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did not stop all war measures within twelve hours, German mobilization would follow. The threat was of mobilization, not war, but the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was, instructed, if no satisfactory reply were received, to declare war at five P. M., August 1, and at 7.10 P. M. that day it was declared. Speaking, June 8, 1918, on the thirtieth anniversary of his accession, the Kaiser said that while his people did not know at first what the war meant, that he knew very well that it was a world struggle between the Prussian-German-Germanic world conception and the Anglo-Saxon conception.
Dr. Hill finds the outcome was but “the morally inevitable culmination of the ambitions, the fantasies and the impetuosity of Kaiser William II, unrestrained by a responsible government.”
“He promised them gain and glory. He has covered them with sackcloth and ashes,” says Dr. Hill. He finds the claim of “Encirclement" made by Germany wholly unreal, either in a military or a commercial sense, German ships on every sea, their goods in every market and Great Britain their best customer. He finds the secret of the Kaiser's course merely in a dynastic ambition that all Germans should continue his taxpayers, his soldiers, his subjects. “Therefore, other peoples must be annexed to the German Empire in order that Germans may remain German subjects.”
That the whole was merely a predatory adventure, in the spoils of which only a few participated; that the people as a whole do not profit by it; that the Kaiser did not will this war, but a swift, short victorious war which should secure large indemnities, add coveted territories and make Germany master on the continent, preparatory to another like war for supremacy at sea ; that Germany fought what she called a defensive war “on the soil of ten other nations."
Dr. Hill sustains his conclusions by full and exact references to official documents and the most accepted of German writers. He adds at the close some thirty-five pages of illustrative documents, and an index of six pages closes the book.
This writer has found these Impressions intensely interesting, an impressive and convincing work, informed by earnest feeling and shaped by not only the most careful scholarship, but by the author's personal acquaintance with Germany and her leaders.
Any reader must hope that by some happy circumstance the country may be able to avail itself of Dr. Hill's erudition, experience, justice and sound common sense in the settlement of its international relations now so vastly complicated and important. His equipment for such a task is obvious and preëminent and his vigor and zeal unabated. There is no more serious impeachment of party government than that it excludes such a citizen from the service of his country, in a time of need, in helping to solve questions as to which he is perhaps the best informed American.
CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY. The Economic Causes of War. By Achille Loria, of the University of
Turin. Translated by John Leslie Garner. Chicago: Charles H.
This work is a multum in parvo of historical erudition and economic insight. Its eminent author has put into one hundred and eighty-two pages a philosophy of war and peace based on history and the overwhelming object lesson of the present war. As he tells us, the occasions for international quarrels multiply with the relations which civilization creates and, as a part of this evolution, international law develops, treaties multiply and the incentives for disregarding both law and treaties increase in like proportion till wars result. All this is largely under the pressure of economic motives. Foreign trade has been one dominant factor from primitive times to the present day. It is both a source of wealth and a breeder of wars. Professor Loria distinguishes sources of wealth as “physiological” and “pathological”—the former being in evidence where wealth is acquired by production and the latter where it is gained by some form of “grab,” simple or complex. As population grows, the seizure of land becomes a prominent means of acquiring—and losing—wealth, though, as the author thinks, it may have been a less prominent one in actual history than it has been made to be in traditional assumptions. Opportunity for traffic has more often figured as the bone of contention.
Professor Loria shows by examples that while international laws increase with material civilization, the motives for disregarding them grow also, and there is a perpetual struggle between that which restrains from war and that which provokes it, and that wars are, ever and anon, occurring as the latter influences become the stronger. Commerce and the resulting motives for war, necessity for law, violations of law, warfare—such is the series perpetually illustrated in the history of any long period.
Science doubtless gains by reason of the fact that advocates of an important principle often run to over-statement, especially during
the period when the principle is making its way toward general recognition, and the value of the present little work is not lessened by such statements as the following:
The Crusaders' sole motive was the increase of revenues of feudal lords at the expense of the revenues of Syrian and oriental lords ;
The change in military art which took place in the early modern period was caused by the decline of the power of the feudal element as compared with that of the bourgeoisie;
Holland's struggle for independence against Spain was in reality simply a privateering war on the Spanish merchant marine and the Hispaño-American colonial trade. The war of England against Napoleon was merely a reaction against the Napoleonic conquests which threatened Britain's commerce;
The Chinese war was undertaken to impede the progress of the United States. The Spanish war was merely the result of the decline in the profits of the American sugar manufacturers. The war in the Transvaal was the work of financiers and speculators in gold mines, who expected to reap great profits from a military adventure in South Africa, etc.?
In general, the work gives too much color to the belief that in modern times wars are frequently, if not generally, brought about by financial interests and, rather than otherwise, against the will of governments and peoples.
A passage in the work throws light on the basis of the so-called “Balance of Power”—a subject which in current discussion is seldom treated with much intelligence. Even in the small compass of this volume there is enough to show that the comparative fighting strength of different nations or groups of nations is necessarily an element affecting the probability of maintaining peace. Among the merits of the work is to be counted its treatment of the relation between labor movements and warfare and its discussion both of the analogy and the marked difference between arbitration of labor disputes and arbitration of international quarrels. Labor movements, which play so conspicuous a part in all modern life, have much to do with international relations, and a democracy which connects itself in spirit and in practice with labor movements is, in the main, a discourager of warfare. These principles are presented clearly and have as much illustration as the size of the work permits.
JOHN BATES CLARK. 1 Page 60 et seq. The italics are mine.
The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century. Edited by
Sir Augustus Oakes, C. B., lately of the Foreign Office, and R. B. Mowat, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; with an Introduction by Sir H. Earle Richards, K.C.S.I., K.C., B.C.L., M.A., Fellow of All Souls College and Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy in the University of Oxford, Associate of the Institute of International Law. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1918, pp. xii, 403. $3.40
This book may be described as a Hertslet in miniature—no small praise, indeed, for the monumental Map of Europe by Treaty is the indispensable starting-point for all who seek to know of the territorial changes in Europe during the past century. The authors give the texts of the principal political treaties, beginning with that of Vienna, to that of Bucharest, more than a score in all, nearly all of them as given by Hertslet. Documents other than treaties are also given, e. g., the Constitution of the German Empire and the Anglo-Belgian military conversations of 1906. The treaties and conventions are arranged under the following topics:“The Restoration of Europe," "The Independence of Greece," "The Kingdom of Belgium, Turkey and the Powers of Europe," "The Danish Duchies," "The Union of Italy, Austria and Prussia,” “The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," "The Franco-Prussian War," "Turkey, Russia and the Balkan States," and “The Triple Alliance.” In an appendix appears "The Treaty of San Stefano.” It will thus be observed that the purely law-making treaties have been omitted. Under each topic is a succinct, careful, and uniformly temperate account of the diplomacy leading up to and following each treaty. Prefixed to the whole is an excellent chapter on the conclusion of treaties.
The atmosphere of the book is throughout one of dependability. The proof has been carefully read and few errors are observable. The date of the founding of Odessa is given once (p. 102) as 1790, and again (p. 164) as 1794, the latter being correct. To state baldly that Luxemburg is bound by the Salic law (without noting the exception provided by the Nassau family arrangement of 1783) is confusing to the casual reader, who might find it difficult to account for the tenure of the present and previous grand duchesses. To say (p. 247) that “Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel threw in their lot with Austria” in 1866 is, of course, literally correct, especially in view of King George's protestations of neutrality, but the
statement leaves one in the dark as to Hanover and Nassau, titles to which Prussia successfully maintained as founded upon conquest. The narrative might also have been made more clear as to the attitude of Great Britain upon the question of the Danish Duchies following Earl Russell's circular of 1865, to the effect that by the Convention of Gastein “the dominion of Force is the sole power acknowledged and regarded.” Russell's earlier fortiter in modo and suaviter in re toward Russia no doubt led Bismarck rightly to believe that Great Britain would not actively interfere against the schemes of Prussia by which were laid the foundations of German sea-power.
Considering the compression and self-restraint of the narrative and the generally excellent choice of treaties presented, one will hardly cavil at omissions, but surely the book would not have been unduly extended had it included the Treaty of Lausanne of 1912. To have clauses III, IV, and VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty as renewed in 1903 (the text appeared in the London Times for June 1, 1915) is, however, some compensation. There are ten full-page maps to illustrate the text.
In his introduction, Professor Richards elaborates the general proposition that treaties are terminated by war. The exceptions, however, are so numerous that the statement of the so-called general rule avails little. Many will share with Professor Richards his dislike of the terms transitory and dispositive as applied to treaties, yet not all lawyers will agree that the suggested substitute (executed treaties) is quite synonymous with the former adjectives.
The aim of the authors “to present an historical summary of the international position at the time of each treaty; to state the points at issue and the contentions of the parties, and so to make readily accessible the materials on which international lawyers have to work,” has been successfully achieved notwithstanding the limitations of space. The result is an extremely useful and reliable book.
J. S. REEVES
The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By Coleman Phil
lipson and Noel Buxton. London: Stevens & Haynes. 1917, pp. 264. 12/6.
World politics is fast becoming a fascinating study to every wideawake man of today. Questions of which he had never heard and places which formerly seemed as remote as the moon, are now the daily