of the indemnity by a Portuguese commission. On February 27th, Dr. Rosen, German Minister at Lisbon, protested as follows:

Je suis chargé par mon gouvernement de protester contre la singulière violation du droit que le gouvernement portugais a commise contre l'Empire allemand en s'emparant, par un acte de violence, sans aucun négociation préalable, des navires allemands se trouvant dans les ports portugais. J'ai l'honneur, en même temps . . . de solliciter . . la révocation immédiate de cette mesure.

In reply to this brief protest, the Portuguese Government held that it had the same right of "domaine eminent" over German vessels immobilized in its ports as it had over other property within its jurisdiction; that it had only provided for urgent needs of its maritime commerce and the German Government had entered no protest when Italy had seized German vessels lying in her ports; that the measures taken were legal and the German owners would be indemnified. 63

The German reply is given by Professor Basdevant as follows:

Le 23 février eut lieu, en vertu d'un décret du même jours et sans négociation préalable, la saisie des navires allemands. Ceux-ci furent occupés militairement et les équipages débarqués. Le gouvernement impérial a protesté contre cette violation flagrante du droit et demandé la levée de la saisie des navires.-Le gouvernement portugais a rejeté la demande et cherché a fonder son acte de violence sur des considérations juridiques. Il déduit de celles-ci que nos navires immobilisés par la guerre dans les ports portugais, en vertu de cette immobilisation, n'étaient pas soumis à l'article 2 du traité germanoportugais de commerce et de navigation, mais, comme une autre propriété se trouvant dans le pays, à la souverainete territoriale illimitée et, par suite, à la mainmise complète du Portugal. En outre, il pense s'être tenu a deçà des limites de cet article puisque la réquisition des navires correspondait à un besoin économique urgent et qu'une indemnité à fixer ultérieurement était prévue dans le décret de saisie. Ces considérations apparaissent comme de vains subterfuges. L'article 2 vise toute réquisition de propriété allemande se trouvant en territoire portugais, de sorte qu'on peut ne pas se demander si l'immobilisation invoquée des navires allemands dans les ports portugais a modifié leur condition juridique. Le gouvernement portugais a violé ledit article à deux points de vue. D'une part, dans la réquisition, il ne s'en est pas tenu aux limites conventionelles puisque l'article 2 suppose qu'il s'agit de satisfaire à un besoin de l'Etat, tandis 63 Basdevant, Revue de Droit Int. Public, XXIII, p. 270.

que la saisie a porté ouvertement sur beaucoup plus des navires allemands qu'il n'était nécessaire pour satisfaire aux besoins du Portugal en navires. De plus, l'article fait dependre la saisie des navires d'un accord préalable avec les intéressés au sujet de l'indemnité à accorder, tandis que le gouvernement portugais n'a pas tenté une seule fois de s'entendre avec les Compagnies allemandes directement ou par l'intermédiaire du gouvernement allemand. Toute la procédure du gouvernement portugais se présente ainsi comme une grave violation du droit et du traité.

64

As pointed out by this German note, the Portuguese Government violated the terms of the 1908 treaty as regards the fixing of indemnity in advance and in accord with those interested. Professor Basdevant attempts to evade this breach of the treaty by explaining that the German vessels were not in transit (in transitu) as contemplated by the treaty, but that they were immobilized in Portuguese ports. He says:

Le point de vue juridique du gouvernement portugais est le suivant: le traité de 1908 ne règle la réquisition des navires que lorsqu'ils sont in transitu, ce qui est, d'ailleurs, leur situation normale: en vue de celle-ci et pour garantir le libre parcours, des garanties spéciales sont stipulées consistant dans la nécessité d'une indemnité préalable et fixée d'accord. Les navires allemands, immobilisés depuis dix-huit mois, ne sont plus in transitu: ils ne sont plus que des propriétés étrangeres dans le cadre territorial de l'Etat portugais. La réquisition qui s'y applique est soumis non au traité de 1908, mais au droit international coutumier selon lequel l'indemnité n'est pas nécessairement fixée par un accord avec les parties intéressées elle peut l'être par acte unilatéral des organes de l'Etat agissant sous la responsibilité de celui-ci.65

While there can be no question that Portugal was within her rights in requisitioning the vessels, it is difficult to explain away the fact that the treaty expressly provides that an indemnity, just and equitable, must be fixed in advance, in accord with the interested parties.

Pchedecki believes that if a neutral is given the privilege of exercising the right of angary, a serious conflict will arise, because the rule that a neutral may not purchase belligerent ships might then be contravened. Instead of purchasing belligerent vessels, the neutral 64 Basdevant, Revue de Droit Int. Public, XXIII, pp. 270-71. 65 Ibid., p. 274.

could requisition them. Speaking of the Portuguese seizure of the German vessels, he says:

D'ailleurs, ceux qui cherchaient par tous les moyens a faire reconnaître la parfaite conformité du decret portugais du 23 fevrier 1916 avec les regles du droit des gens ne se sont pas aperçus qu'ils en-. traient ainsi en contradiction avec eux-mêmes. En effet, d'un côté ils reconnaissent le droit pour le neutre de réquisitionner les navires marchands belligérants, de l'autre côté, ils n'admettent pas la faculté réclamée par certains neutres, d'acheter ces navires. Comme nous verrons plus loin, cette dernière opération est considérée comme illicite par la pratique internationale: il faut alors pour rester dans la logique condamner également la réquisition, car elle pourrait servir a tourner l'interdiction d'acheter les navires d'une nation en guerre. 66

While it is true that international law does not permit a neutral to purchase vessels of belligerents, the reason for such prohibition is to prevent one of the belligerents from selling vessels to keep them from falling into the hands of the enemy. As in the case of Portugal, the neutral may exercise the right only when its own urgent needs demand it, and the question of neutrality should not enter.

On August 21, 1918, the Spanish Government issued the following statement:

As a consequence of the submarine campaign, more than 20 per cent. of our merchant marine has been sunk, more than 100 Spanish sailors have perished, a considerable number of sailors have been wounded, and numbers have been shipwrecked and abandoned. Ships needed exclusively for Spanish use have been torpedoed without the slightest pretext, serious difficulties resulting to navigation.

The government has believed that it is unable, without failing in its essential obligations and without setting aside neutrality, to defer the adoption of measures necessary to guarantee Spanish maritime traffic and to protect Spanish crews and passengers.

Consequently, the government has decided to address the Imperial German Government and declare that, owing to the reduction of tonnage to its extreme limit, it will be obliged in the case of new sinkings to substitute therefor German vessels interned in Spanish ports. This measure does not imply the confiscation of the ships under definite title. It would be only a temporary solution until the establishment of peace, when Spanish claims also will be liquidated.

Our Ambassador at Berlin has received instructions to bring this decision to the notice of the German Government. The Spanish Gov

66 Le Droit International Maritime, pp. 218-19.

ernment does not doubt that the German Government will appreciate the circumstances determining this resolution and will recognize that Spain, in holding to the neutrality she has practiced since the beginning of the war, has sacrificed many of her rights and legitimate conveniences when it has been possible without affecting the dignity of Spain and her national life.

The decision of the government to assure for itself sufficient tonnage, which is indispensable to its existence, does not affect its firm resolve to maintain strict neutrality."7

On August 31, 1918, the Spanish Government took over all German vessels lying in Spanish ports. About ninety vessels were affected.68

The action of the Spanish Government furnishes a clear-cut example of a neutral seizing vessels of a belligerent, and unlike Portugal, Spain remained neutral throughout the war. The Spanish note makes clear that neutrality was to be maintained, that no change of title, but temporary use was contemplated, and that the seizure is "indispensable to its existence." Nothing is said of indemnity, but it appears from the note that the Spanish Government regards the requisitioned vessels merely as substitutes for its own vessels sunk by Germany, and hence that no indemnity is to be paid."

VIII. THE QUESTION OF INDEMNITY

The Associated Governments requisitioned the Dutch vessels upon the following conditions: (1) That an effort to arrive at an agreement as to rate of payment, values for insurance, etc., would be made; (2) that at the end of the war the vessels would be returned to the owners, who are to be compensated for any losses caused by enemy action; (3) that, subject to mutual agreement, the Dutch Government might have ships lost in the danger zone replaced by the Associated Governments as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace.

67 New York Times Current History Magazine, October, 1918, p. 115. 68 Ibid.

69 EDITOR'S NOTE: The act of the Spanish Government may perhaps be better understood as in the nature of reprisal than as an exercise of the right of Angary.-C. N. G.

As to the amount of compensation which will be given, the correspondence does not furnish any light. Indeed, the fixing of this amount will be a considerable task, and many factors must enter. Will the value of vessels which have been lost be fixed for the time of requisitioning in March, 1918, or will it be for the time of fixing the compensation? Obviously, there would be a considerable difference in value for the two periods. When the very existence of Great Britain depended upon vessels and food, it is clear that a ship was worth much more to her and other nations as well than it will be when the compensation is determined.

The only precedent which furnishes a guide as to a probable method of fixing compensation is that of 1871. From Earl Granville's note of April 24, 1871, we find that the value of the seven British vessels was determined as follows: Lloyd's Association, an expert body on naval affairs, were employed by the British Board of Trade to make an appraisal of the vessels, the assumption being made that they were in good condition at the time of destruction; the Board of Trade considered the circumstances in the case similar to a forced sale and comparable to a case of collision. As was customary, something over the actual value should be allowed the owners, and the Board fixed this at 25 per cent. to be added to the estimate of the expert surveyors; on the amounts determined in the categories given above, interest at 5 per cent. was to be paid, those sums being considered as unemployed capital. Other items presented by the British Government and paid by Germany included expenses to the seamen for consular certificates, claims for loss of employment and personal effects, and the expense of transporting the crews to their homes.

Just what the "liberal chartering rates" to be paid to Holland will be, are yet undetermined. The suggestion of Bismarck in 1871, that if Prussia and Great Britain could not agree on a fair amount, it should be submitted to an arbitrator, is a sound one. The rights of two or more states are involved, and the fact that international law gives one state the privilege of exercising the right of angary, does not justify that state in proceeding unilaterally and arbitrarily to fix the compensation which it undertakes to make by the exercise