states shall belong, no state in which shall be at liberty to go to war without reference to arbitration, or to a conference of the League, in the first place."

Lord Robert Cecil goes very much farther, urging that a League was essential to the relief of starving peoples, to the regulation of railways, posts and wires. He laid upon it also "public health and the protection of women and juveniles in industry" and the guidance of backward peoples.

A year earlier the French Chamber of Deputies resolved that victory must bring "durable guarantees for peace and independence for peoples, great and small, in a League of Nations such as has already been foreshadowed."

And there are many contemporary expressions of approval of the League principle, but equally vague as to what the details shall be.

The program of Mr. Taft's League to Enforce Peace, however, is not vague; it is quite specific in advocating the tribunal idea, in backing it with force, so as to insure delay at least, and in promoting world progress as well as world peace.

These various programs show the extremes of opinion which the League discussion has brought out. They also convince one that some kind of a League is really probable. It is now or never. It is the psychological moment. But is it to be chiefly machinery for the education and protection of the new states which the peace may create; or may there be coupled with this a kind of international uplift movement!

The first is wise, provided it does not copy the Holy Alliance. That league in 1815, in the name of Christianity, to perpetuate religion, peace and justice, tried to stabilize European political society in the interest of absolutism; it even planned to extend its influence to this continent. This League must not similarly, in the name of peace and justice, try to stabilize the world in the interest of democracy. It would be an identical blunder. For when, to use the prevalent phrase, self-determination of a people has formed a state, that state is endowed with sovereignty and independence and, like maturer states, has the right to be let alone. Its future must be determined by itself, not by others.

As for the second ideal, a socialized international society of states built up on a basis of altruism rather than on reciprocal benefitsit is built upon the sand. A proposal that all war debts on the victors' side shall be pooled and then redistributed on the basis of population or national wealth, has been seriously made and is a valuable commentary on the new gospel. Moreover, it is practical politics today, to emphasize nationalism as against internationalism. Nationalism is the consciousness of race and desire of sovereignty; we see it in its finest expression in Bohemia. Internationalism, on the other hand, exalts social welfare and class interest above the race and the state. That way lies Bolshevism. The one is antidote to the other.

At the other extreme is a League which shall offer a reasonable way of keeping the peace between states by providing a tribunal for judging their differences, with fair assurance that the award can be executed; by setting up a system of conciliation in disputes which are not justiciable; by a self-denying renunciation of war between the members; by making delay certain and settlement probable after an issue is joined. But it does not absorb the sovereignty of individual states; they retain their sovereignty. It does not attempt to govern the world, but to make the world more peaceable.

Of these two ideals, my own judgment, or perhaps it is prejudice, inclines to the less ambitious program just indicated. It places responsibility for conduct where it belongs, within the state, and not in a league outside it. Its working would be easier, its breakdown less dangerous. But perhaps the outcome may be somewhere between the two extremes, stressing for the moment the need of enforcing the terms of peace and of giving a fair start to the backward peoples which have just achieved statehood.

And here it may not be amiss to place together the desirable features of a rational International League, in accord with the principles above advanced, but somewhat more specifically.

Its members retain their sovereignty, each one, but by treaty for an experimental period, confer certain powers upon a central body.

These powers are partly administrative, partly judicial, but not

legislative. Legislation should require further treaty cooperation in each new proposal.

The administrative powers are to be used, first, to protect newly formed states; second, to enforce other conclusions of the Peace Treaties, such as disarmament; third, to carry out decisions of the League.

Its judicial powers are to conciliate or judge disputes between members and more widely to substitute law for force in international relations, so far as possible.

Disarmament must reduce the strength of the individual members and thereby relatively increase the strength of the central body, i.e., the sum of the military units put at its disposal.

The League must also have the power of boycotting as one of its weapons, but otherwise is not an economic union.

Its field is political; it relegates social problems to the member states. For instance, women's and children's labor in Japan or Brazil, seamen's wages in India and the United States, can not be regulated from a League capital without disaster.

It is a loose union for the prevention of war; with no ulterior aims beyond this; a limited but a safe conception.

This was written before the first draft of the League Constitution was given out at Paris, and even yet the last word has not been said. Judging it in the light of the principles tentatively set forth above, it would seem to have avoided much that would be dangerous and to embody much that is hopeful and valuable. Its members retain their sovereignty. Much stress is laid upon disarmament and the control of private munition factories. Defense against external aggression is contemplated, but the right of a state to change its own condition is not questioned. As between members of the League, disputes are to be submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council before resort to war; this implies a certain delay. Such submission to arbitration is voluntary, however, while the resort to inquiry at the hands of the Council is obligatory, an international league boycott being the penalty for non-compliance. The Council may also use force. These provisions are obscure and need rephrasing.

If the dispute is between a League member and an outside state, such state is forthwith to be asked to join the League for the purpose of settling the difference, but whether it does so or refuses, the Executive Council may use its judgment in trying to keep the peace, acting in accordance with League principles. This is vague and unsatisfactory.

Then there is a novelty in placing German colonies and backward states under the protection of advanced powers which are called Mandatories. The only provision for social welfare is in Article XX. "The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree to establish as part of the organization of the League a permanent bureau of labor." This does not call for uniformity of conditions, and is probably both meaningless and harmless.

Of course, it is too early to criticize textually. Nor has reference been made to other subjects treated in the Constitution, but which are not germane to the special purpose of this paper. In general, it seems to the writer that the effectiveness of the League machinery for checking war depends upon the impression of solidarity which the League produces, and that this solidarity will depend too largely upon the make-up of the Executive Council. But read in connection with the disarmament stipulations, the judicial provisions should be reasonably, perhaps absolutely, workable.

These, then, are the two principal changes which international law should find impressed upon its system as a result of the great war, a league of states which retain their sovereignty but agree to get the judgment of the whole body in some way before resorting to war; a method of investigation and punishment which would make the violation of the laws of war highly dangerous.

There are now two or three other particulars in which the old law of nations may have new light cast upon it as a result, or byproduct, of the war. If a tribunal, under whatever auspices it comes into being, adjudges international causes, it will need a code of law, and it will also tend to build one up. The code with which it will

set out is one of usage supplemented by treaty compact. It may lack precision, but is workable nevertheless. In time the demand for a Code of International Law will create one, not as a whole, but in parts-diplomatic intercourse, for instance, or maritime jurisdiction, or the laws of war on sea. Meanwhile, the court itself by dint of judicial decisions will add to and clarify the law which it administers. This double process of growth is a better, more reasonable, form of code-building than codification covering the whole field and jeopardizing its results by attacking in one engagement all the burning questions. This method of growth through the arbitral decisions of the last half century, has already been marked. Thus jurisdiction over seals' swimming free in the high seas has been denied to the country of their origin. The Alabama arbitration enlarged neutral duty and defined due diligence in its performance. Light was thrown upon the question of how territorial waters shall be measured, in the Alaska and Newfoundland cases. It is not necessary to multiply examples.

Another question which the events of the war have brought into prominence and which the future law might possibly take cognizance of, relates to armed intervention in the affairs of a state with which one is not at war, on the plea of self-defense. The condition of portions of Russia illustrates what is meant. The forces of anarchy, of chaos, have gained the upper hand. Life and property of native and of alien are in jeopardy. The obligations of the old state are disregarded. Moreover, the spirit of misrule, like a religion, is being spread as widely as possible over the world. Our own country, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, are objects of attack, besides contiguous states. Shall resistance to these noxious doctrines be defensive only, or may they be attacked at their source? We justify the presence of our troops in Russia at this moment on the ground of self-defense, as an outcome of war. But if no declared war existed, and organized society found itself attacked out of a clear sky, under the new dispensation, what is society to do? Here is war no less real and dreadful because unregularized. If a league of states exists to keep the peace, with powers to settle disputes and to police the world granted to it, the anarchical menace, if anything, should call those powers out.