bodied in the policy and made a part of it by suitable terms, a life policy is usually found to contain certain other stipulations hinging upon the future, or conditions subsequent, for any breach of which forfeiture of rights is threatened. Among these are to be found conditions of forfeiture for nonpayment of future premiums at the periodical dates fixed; conditions limiting the travel or residence of the insured to certain specified regions, or restricting employment, so as to keep the insured out of the army or navy or from pursuits which expose human life to extraordinary perils, without express permission from the insurer, a permission frequently granted, however, with or without asking payment, for the time being, of extra rates; sometimes, prospectively, a condition against habitual intemperance; and conditions voiding the policy for death by the insured's own hand, by the hands of justice, in a duel, or in consequence of a violation of law.1 Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518; 1 Big. Life Ins. Cases, 313; Bliss Life Ins. 167170. For questions concerning the medical attendant of the applicant for insurance, &c., see Bliss, 170-180; May, § 304; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Flack, 3 Md. 341; Morrison v. Muspratt, 4 Bing. 60; Anderson v. Fitzgerald, 4 H. L. Cas. 484. Upon the subject of intemperance, see May, § 299 et seq., and cases cited; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Daly, 65 Md. 6. The point of inquiry usually relates to habits and character at the time of application, not to habits as acquired or confirmed later. But a policy prospectively conditioned to become void for excessive use of liquor so as to impair health, must operate. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Davey, 123 U. S. 739. This, however, does not refer to alcoholic stimulants taken bonâ fide upon medical advice. 140 U. S. 76. And such provisions should receive reasonable interpretation. Statements by the applicant fairly as to his occupation, &c., should be liberally construed where no essential harm results. Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281. Also, as to “ knowledge of pernicious habits," see, further, Knecht v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Penn. St. 18; 94 Penn. St. 59; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., Re, 105 U. S. 350. Entire omission to answer a question does not vitiate. Armenia Ins. Co. v. Paul, 91 Penn. St. 520. But equivocation is of the nature of falsehood. Smith v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 49 N. Y. 211. As to previous injuries, see Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222. A medical examiner who writes out answers may be regarded as agent of the company for reporting answers. Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281; May, § 303. 1 The policies issued by American companies will be commonly found very stringent in these and similar restrictions; more so than English policies, which frequently distinguish in favor of a bonâ fide holder, while Such conditions being violated, no matter how honorable the motives, the policy is worthless, if so the insurer chooses to regard it, and if no waiver or permit can be set up against him.1 But policies may differ in the form of clauses restricting residence and travel; and upon the construction of a particular phrase the decision will often depend.2 And where the visitation of God prevents the insured from fulfilling his part of the contract, or where some waiver by the insurance company or its agents can be inferred, courts are not reluctant to save the insurer from the harsh consequences of conduct which under some circumstances might involve the breach of a condition. And to any permission or license, such as the insurance company is always at liberty to grant, the insurer is pretty strictly held.* § 551. The Same Subject; Manner of Death. Death "in the known violation of law" another condition to be found in policies-appears to be confined to criminal offences and to death flagrante delicto and not to extend to mere tres in this country the rights of a party having an insurable interest in another's life are in continual jeopardy from the latter's imprudence. See Bliss Life Ins. 300, 301; Bunyon, 67. "Illegal traffic," carried on by insured, does not prejudice rights of beneficial party under a policy, where such traffic is not prohibited in terms. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115. 1 Thus, an Episcopal Bishop of Rhode Island, some years ago, went beyond the limits named in the policy on his life, on a holy errand; and though his death was neither caused nor hastened by the change of climate, but grew out of constitutional causes alone, it was adjudged that no insurance money could be recovered; for the policy was conditioned to be void under the circumstances shown, except with consent of the insurer. Nightingale v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 R. I. 38. And see Hathaway v. Trenton M. L. Ins. Co., 11 Cush. 448; Evans v. United 2 See Casler v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 427, as to the phrase "settled limits." 3 See Forbes v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 15 Gray, 249; 1 Big. Life Ins. Cases, 504. 4 Welts v. Conn. M. L. Ins. Co., 46 Barb. 412; Taylor v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 434. And see Bliss Life Ins. 302-323, and cases cited; Notman v. Anchor Assurance Co., 4 C. B. N. s. 476; Bevin v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244. For a policy vitiated because the insured went to Europe without the written assent of the company, see Douglas v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 492. And see, as to residing out of prescribed limits, Bennecke v. Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 105 U. S. 355; Ayer v. N. E. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 430. passes upon property or other infringement of private rights, or to a later death provoked by an earlier crime.1 But death by the hands of justice appears to be accepted always by implication on grounds of public policy. On the other hand death by violence is covered by a policy unless expressly excepted.3 Finally, death by suicide, or by the insured's "own hand," as the phrase goes, is something against which insurance companies almost always seek to protect themselves, but often unsuccessfully. Acts of suicide are traceable in a large number of instances to insanity; and the tests of insanity are in these days, as all intelligent men well know, strangely contradictory and inconclusive. Long-continued madness preceding the commission of the fatal act may fairly be thought to render the insured so far irresponsible as to sustain the policy; but in the doubtful cases of temporary insanity or suicidal depression, the better opinion is that a policy providing against death by one's own hand, or suicide or self-destruction, will be avoided whenever the act of selfdestruction is the wilful act of a man having at the time sufficient powers of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of the act of suicide, and having at the time a purpose to cause his own death by that act. 1 Cluff v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308; 99 Mass. 317; Harper v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 109; Bradley v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 422; Bliss Life Ins. 334337; May, §§ 327-331. Death by abortion held to vitiate. Hatch v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550. As to "death by hands of justice," see May, § 326; 4 Bligh, N. s. 194. As to death in military service, see May, §§ 332-334; 24 Gratt. 540; 44 Ga. 119. Sundry provisions respecting time and manner of death are to be construed according to the terms of the policy. See Jennes v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 26 Minn. 271. Death from intemperance is sometimes pre But scribed in policies as a cause of forfeiture. See May Ins. § 302. 2 May, § 326; 5 M. & G. 639; 1 Jones (N. C.) Law 126. 3 May, § 330. 4 See Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & Gr. 639; Dean v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Allen, 96; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, 268; Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co., 21 Penn. St. 466; Eastabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224; Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill, 73; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227. And see Bunyon, 73; Bliss Life Ins. 346-400; May, §§ 307325. The authorities are quite discordant in announcing general prin if death is caused by one who, while intending to kill himself, was so disordered in his reasoning faculties that he cannot understand the general nature and consequences of the act or is impelled thereto by an irresistible insane impulse, which he cannot resist, the insurer is liable.1 § 552. When the Insurance Risk commences.-When does the risk under a life insurance policy commence? As in other kinds of insurance it may commence from any time mutually agreed upon; whenever, according to the facts. presented, there was a meeting of the minds of the parties on all essentials of the contract. But usually the life insurer issues a written policy, based upon a preliminary application, with questions and answers filed; and it is agreed that the policy shall not be delivered, nor the contract take ciples as concerns suicide; but there farther into the inaccessible regions of a flickering intellect seems all the more inappropriate, when we reflect that insurance contracts are made between parties who are supposed to have in mind the common-sense interpretation of familiar expressions, and not those nice distinctions which some medical experts would fain force upon us. 1 Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 58. Here the rule with its alternative appears on appeal consistently announced; and still more so by Mr. Justice Miller on the circuit. 1 Dill. C. C. 403. There is still, however, much uncertainty; the rule of some cases insisting apparently upon the distinct element of "moral" comprehension, and so affording all possible favor to those who claim under the policy in cases of suicide. And to that latter rule the Supreme Court of the United States has fully at last (1896) committed itself. Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468, 473, and cases cited. There should be no presumption of law, primâ facie or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity. 1 Dill. C. C. 403. effect until the first premium is paid by the insurer.1 The date when the risk commences and the date of its termination are both indicated clearly in all well-drawn policies.2 § 553. Forfeiture through Non-Payment of Premiums. We have seen that life insurance policies are made forfeitable, during the continuance of that life upon which the risk was taken, for breach of various conditions. Among these conditions is that of non-payment of premiums. Fire and marine policies run for short periods, and are frequently renewed; but life policies commonly run for an uncertain, and that perchance a very long, period. While, then, the payment of a single premium in advance may insure a house against fire or a ship against the perils of the sea, premiums under a single life insurance policy are usually receivable by the insurer in periodical and generally annual sums. Any failure on the part of the insured to pay the premium promptly when the day comes round forfeits the policy, if the contract be thus conditioned; and it is only as a favor, under such circumstances, not as a right, that a continuance of the risk can be claimed on the part of the delinquent. • But the waiver of a forfeiture for such cause may be evinced by acts, as well as by the express agreement of the company; and no form of waiver is more common than that a 1 There may be, of course, waiver of prepayment on the part of the insurer; or a binding oral contract of insurance to be inferred from acts or words; or a contract which fails to express the mutual intention of the parties, and reformable in equity; or a new insurance contract which has superseded the existing one; but in all such cases the party claiming the benefit of something so unusual should establish his right by clear and convincing proof. See Bliss Life Ins. 181-248, and cases cited in general works on fire and marine insurance; Com. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 19 How. 318; Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 296; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 6 Bush, 450; Faunce v. State Mut. Life Ass. Co., 101 Mass. 279; Myers v. Keystone Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 Penn. St. 268. 2 See Ruse v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516; Am. Horse Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 28 Ind. 17; Bliss, 248-250. And see May, § 340. May Ins. § 341. In Windus v. Lord Tredegar, 15 L. T. N. s. 108, the House of Lords denied the right to relief in equity on a lapsed policy, even though the lapse was without culpable negligence on the part of the insured. To the same effect see Klein v. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 88; 52 Md. 16. Insanity of the insured affords no excuse. Wheeler v. Conn. Life Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 543. |