ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT

ARTICLE 1.—This article, treating of the repatriation of valid prisoners of war through the medium of exchange, is a combination of the ideas contained in the original German Article 1, and our original Article 1 of Section XVI. In its final form it represents the result of a great deal of discussion, study, and consideration. On the theory that the principal object of holding prisoners of war is to deprive their own state of origin of their services, our commission proposed in our original Section XX the internment in a neutral country of all officers, whether valid or invalid, as soon as practicable after their capture. We did not include the enlisted ranks and grades for the reason that the number of officers taken would be relatively small, and, looking forward to the possibility of large numbers of captives, the practical question for the neutral country or countries would be a very grave one in caring for so grand a total of internés; on this account we restricted the provisions of this section to officers. Imagine our surprise to hear from the German side of the table a most suave and apparently heartfelt objection to this undemocratic (!) discrimination on our part between officers and enlisted men, prisoners of war; a statement to the effect that the German delegation, bearing in mind the conspicuous consideration that the German military authorities had always entertained and exhibited for their men in the ranks, could not face their people at home should they agree to so gross a distinction in the treatment of unfortunate captives! Having thus had the lesson of true democracy read to us, we withdrew the whole section from consideration.

ARTICLE 2. This article was adopted in order to cover those German prisoners of war in our hands who had been in virtual captivity, either as interned belligerents or as prisoners of war, for more than three years. It was thought to be only just and considerate to arrange for their repatriation; and in the deal we provided for exchange with a corresponding number of American prisoners of war, whether these latter had been in captivity a year or a month. Under this provision the surplus of "trading stock" in our possession assured the speedy return of all American prisoners of war in Germany.

ARTICLE 3. In all of the discussions relating to prisoners of war there was a tendency to show especial consideration for captives of or beyond middle age. Both the French-German and the British-German agreements put them in a special class; and it was our own opinion, strengthened by information received from various sources, that the hardships of captivity bore more heavily upon men of forty years of age and upward than upon those of fewer years. The original proposition took into account also the question of the headship of families. and the number of children in such families. We, however, counterproposed, and the Germans apparently gladly accepted, the provision in relation to age only and without regard to the question of family responsibilities. This feature invested it with greater liberality.

ARTICLES 4-5.-These articles refer directly to the annex defining invalidism. This particular annex, as adopted, is a new edition, modified and improved through the experience of the Swiss medical officers who have had to administer it, of a similar annex included in the British-German and French-German agreements.

ARTICLES 6-15.-These articles provide for the formation and administration of Medical Traveling Commissions and Commissions of Control, with definition of their duties and prerogatives; they are all explanatory, enacting and amplifying in considerable detail the steps to be taken, not only for the determination of the fact of invalidism, but also the disposition to be made in accordance with the recommendations of the above mentioned commissions. Our delegation felt very strongly that the functions of these medical commissions, including their rights and privileges as well as their duties and obligations, should be definitely laid down in the agreement in order that should there ever arise on the part of either signatory any indisposition to permit these commissions to perform their full duty, the terms of the accord would be so positive that such indisposition could not be properly entertained.

Right here is an illuminating side-light on an important provision contained in Article 12, which stipulates that certain arrangements must be made to forward the work of the medical commissions within the limits of military barred zones. In relation to the activities of the medical traveling commissions, the German delegation in subcom

mittee vigorously objected to any provision authorizing such commissions to visit prisoners of war held within the areas termed "zone of operations" and "line of communications." We, on the other hand, were insistent that such visits should be provided for in terms clear and unmistakable; for we were in possession of positive information to the effect that thousands of Entente prisoners of war were held by the Germans in these barred areas, who never had had and, unless (in the case of American prisoners of war) we should provide specifically therefor, never would have, the benefit of inspection by a traveling commission; and that the lot of prisoners so situated was in general a sad and hopeless one, without the security of neutral inspection, and that they were therefore subject to the grossest abuse. We asked the German delegation to define operationsgebiet and atappengebiet. They replied that these terms did not lend themselves to exact definition, since the areas they described changed from day to day, indeed with every change in the territorial military situation. In vain we argued the matter with them, reminding them that our joint agreement would be in every particular reciprocal, giving them the corresponding right of medical inspection within our zone of operations and line of communications to that which we would have in theirs. But they were obstinate. They could not and they would not. Then we put it to them straight, and this was it: that owing to the unusual and peculiar location of the military forces of the United States, they being in neither American nor German, but in French territory, our zone of operations must necessarily be defined as covering the whole of France, our line of communications as reaching to the French littoral, or even transatlantic; thus, under their own proposed restrictions no German prisoners of war held by the American military forces in France could enjoy the privilege of medical inspection by a traveling commission. The light dawned upon them; they saw the point; they smiled; they even laughed (at themselves for what they had almost self-imposed).

Some days later they accepted Article 12 without demur. ARTICLE 16.-Originally Article 16 was Section XIX of our proposal. It prohibited exchange, repatriation, or internment in a neutral country, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace, of the officers

and crews of submarines taken prisoners of war; it held them in a separate and distinct, but otherwisely not unfavorable, category from other prisoners of war. This section nearly "broke up the meeting." The German delegation took the stand that the officers and crews of submarine vessels should not and could not be treated by their own Government as in any other category than other members of the governmental armed forces; that they were only carrying out authorized orders and instructions in the performance of their duty; and that the German Government would not admit that they were deserving of any discriminatory treatment as prisoners of war. We on our side were just as positive that the actual operations of the German submarines were such in character as to place their personnel, when captured, in a special class, and therefore, while we for the time being held them in an equal condition with other prisoners of war, we could not see our way clear to enter into any agreement which would permit the return to Germany of any captured submarine personnel prior to the final conclusion of peace. In this view we were in large measure actuated by the knowledge that Germany was much in need of trained submarine personnel, and by the further knowledge that in the British-German agreement at The Hague, 14 July, 1918, never as yet ratified, there had been inserted at different parts of the agreement two articles on this subject as to the meaning of which the two contracting parties were at the present time absolutely at odds.

The deadlock came in the course of a meeting of the subcommittee. The German subcommittee announced that under instructions they could not proceed further in the consideration of the proposals, and that unless our Section XIX should be withdrawn, negotiations on their part must come to an end. Inasmuch as we had neither any intention to give way on this point, nor indeed did our subcommittee have any authority to do so, there was nothing else left to do but to adjourn.

At this stage of the proceedings it looked very much as if the whole Conference might come to naught; but the tact of M. Dinichert, supported somewhat, it may be, by the real underlying desire of the German delegation to reach the all-important question of German civilians interned in the United States, brought about a special and

informal meeting of delegates from the two commissions on the following day, at the conclusion of which the German delegation signified its willingness to continue the negotiations. That delegation, however, represented very strongly that it would be a most difficult matter for them to accept as an integral article of the agreement such a provision as we proposed, especially since it was the mutual intention to publish in each prisoner of war camp a sufficient number of copies of the agreement to keep all prisoners of war informed of its provisions. They contended that such an article, so published, its features being widely known, would exert a most undesirable influence if not a disastrous effect upon the morale of their armed forces. As a matter of fact this was no new conception to us who, at least in our own mind, had already concluded in advance that the publication of this article would most probably have such an effect.

In order to relieve the tense situation the "submarine article," as it came to be known, was permitted to slumber quietly for some days thereafter, and the subcommittee proceeded with its work very much as if nothing had happened to disturb the even tenor of its way. The terms of the "submarine article" were softened somewhat and, after presumably having been submitted to the Berlin Government, it was, near the close of the Conference, adopted in the form in which it appears as Article 16 of the final agreement. In its accepted terms, Article 16 concedes that which was denied in its original form, namely, the internment of submarine personnel in a neutral country. It, however, specifically states that there shall be no repatriation of such prisoners of war until the conclusion of peace. This restriction really accomplishes practically all that we set out to obtain in the first instance; for it denies to the government the services of its trained submarine complements through the process of repatriation.

In connection with the discussion of this article, there should be borne in mind that which apparently escaped our enemy associates often while at the council table, the fact that this entire agreement is entirely and expressly reciprocal and, therefore, should any of our submarines be captured by the Germans, their crews would be subject to exactly the same restrictions and conditions as the crews of German submarines in our hands. The fact is that very often in the course of