of a receipt by the company or its authorized agent of a premium after the day when it became payable. Waivers of this sort are regarded with favor to the insured, and the company receiving a new premium is held bound to knowledge of the actual time of payment.1 Where, as often happens in this country, the annual premium is paid in part by a note, and the policy by its terms is forfeited on the nonpayment of the note at maturity, like considerations apply; and if the insured dies after the note becomes due and the note is not paid, the insurer is released from liability.2

But non-forfeitable policies are sometimes issued; and even non-forfeiture laws are enacted in some States, with the special object of protecting the insured against the most disastrous consequences attending a delay in the payment of his regular premiums. And any agreement, declaration, or course of action, on the company's part, which leads the party insured honestly to believe that by conforming thereto he

1 Ib.; Hodsdon v. Life Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 144; May, § 361; Wing v. Harvey, 5 De G. M. & G. 265; Bouton v. Am. M. L. Ins. Co., 25 Conn. 542; Bliss, 253 et seq.; Catoir v. Am. Life Ins. & Trust Co., 33 N. J. 487. Days of grace are sometimes allowable to the insured by custom; and even the want of a notification habitually given by the company may in some instances relieve the insured from forfeiture. See Helme v. Phil. Life Ins. Co., 61 Penn. St. 107; Bliss, 286; 1 Big. Life Ins. Cases, 99, 621. But want of a notice is not a good excuse as a rule. 97 Penn. St. 15; 104 U.S. 252. Premiums may be payable in labor or services. 18 Minn. 448; Kentucky M. L. Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96. See further, May, § 345. The last day for payment occurring on Sunday, the premium is not payable until Monday. 121 Mass. 499; Hammond v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 306. And see Campbell v. Int. Life Ass. Co., 6 Cush. 42; Howard v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 48

Cal. 229. Parol waiver of a condition has been sustained. May, § 346.

2 Pitt v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 500; Bliss, 261-269; McAllister v. N. E. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 101 Mass. 558; N. E. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hasbrook, 32 Ind. 447; 123 Mass. 113. Where forfeiture for nonpayment of a note, &c., is doubtfully expressed or not expressed at all, non-forfeiture is the fairer construction. May, §§ 341-343; 101 Mass. 558; 32 Ind. 447. Cf. 60 Ind. 515, and 41 Mich. 385. And see American Ins. Co. v. Klink, 65 Mo. 78. If the contract required the company to give previous notice (as in an assessment) such notice is a prerequisite to forfeiture. 139 U. S. 297.

3 Bliss, 293, 405; Carter v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 153; Chase v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 67 Me. 85; May, § 344; 73 N. Y. 480. A premium payable is not strictly a debt. 41 Conn. 416. A non-forfeitable statute, if mandatory, controls

will avoid a forfeiture, may be set up as against the strict letter of the policy itself.1

§ 554. Re-Insurance, Double Insurance, etc. The doctrine of re-insurance applies with much the same force to life as to fire and marine risks; the original insurer thus protecting himself by getting some other insurer to cover his liability; and cases have arisen in England, under statutes of that country permitting the amalgamation of insurance companies, where the risks of the old company, with the assent of policy-holders, are transferred to the new one. And "double insurance," if this term be a proper one in the present connection, is also very common; that is to say, on one life or risk and for one and the same insurable interest, insurance may be effected in various companies. Generally speaking, no price is set upon a man's life; and, unless prohibited by the terms of his policy, the insured may go and insure himself again elsewhere without regard to amount. It is not an uncommon thing at this day for married men of good and secure incomes, but small available capital, to insure their lives heavily, and by the payment of annual pre

the contract of insurance. 140 U. S. 226.

Whether act of God (e.g. death) or of a public enemy (e.g. war) or the obligor's own acts, can be set up to excuse the non-payment of premium at the stipulated date, see May, §§ 350-355, showing that the latest cases are somewhat discordant. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, and cases cited; Homer v. Guardian Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 278; 11 Am. Law Rev. 221; 18 W. Va. 400. See as to death, Palmer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 84 N. Y. 63. See, as to acts not amounting to waiver of forfeiture, 88 N. Y. 541; 80 N. Y. 32. Policies are not always clear in their expressions as to the date when premiums are payable, or the certainty of a forfeiture for non-payment. See Phoenix Life Ass. Co. v. Sheridan, 8 H. L. Cas. 745; Bliss,

254; Norton v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 36 Conn. 503.

1 Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Unsell, 144 U. S. 439. Payment to the company's agent is good though he convert the premium money to his own use; but the agent's scope of authority follows the usual rules. See May, $345. Part-payment of a premium is not compliance with the contract; nor does it give a right pro tanto to the fund. 74 N. C. 22; 81 Ind. 300; May, ib.

2 See Bliss Ins. 250, 682; Phil. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Life & Health Ins. Co., 23 Penn. St. 65; Bunyon, 158; Ernest v. Nicholls, 6 H. L. Cas. 401; In re India & London Life Ass. Co., L. R. 7 Ch. 651.

miums provide handsomely for their families in the event of death, while living freely in the mean time. And inquiries made by companies as to whether an applicant has already been insured are chiefly for ascertaining what other insurers thought of the same risk, and thus aiding their own determination; though the danger of having a risk so heavily valued as to tempt death is always for obvious consideration.

§ 555. Time and Mode of obtaining Payment. A life insurance policy, by its own terms, was almost invariably in former years made payable on the death of the insured person before the risk expired; though risks are sometimes taken only for a specified number of years, and endowment policies to be paid absolutely after a given number of years are becoming quite common of late. The rule as to death is that it must actually occur during the continuance of the policy; nor can it avail that the cause of death arose during the existence of the policy, the life having ceased after the policy expired. For instance, the fact that a mortal wound was received while the policy continued does not, unless the policy is worded to that effect, cast any new liability upon the insurer, the extent of whose risk must ordinarily be referred to the period of actual death.1 Policies are so carefully worded, even to the precise moment of the day when the risk expires, or the precise extent of the risk, that in the great majority of cases there can be little perplexity. But where the insured person has disappeared, or a casualty occurs under such circumstances that the exact time of death, or indeed the fact of death, cannot be ascertained, the insurer's liability is to be determined by the ordinary rules of evidence and the doctrine of presumptions.2

The executor or administrator of the estate of the insured, or such other party as may be entitled to the benefits of the policy, must scrutinize its terms very carefully as soon as

11 T. R. 260; Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 276; Perry v. Prov. Life Ins., &c. Co., 99 Mass. 162.

2 See Bliss Life Ins. 289-299; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 30, 278; Moehring v. Mitchell, 1 Barb. Ch. 264; 3 Denio, 610.

possible after the death has occurred; for insurers have very cunning contrivances ready- of which, to their credit, it should be said, they do not avail themselves as frequently as they might for evading payment of the insurance money at the very last moment. Life policies usually provide that the insurance money shall become due and payable at a certain time, say sixty days after formal notice and presentation of formal proofs of death, and not before. Proofs, too, must frequently be prepared in a specified manner, and be presented within a limited time after the death of the party insured, pending the expiration of which the company cannot be sued.1 Another point in which insurers are quite astute is in providing a special limitation of time within which suit may be brought upon the policy; shortening by contract the period of limitations ordinarily prescribed by law, and otherwise modifying the remedies of parties entitled to the insurance money, to meet their own convenience.2

1 There is, certainly, reason in such requirements, inasmuch as the company should have proofs, and be allowed time to investigate the facts of death and questions of liability in its own way; but there is hardship besides in conditioning the rights of a party entitled to the benefit of insurance upon a rigid compliance with mere formalities of notice, preliminary proofs, and sworn certificates; hence the courts will readily presume that the company has waived defects in the proofs or dispensed with them altogether. And such a requirement might be so unreasonable of itself that public policy would reject it. Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 396; Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind. 236; Bliss Life Ins. 407-418; O'Reilly v. Guardian Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 169; Taylor v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 13 Gray, 434; Woodfin v. Asheville Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Jones, 558; I Big. Life Ins. Cases, 375; Miller v. Eagle Life & Health

Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268; May, cs. 19, 20.

2 Conditions of this sort contained in a policy should, like those which relate to notice and proof of death, be carefully examined and diligently complied with; for insurers have the right to designate the terms upon which they will be responsible for losses, and the contract of insurance is a voluntary one. Yet conditions like these are and ought to be construed liberally for the insured, even where the mouth of the insurer is not stopped by his own acts and conduct against asserting that there has been a breach and forfeiture of the policy. See Bliss Life Ins. 561-570, and cases cited; Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386; Ames v. N. Y. Union Ins. Co., 4 Kern. 253; May, c. 21. Most cases on this point relate to fire insurance. As to agreement not to sue except in States where the insurance company is located, see Reichard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518.

§ 556. Insurance against Accidents. — III. Insurance against accidents is a branch of business not yet greatly developed, though pursued to some extent in Great Britain and the United States. The want of proper statistics to serve as a basis for risks of this character is a serious obstacle to taking them; for the more shifting the rule of chances, the more surely does an insurance transaction sink to the level of common gambling. But experience may bring a more correct understanding of the business, and establish hereafter a better state of mutual confidence between insurer and the insured. The avowed object of such contracts is humane, and in these days of perilous travel the benefits received may often be highly valuable. The contract which is most frequently made in our country with railroad passengers appears in form as one by which the insurer agrees to pay a given sum per week during disability caused by any accident received while the risk continues, and a gross sum in case of death by accident; this contract being, however, subject to various modifications, according to circumstances. In this country the business is generally conducted in a brief and informal manner; the traveller purchasing an accident insurance ticket of some agent near the railroad ticket office, and the bargain being consummated in a hurried manner and upon a verbal application with neither warranty nor representation on the part of the insured. But sometimes the business is conducted with those formalities which attend the transaction of life insurance business, in which case the usual doctrines of life insurance would apply; and in general the law of accident insurance differs not greatly from that of life insurance, except in its greater apparent simplicity.1

An accident insurance company will often issue tickets at the principal office, and transmit them to various agents to sell them indifferently, in which case even an agent's clerk may sell them. And we often find two classes of tickets

1 See Bliss Life Ins. 683 et seq.; May Ins. c. 23. As the contract is not strictly one of indemnity, the parties may agree upon the amount recovera

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ble within such reasonable limits as may prevent it from being a wager policy. May Ins. § 535.

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