion, or precious metal, in the rough state, dividing it into small portions of convenient size, and marking them with a stamp which attests their value. This is 4 or removing it, becomes part of the latter person's land. Lacustrine Fertilizer Co. v. Lake Guano Co., 82 N. Y. 476. The owner of land cannot, by agreement between himself and another, without actual severance, make that which is part of the realty personal property as against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. Ib. Cutting down timber trees did not, at common law, entitle tenant in dower or by the curtesy, &c., to them; nor where a stranger cut them down, nor even though the wind blew them down. 4 Co. 63 a; Bewick v. Whit field, 3 P. Wms. 268. But as to 2 Goddard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa, 4 Art. 1, § 10. 65 what constitutes coined money. The usual money of the United States consists of gold and silver coins; and though copper coins and nickel cents are used in making small change, being authorized by statutes to "pass current," they are not constituted a legal tender for the payment of debts.1 During a revolutionary period, and in seasons of great financial distress, however, government sometimes puts forth, as a means of temporary relief, notes of a promissory nature, and declares these to be a legal tender for the payment of debts, thereby forcing them into circulation to supply the place of the gold and silver coins which have disappeared, establishing them temporarily as the medium of exchange, and constituting them in effect lawful money.2 Such notes, if irredeemable, are corporeal chattels personal; and, even though they be redeemable, we should say they were still corporeal rather than incorporeal; though greatly assimilating in general features to bills and notes which are now fully recognized as incorporeal chattels. For whatever circulates as money, whatever we may pronounce to be "cash," appears to be properly treated as a chose in possession; that is to say, as a chattel personal of a corporeal character. And even bank-notes are for many purposes treated as money. § 55. Ships and Vessels are Corporeal Chattels Personal. Among chattels personal of a corporeal character, no class is more important, in a legal point of view, than that of ships and vessels. But the law of shipping is in many respects peculiar; and while ships and vessels are undoubtedly personal chattels per se, and not real estate, yet the rules respecting their title and transfer, together with the registry systems established by legislation in England and America, are such as liken these considerably to lands and tenements.3 § 56. Miscellaneous Corporeal Chattels Personal. There are many other chattels personal of a corporeal character, 1 See Bouv. Dict. "Money;" En- post, on Money, where the subject of cycl. Am. "Money." legal-tender notes under our Constitution is fully discussed. 2 See Bouv. Dict. "Money;" Encycl. Am. "Money." And see chapter, 8 Taggard v. Loring, 16 Mass. 339; |